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ABSTRACT
This study examines the development of modem campaign finance reform
legislation and analyzes some of the major proposals for continued reform.
Arguments both for and against various proposals for campaign finance reform have
been advanced in the continuing debate. This study examines key elements of the
major reform proposals which have continuously resurfaced in that debate.
Out of the campaign finance discussion certain central issues emerge, each of
which is empirically examined in this study. Those issues are: (1) Whether or not to
impose expenditure ceilings on all congressional campaigns, (2) Whether or not
further restrictions, or an outright ban, on political action committees is warranted
from a finding of "undue influence" on the electoral and legislative processes, and,
(3) Whether the present system of private campaign finance ought to be replaced with
a system of public financing for federal campaigns. This investigation explores the
rationale behind each of these refonn proposals in order to determine whether
adoption is warranted.
In the case of spending ceilings, a regression analysis of expenditure data and
election results for U.S. Senate races from 1988 through 1994 reveals that such
ceilings may not accomplish their stated goal of increasing electoral competition. In
as much as the regression study reveals a statistically significant positive relationship
between a challenger's spending total and his/her eventual share of the vote, any
proposal to amend the current private finance system which would detrimentally
affect what challengers could spend might well reduce competitiveness. However,
this thesis ultimately argues that such a result would not necessarily occur in a system
of full public financing with concurrent expenditure limits.
vii

As for proposals to further limit or ban political action committees, the rationale of
PAC "undue influence" is examined with respect to both election results and
legislative decisions. A correlation analysis (Pearson's R) of PAC donations and
election results for 1992 and 1994 House races demonstrates a moderate linear
association between PAC dollars and vote percentages yet not at a level high enough
to support a charge of "undue influence." A regression analysis confirms that
conclusion.
PAC donations and their effect on floor votes are analyzed with respect to two
1994 Senate votes. Crosstabs reveals no statistically significant relationship between
a member's PAC donation totals and his/her floor vote on two 1994 Senate cloture
motions. Other factors (i.e. party) are seen to be much more important determinants
of those votes. However, many empirical studies have demonstrated a statistically
significant relationship between PAC monies and votes on less visible, less
controversial votes. Additionally, much empirical evidence is cited illustrative of the
"unequal access" of wealthy PAC interests to the democratic electoral and policy
processes.
It is argued that this inequality of access, precipitated and fostered by the current
system of private campaign finance, is contrary to the constitutional and practical
criteria by which any system of campaign finance ought to be judged. The current
system of private campaign finance should, therefore, be replaced with a system
which can be judged by those same criteria to be more desirable. Full public
financing for all congressional campaigns is such a system.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform has been an issue which has received a great deal of
both political and scholarly attention since the beginning of the 1970's "decade of
campaign reform." The regulatory system of private campaign finance established by
law in 1971, with adoption of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), has seen
several modifications and has faced numerous proposed revisions since its enactment.
Politicians of both parties, political scientists and other academicians, as well as
citizen action groups like Common Cause and Public Citizen, have advocated
changes in the law ranging from imposition of spending ceilings for congressional
campaigns, to a further restriction on the amounts which can be donated to federal
candidates by both individuals and organized political committees (PACs), to an
extension of public financing for all congressional campaigns. Often the more
comprehensive reform proposals have embodied variations of all of these singular
proposals in a more complete "plan" of reform. While early revisions of the initial
1971 FECA met with considerable success, latter day reform proposals have been
conspicuous for their lack of success.
The issues involved in campaign finance reform are issues of importance for
Americans in general, and for political scientists in particular, because they go to the
heart of participatory democracy. The impact of private funding sources on both
electoral and public policy processes is of concern because of the inequalities of
private wealth in our capitalist economy. Charges of the "undue influence" or
"unequal access" of wealthy individuals and interest groups (the primary sources of
1
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campaign funds in the current system of campaign finance) in affecting the processes
of our democratic republic have provided the rationale behind most reform proposals.
Indeed, it was the legitimacy of such concerns proven by the revelations of campaign
finance improprieties connected to the Watergate scandal that fueled much of the
1970's drive for reform.
Public cynicism toward, and alienation from, both electoral participation and
participation in the development of public policy is reflected in various polls and
surveys. Such cynicism reflects a growing perception of, and resentment toward,
wealthy "special interests" which are seen to dominate both elections and public
policy. The extent to which this perception can be empirically verified has occupied
a good deal of scholarly study.
Reformers have seized upon this expanding attitude of public cynicism for the
participatory processes of our polity as "proof' that the current system of private
campaign finance is in dire need of comprehensive reform in order that public
efficacy and governmental legitimacy can be restored, or, at least, revived. Proposals
are usually touted as "cures" for what ails the present system, and for what ails the
electorate.
Asserting that wealthy individuals and interest groups have gained effective
control over the electoral and policy processes, through their "undue influence" and
"unequal access", calls for comprehensive reform have come from many quarters.
Virtually every President and every Congress since 1970 has had to deal with the
questions of campaign finance reform. The most recent plan of comprehensive
reform was introduced in 1993.
On May 7, 1993, at a White House lawn ceremonial announcement, President Bill
Clinton and Democratic congressional leaders unveiled the latest in a long litany of
plans to revamp federal campaign finance laws. The fruits of many months of
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negotiations and hours of political calculations were borne out in a bill which
centered on voluntary spending limits in congressional campaigns and the provision
of public funding to induce compliance with such limits. Additionally, the bill
proposed that limits on amounts of contributions from political action committees
(PACs) be tightened, as well as new restrictions on "soft-money" spending by the
national parties. The amount of public funds which are currently made available to
major-party presidential nominees, under the provisions of the 1971 Federal Election
Campaign Act and its subsequent amendments of 1974, 1976, and 1979, was to be
increased, according to the proposal, by $11 million for each nominee1 ostensibly for
the replacement of soft money funded party activities.
The price tag of such a plan was estimated by White Flouse officials at $150
million per election cycle. It was expected that the price for public funding of federal
congressional campaigns would be a major source of criticism of any campaign
finance reform efforts involving the use of taxpayer money to finance political
campaigns. Accordingly, President Clinton announced his intent to tax lobbying
expenses in order to pay for the public funding provisions of the new legislation.
"Lobbyists, not the American people," would pick up the tab, said Clinton in
announcing the White House plan.2
Major elements of the Clinton Plan included the following:
•

Spending limits for Senate general elections would range from $1.2 million to
$5.5 million, depending on state populations and would be indexed for inflation
after 1996. (Campaigns in states with larger populations would have the higher
limits, up to $5.5 million) House limits were set at $600,000 for the general

1 Beth Donovan, "Clinton Offers Details of Plan; Big Test is GOP Senate Unity",
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. May 8, 1993, v.51, n.19, p.l 121(2).
2 President Clinton quoted in Donovan, p.l 121.
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election (with one-third of that amount to come from federal public funds, onethird from individual contributions greater than $200, and one third from PACs)
but were indexed for inflation from 1992 forward, such that, at the time of the
announcement, the actual ceiling for House races was nearly $700,000 (with
inflation running at a 3% rate). These limits could increase if any candidate were
to face an opponent who chose not to abide by the limits and exceeded them,
became the focus of substantial opposition independent expenditures, or (in the
case of House members only) wins a hotly contested primary. Spending on legal
and accounting fees in order to comply with the law, and some limited fund
raising expenses, were exempt from inclusion under the caps.
•

Vouchers for candidates who complied with the spending ceilings could be used
to purchase media advertising, or for printing and postage costs. Senate
candidates would receive vouchers in amounts up to 25 percent of their spending
limit. Broadcasters would be required, under the law, to sell discounted
advertising time to all qualifying Senate candidates. House candidates would be
entitled to vouchers worth up to 33 percent of the legal spending limit to pay for
advertising costs.

•

PAC contributions for all federal candidates would be further restricted under
the plan. Presidential candidates could receive only $1,000 from any one PAC
while Senate hopefuls could get up to $2,500 for each primary and general
election campaign ($5,000 in any single election cycle). House candidates could
take up to $5,000 from any single PAC for each election in a given cycle. PAC
contributions for candidates in compliance with spending limits, could not total
more than 33 percent of the House expenditure ceiling. Senate PAC contributions
would be limited to no more than 20 percent of the legal spending limit.
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•

Small donor contributions (those under $200 for House campaigns, and $250 for
Senate races) would have to comprise at least two-thirds of a House candidate's
expenditures under the limit. Senate candidates would have to raise 20 percent of
their indexed limit in small contributions in order to receive public funds and
vouchers.

•

Lobbyists' contributions would be prohibited to any member of Congress from
anyone who lobbied that particular member, or an aide, over the previous year.
Those same lobbyists could, however, make donations to party committees.

•

"Soft money" expenditures3 by state and national parties to influence federal
elections would be prohibited under the new legislation. Instead, the plan would
establish an increased threshold of individual donations to political parties from
$50,000 to $60,000, and create new choices for those contributors. Under the
proposal, (and within the overall legal limit) an individual could give up to
$25,000 per year to federal candidates, $20,000 to a national party, and $20,000
to newly envisioned state party grass-roots funds. These grass-roots funds would
be used by state parties to generate generic media spots and to coordinate party
candidate campaigns.
Presidential nominees would receive the additional $11 million in order to
replace the use of soft money for grass-roots party activities.

•

Bundling (the practice of wrapping together the contributions of many individual
donors and donating them as a single contribution by a PAC, union, corporation,
or lobbyist) would be forbidden. There is some leeway in the Plan to accept the

3 "Soft money" refers to funds raised from various sources which are not subject to
the restraints of federal law and are spent on state and local party-building, get-outthe-vote, and voter registration activities not directly tied to a particular campaign but
intended to affect federal elections.
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possibility of allowing PACs which don't engage in congressional lobbying
activities to continue to bundle contributions. 4
•

The price-tag for such a proposal, according to the Congressional Budget Office,
is estimated at approximately $150 million for the first election (1996). Others
had set the cost higher - approaching $200 million. The President's plan was to be
financed by an increase in the amount of the taxpayer checkoff for federal
elections currently in place from $1 to $5. Also, funds would be generated and
earmarked for federal campaign financing through an end to the exemption for
lobbying expenses. White House estimates indicated that the higher checkoff
amount would generate $150 million per year (at current participation rates).
Because the publicly funded presidential campaign requires nearly half that
amount, additional revenue is needed to extend public funding to all
congressional races. In order that that might be accomplished, the change in tax
law ending the lobby exemption was expected to yield some $978 million in new
revenues over five years.
That Clinton's plan met its demise in the 103rd Congress is not surprising given

the volatility of the issues revolving around campaign finance reform efforts. The
political calculations which went into the provisions of the plan and were involved in
its defeat have been evidenced in the debate about campaign finance reform since the
passage of the comprehensive Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).
Concerns over the skyrocketing costs of federal campaigns and the implications of

4 This is seen to be a concession to House Democrats who wish to retain the
possibility of such groups as EMILY's List, to continue bundling individual
contributions. The President believes that EMILY's List, and others like it can
continue to operate under the law by sending out information and envelopes to
members who would then send their contributions directly to campaigns. See
Donovan, p. 1122.
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those high costs in terms of the accountability of elected public officials, preceded
even that Act, and have continued in its wake.
The explosive growth of political action committees (PACs) as major providers of
the increasingly greater campaign funding needs of federal candidates has occurred
since FECA's enactment. As PACs have acquired their role as important players in
federal campaign finance, charges of "undue influence" and enhanced accessibility,
as well as quid pro quo "vote buying" have been leveled against them. Calls for
reform have included demands that PAC contributions be regulated even more than
they currently are under FECA. Proposals to limit PAC contributions to a given
campaign, either individually (a set limit per PAC), or in the aggregate (as a
percentage of total campaign funds), have been made nearly continuously over the
two decades since FECA.
Concerns over the high costs of federal campaigns for public office have
precipitated demands on the part of citizen's groups (Common Cause, among others)
and politicians of both parties that spending for such campaigns be capped at
appropriate levels in order that competition can be enhanced. The exorbitant costs of
today's campaigns have led many to believe that only the wealthy, or those with
access to wealthy contributory sources, can run for federal office. The present system
of campaign finance has been accused of enhancing the inequities of access to the
policy process wherein only those wealthy individuals or groups with sufficient
economic resources are able to gain access to the policy process. In possessing the
means by which to make substantial contributions to the election coffers of
incumbent and would-be legislators, wealthy groups and individuals are afforded
greater access. Concerns about the amount of time taken by elected public officials
to focus on campaign financial matters, rather than the public business, run
concomitant with rising campaign costs. As such, many qualified individuals have
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opted out of running for office and many of those who currently serve, or have
served, find themselves overwhelmed with concentrating on fund-raising activities
over constituent concerns or other more important public business.
Loopholes in the law and the unintended consequences of FECA's implementation
caused many to advocate new reforms designed to alleviate concerns over the manner
in which federal campaigns are financed. Many of the most frequently advocated
reforms include some imposition of spending limits and some design of public
financing for federal election campaigns. Also, they tend to include provisions for
either eliminating the role of political action committees as sources of significant
amounts of congressional campaign finances, or, at least, further restricting the
individual or aggregate amounts which those PACs can give to campaigns. It is the
intention of this paper to analyze each of these reform proposals, spending ceilings,
public financing, and the role of political action committees in congressional
elections, in order to arrive at a conclusion about the desirability of their adoption.
But, before examining the merits of the various proposals for campaign finance
reform, and in order to understand the political climate which surrounded President
Clinton's reform legislation and its subsequent defeat, it is necessary to begin with an
examination of the original comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation of
1971, the Federal Election Campaign Act and the issues which surrounded its
adoption. From there, the history of modern campaign finance reform efforts5 will

5 For a history of late 19th and early 20th century campaign finance reform efforts as
well as a comprehensive treatment of the topic of campaign finance see Herbert
Alexander, Financing Politics: Money. Elections, & Political Reform. 4th ed.,
Washington, DC.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992. Issues, debate and provisions
of the 1971,1974, and 1976 FECA legislation are chronicled in "Campaign
Financing" in Politics in America. Washington, D C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
May 1979, p. 93-115. Another excellent synopsis of campaign finance history
including a yearly account of post-FECA campaign finance legislative efforts and the
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reveal the constancy of the issues involved (both political and practical) and the
commonality of various reform proposals offered over the years. The merits of major
proposals will be evaluated in light of statistical analyses of campaign finance data
collected and made available to the public by the Federal Election Commission (a
creation of FECA's 1976 amendments). Prospects for passage of meaningful,
comprehensive campaign finance reform will be evaluated in light of partisan
political positioning on the issues involved and the likelihood of voter approval. No
proposal, despite its merits, is worth much if it is not politically feasible.

political machinations surrounding the various proposals actually introduced as
congressional bills, can be found in Congress and the Nation, particularly Vol.5
1977-1980, pp.943-953, Vol.7 1985-1988, pp.892-896 and Vol.8 1989-1992, pp.951963, Washington D C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981, 1989, and 1993.

CHAPTER TWO
THE 1970s
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
Immediately preceding passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Congress, on December 8, 1971, approved legislation establishing a federal fund to
finance presidential election campaigns. Initially adopted as a non-germane Senate
amendment to the Revenue Act of 1971, the funding plan required Congress to
annually appropriate to the fund money designated by federal taxpayers as
contributions to the presidential campaign fund. The plan was to go into effect with
the 1976 presidential race. Taxpaying citizens first had the opportunity to participate
in the plan with the filing of their 1972 federal income tax returns. Participation was
voluntary, through the optional designation of $1 of an individual's federal annual
income tax payment to be used by the presidential nominee of the eligible political
party of choice or to go into the general campaign fund to be divided among all
eligible presidential candidates.
Debate in Congress over the legislation split largely along partisan lines with
Democrats arguing in favor of the bill and Republicans in opposition. The
Democrats, whose party had amassed substantial debt (some $9 million) following
the 1968 presidential election, argued that the proposed tax checkoff plan was
necessary to open up the avenues of participation in presidential campaign finance to
thousands of small contributors and to free presidential candidates from reliance on,
and obligation to, wealthy "fat cat" contributors.
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Republicans, whose party treasury was in much better shape, countered that the
public funding scheme outlined in the legislation would inject the government
bureaucracy into the business of political campaigns and was merely a device to bail
the Democratic party out of its financial doldrums. Republicans also feared that the
plan would help to insure the third party candidacy of George Wallace by providing
crucial public funds for his campaign. A Wallace candidacy was seen as threatening
President Nixon's reelection chances. President Nixon threatened to veto the bill
unless its applicability were delayed until after the 1972 presidential election.
With the threat of a presidential veto hanging in the balance, Democrats accepted
the Republican proposal to delay the application of the legislation, as President Nixon
had demanded, and passage of the new presidential campaign finance law was
assured.
Officially titled the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, the law included
these major campaign financing provisions:6
•

Tax credits of $12.50 (or $25.00 for a married couple) for political contributions
to candidates for local, state, or federal office were enacted. Taxpayers could
choose the alternative of a $50 deduction against income ($100 for married
couples filing jointly) rather than the tax credit. These credits and deductions
were designed to stimulate individual participation in the financing of political
campaigns and were passed with the idea that fostering participation in the
political process, even if only in the form of small individual donations, was
consistent with democratic values and would lead to greater public interest in
political campaigns at all levels.

6 PL 92-178, The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 1971.
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•

The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Income Tax Checkoff allowed
federal income taxpayers to designate on their 1972 returns $1 to go towards
either the presidential campaign of the party of their choice or to a general fund to
be divided among all eligible presidential campaigns. Participation was strictly
voluntary and was to be redesignated with each yearly income tax filing after
1972.

•

Authorization was granted for the Congress to distribute to the candidates of
each major party (defined as one which received 25 percent of the votes cast in
the last presidential election) amounts equal to 15 cents times the number of U.S.
citizens age 18 or older. Congress also established a formula for the distribution
of some public funds to minor parties whose presidential candidates had garnered
5 percent or more, but less than 25 percent, of the votes cast in the immediately
preceding presidential election. Payments could be made after an election to
reimburse new parties whose presidential candidates had received enough votes
to meet the threshold for eligibility, or to established minor parties whose
candidates received sufficient votes in the election to qualify.

•

Public financing of the presidential election campaigns of major party candidates
was to be voluntarily opted for by the candidates. Candidates who chose public
financing were prohibited from accepting private campaign contributions unless
their share of public funds fell below amounts to which they were entitled under
the allocation formula. This scenario might occur if contributions to the
Presidential Campaign Fund via the tax checkoff procedure fell short of the
necessary level of participation needed to insure adequate funds to finance
campaigns at 15 cents per voting age U.S. citizen.

•

Spending limits for all presidential candidates who participated in the public
financing plan would be imposed under the law. Major party candidates, and all

13

campaign committees authorized by a candidate to work on his/her behalf, who
opted for public campaign funds were prohibited from spending more than the
amount to which the campaign was entitled under the public funding formula.
•

Penalties of $5000, or one year in prison, or both, for any candidates participating
in the public funding plan, or committees operating on behalf of the candidate,
which spent more than the legally permissible amount or which accepted private
contributions when adequate public funds were available, were sanctioned under
the law. Additionally, penalties were provided in the amounts of $10,000 or five
years in prison, or both, for any unauthorized use of public campaign funds by
candidates or their campaign committees. Any candidate who received or gave
kickbacks or illegal payments, or engaged in fraud of any kind using public funds,
or knowingly furnished false campaign finance statements to the U.S.
Comptroller General, was subject to these penalties.
The tax checkoff plan got off to a slow start as few taxpayers opted to participate

by designating the $1 payment to the presidential campaign fund. But, as more people
became aware of the fund, and as the IRS displayed the checkoff feature more
prominently on income tax forms, participation levels increased. The U.S. Internal
Revenue Service reported that 23.9 percent of 1974 tax forms authorized the $1
payment to the presidential fund. By July of 1976 some 25.9 percent of tabulated
1975 tax forms designated such payments.7
Despite the relative lack of public enthusiasm for the new checkoff procedure, the
presidential campaign fund grew at a steady pace. For the 1972 tax year, the fund
received $4 million. By 1973 the total had reached $26.2 million, $31.8 million for
1974, and $33.4 million for 1975. This meant that public funds available for
7 "Campaign Financing", Politics In America. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., May 1979, p.104.
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disbursement to eligible presidential candidates would total $95.4 million by the start
of the 1976 presidential campaign season.8 Reports made public by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) showed that disbursements in amounts totaling $24.1
million had been made to 15 presidential candidates and $3.9 million had been given
to the Democratic and Republican parties combined for expenses associated with
running their national nominating conventions. President Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter, as eligible major party nominees each received $21.8 million for their general
election campaigns. By January 1979, the presidential campaign fund had amassed
some $100.8 million in public funds.
The Federal Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971 and its establishment of the
income tax checkoff mechanism to gather public funds for the purpose of publicly
financing presidential campaigns was to usher in what has been called "the decade of
campaign finance reform." The 1970's were to witness passage of numerous pieces of
extensive campaign finance reform legislation.

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
By 1971 the climate was ripe for consideration of new laws designed to cope with
what were perceived to be outrageously high costs in federal political campaigns.
Campaign spending by both parties in 1968 and 1970 reached levels unfathomed in
earlier campaigns and a profusion of wealthy candidates in both parties made
spending itself an issue of significance in those campaigns.
Advocates of reform sought to write a bill which could gamer bi-partisan support
by constructing reforms which could not be seen as favoring any one party or
candidate. Once more, as was evidenced in the debate surrounding consideration of

8 Figures are from "Campaign Financing", p.104.
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the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Republicans were anxious to protect
their healthy party financial assets and Democrats were just as concerned about
protecting their large labor contributions. But, because of public calls for action by
constituents and the commitment of various citizen interest groups such as Common
Cause and the National Committee for an Effective Congress, bi-partisan support for
reform measures was effectuated.
Public Law 92-225, passed by the Congress in late December 1971 and officially
titled The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), placed limits on a candidate's
personal contributions to his/her own federal campaign, required public disclosure of
both receipts and expenses of those campaigns, and, for the first time, imposed some
expenditure limits on candidates for the U.S. House and Senate. The Act was the first
major election reform law enacted by the Congress of the United States since the
antiquated, and unenforced, Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.
FECA placed a maximum threshold on expenditures for media advertising by
candidates for President, Vice-President, the Senate, or the House of Representatives.
A spending ceiling of 10 cents per eligible voter, or $50,000, whichever was greater,
was imposed for all radio, television, newspaper, magazine, billboard, and automatic
telephone messaging.
Other key provisions of the law included:9
•

A contributions ceiling of $50,000 by any candidate for President or VicePresident (or his/her immediate family) to his/her own campaign was imposed.
Likewise, ceilings of $35,000 for senator and $25,000 for representative, were
established.

9 PL 92-225, The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
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•

Registration of all political committees which anticipated receipts in excess of
$1000 during any single calendar year was required under the law. Each
committee was obligated to file a statement of organization to include the names
of all principal officers, the scope of its operations, the names of all candidates it
supported, and any other information which might subsequently be requested
under the law. The appropriate supervisory offices which were designated to
receive such reports were the General Accounting Office for presidential
candidates' committees, the office of the secretary of the Senate for Senate
campaign committees, and the clerk of the House for committees working on
behalf of candidates to the House of Representatives.

•

Prohibition of patronage employment, or other rewards or benefits, in return for
political financial support was included in the language of the bill. Any contracts
between federal candidates and any government department or agency were
strictly forbidden.

•

Disclosure provisions required that each political committee, or individual
candidate, must report any single expenditure greater than $100 and any
expenditures which exceeded $100 in the aggregate over the course of the
calendar year. Contributions to those same committees, or to the candidates
themselves, in amounts exceeding $100 were required to be disclosed, to include
the names and addresses of individual contributors as well as the date the
donation was made. Names, addresses and occupations of any who made loans to
a candidate's campaign in amounts greater than $100 were to be included in these
disclosure reports. Any individual who contributed directly (other than through a
political committee) to a candidate for federal office an amount greater than
$100, was to report that contribution to the appropriate supervisory body. No
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contribution to a candidate by one person in the name of another person was
allowed.
•

Timeliness in meeting the disclosure mandates was of the essence. Reports of
contributions and expenditures were to be filed on the 10th of March, June and
September of every year. In addition, reports must be submitted on the 15th and
5th days immediately preceding an election day. Any contribution which
exceeded $5000 was to be reported within 48 hours of its receipt.
The presidential and congressional elections of 1972 were the first to be

conducted under the new FECA law. Despite the law's provisions and prohibitions to
correct what were seen to be abuses and problems inherent in previously unregulated
campaigns, many new loopholes arose, as a result of the FECA legislation of 1971,
which were revealed in the 1972 campaigns.
The "pass through" political contributions, which were to have been eliminated
under the prohibitions of such in FECA, continued through a loophole in the law
which allowed organizations such as social clubs which had not been established
solely, or even incidentally, to influence elections, to use some of their dues for
purposes of making contributions to candidates for public office. If such an
organization were to donate an amount exceeding $1000, it was required only to
report the amount and not the names of members who had paid the dues which were
eventually to wind up as political contributions.
The definition of the term "candidate" in the FECA was such that persons who had
not officially declared themselves as candidates for federal office, but who were for
all intents and purposes acting as candidates, could raise and spend money outside of
the spending ceiling for political advertising of 10 cents per eligible voter.
Essentially a non-declared candidate could spend unlimited amounts so long as he
remained officially "undeclared". As a result of this loophole, many candidates in
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1972 made a habit of running unannounced for a long period of time so as to build up
a war chest and to do groundwork advertising before actually becoming official
candidates.
A loophole not addressed in the 1971 FECA legislation concerned the federal gift
tax exemption given to political contributors of amounts under $3000 to a single
candidate. In 1972, many individuals made donations in amounts exceeding $3000 to
a single candidate and had still legally managed to avoid any federal gift tax on those
contributions by making more than one donation under the $3000 limit to numerous
political committees working on behalf of the same single candidate. The gift tax
only applied to single contributions of more than $3000 and not to aggregate amounts
to the same campaign.
While the FECA of 1971 did address the subject of loans made to candidate
campaigns, by requiring that loan amounts greater than $100 be disclosed along with
the names and addresses of those making the loans, it did not spell out how those
loans might be paid off. As a result there was nothing in the law to prevent complete
forgiveness of loan debt or a simple token payment sufficing as repayment. Reports
of loan termination subsequently made public would only note that outstanding loans
had been paid up and did not require that the sources of loans certify that the loans
had actually been paid in full. Consequently, many contributions of substantial
amounts were made as "loans" to federal campaigns in 1972.
Furthermore, although the FECA did contain a provision regulating the amounts
which a candidate, or immediate family members, could contribute to his/her own
campaign, the restrictions did not apply to relatives outside the immediate family.
Nor did it restrict family members, or the candidate, from legally contributing the
maximum allowable amount and, in addition, making a personal loan to the
campaign.
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What was perhaps the most serious flaw in the 1971 FECA, was its failure to
provide for a capable, independent monitoring and enforcing agency. The FECA had
designated the clerk of the House responsible for oversight in House races, the
secretary of the Senate was charged with overseeing Senate campaigns, and the GAO
was the agency responsible for presidential election campaigns. But, it was the U.S.
Department of Justice which was given the authority to prosecute violations which
were brought to its attention by the appropriate oversight bodies. The law required
that Justice commence prosecution in any civil case involving matters brought to its
attention with respect to violations of FECA, but whether or not to prosecute criminal
cases was wholly within the discretion of the Department of Justice. During the 1972
campaigns, Justice reported that it had only one full-time attorney supervising
enforcement of the FECA.10
Because the law required frequent periodic reporting of receipts and expenditures
throughout any given year, many campaigns were faced with monumental
bookkeeping tasks and increased costs associated with the increased complexity of
those accounting tasks. Paradoxically, the FECA's attempt to reduce campaign
spending by imposing ceilings on advertising expenses, and the imposition of stricter
contribution disclosure requirements, created a situation in which campaigns were
compelled to seek even greater contribution amounts in order to pay the increased
costs of those same disclosure requirements.
The flood of reports which inundated the congressional oversight offices of the
clerk of the House, the Senate secretary's office, and the comptroller general's GAO
office, made close and detailed scrutiny nearly impossible. Since the Congress would
not contemplate appropriation of substantial increased resources to those offices in

io »Campaign

Financing", p. 106.
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order to meet the increased oversight demands imposed on them under the law,
relatively little effective oversight ability could be exercised.

1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
Efforts to amend the 1971 FECA began immediately after the conclusion of the
1972 general election. The House in 1972 saw the introduction of an amendment bill
designed to repeal a provision of the 1971 legislation which prohibited campaign
contributions to federal candidates from corporations and labor unions which had
federal government contracts. Although that bill was passed by the House, the Senate
refused even to consider it. Conversely, legislation introduced and passed in the
Senate in early 1973 sought to further tighten federal laws on campaign financing but
were stymied by House inaction.
It was not until the Watergate revelations of financial impropriety in the 1972
Nixon reelection campaign surfaced in detail in mid-1973, that the impetus for
further campaign finance reform efforts really accelerated. Watergate became the
code word for what was wrong with current campaign finance law. John Gardner of
Common Cause, said of the scandal, "Watergate is not primarily a story of political
espionage, or even of White House intrigue. It is a particularly malodorous chapter in
the annals of campaign financing. The money paid to the Watergate conspirators
before the break-in - and the money passed to them later - was money from campaign
gifts."11 Watergate epitomized the need to readdress the issues of federal campaign
financing and to focus on the loopholes left open by the 1971 FECA. Congress, in
response to public outcry, and in reaction to the abuses of law made by the Nixon
reelection campaign, enacted a campaign reform bill of sweeping change in 1974. It

11 John Gardner quoted in, "Campaign Financing", p.93.
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was hoped that the new law would close existing loopholes and answer the
continuing questions surrounding the way in which federal campaigns were financed.
Technically, the 1974 legislation was enacted as a set of amendments to the 1971
FECA. It was, in fact, the single most comprehensive campaign finance legislation
ever before, or since, passed by the Congress. Signed into law on October 15, 1974
by President Gerald Ford, the new FECA 1Established the first spending limits ever
for candidates in the presidential primaries and the general election. It also instituted
spending limits for House and Senate primaries as well as replacing the ceilings
which were supposedly mandated by the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.
Those old limits had never been effectively enforced and had actually been repealed
in the 1971 version of FECA.
Although the 1974 bill contained explicit language regarding the use of public
funds to pay for presidential campaigns, by providing for optional public financing of
those campaigns and by allowing for coverage of up to 45 percent of presidential
primary campaigns by those same public funds, the final bill emerged from the
Congress without the Senate passed extension of partial public financing to
congressional campaigns. Major sections of the new bill (PL 93-443) included the
provisions for the establishment of specific contribution and expenditure limits. One
of the most significant provisions of the law in 1974 was the creation of an
independent enforcement agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to oversee
compliance with contribution and expenditure limits and disclosure and to distribute
allocated public funding.
Public Financing
With respect to its public financing provisions, the 1974 FECA included:12

12 PL 93-443, The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.
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•

Voluntary public financing for presidential general elections - Candidates of the
major parties would qualify for full public financing before the general election
campaign began. Candidates from minor third parties would become eligible for
proportional public financing based upon their party's past or current votes
received. (Funding based on current votes would be in the form of a
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the general election campaign.) If any
major party candidate opted for full public financing, no private contributions
from any individual or group would be permissible under the law.

•

Optional public financing would be available to the two major parties in order to
organize and manage their national nominating conventions. Third parties could
qualify for proportional public financing for purposes of holding a national
nominating convention, with the amount of such funding dependent on the
proportion of votes received in a past or current election.

•

Matching public funds of up to $5 million would become available for use by
presidential candidates in presidential primary contests providing they had met
the threshold fund-raising requirement of $100,000 raised in amounts of at least
$5,000 in each of at least twenty states. Equally important, only the first $250 of
private contributions from individuals would qualify for matching public funds.
Only private donations made after January 1 would qualify for matching and no
federal funds would be allocated before January 1 in the year of a presidential
election. These matching grants would be allocated as quickly as possible among
the competing candidates and the order in which the candidates qualified would
be taken into consideration. The incentive to gain an early competitive edge was
unmistakable. The allocation formula clearly favored front-running candidates.

•

The Presidential Election Campaign Fund was the source of all public funds
made available for public financing of all presidential election campaigns. Money
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which was deposited into the fund via the income tax checkoff procedure was
automatically appropriated for use in the public financing scheme.
Disclosure
Disclosure requirements were revamped in 1974 as a response to the problems
arising out of the reporting mandates established in the FECA of 1971. In an effort to
streamline and simplify those complex 1971 stipulations, the new bill required the
following:
•

One central campaign committee was to be established by each candidate
through which all contributions and expenses on behalf of that candidate must be
reported. In addition to this central committee, specific bank depositories for all
campaign funds were required to be designated and disclosed.

•

Full reports of contributions and expenditures were to be filed with the Federal
Election Commission 10 days before and 30 days after every primary or general
election. Reports must also be filed within 10 days of the close of each quarter
unless the committee received or spent less than $1000 in that particular quarter.
Comprehensive year end reports were due in all non-election years.

•

Contributions of $1000 or more which were received within the last 15 days
before a given election had to be reported to the FEC within 48 hours of their
receipt.

•

Loans to a candidate's campaign were to be considered the equivalent of
contributions and a cosigner or guarantor was required for each outstanding debt
in excess of $1000.

•

"Pass through" contributions made by individuals, or organizations, in the
name of another were expressly prohibited in the law.
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•

Any person who spent or contributed SI00 or more other than through a
political committee or a candidate must register and report such independent
activity under the law.
In what was to become one of the most significant and consequential provisions of

campaign finance reform efforts in the 1970s, the FECA amendments of 1974
permitted government contractors, unions, and corporations to form and maintain
separate, segregated political funds for the purpose of making contributions to federal
congressional campaigns. Prior to 1974, contributions by government contractors
were not allowed. In essence, the 1974 law sanctioned the formation of political
action committees (PACs) and extended legitimacy even to PACs formed and
maintained by organizations with a vested stake in legislative, as well as electoral,
outcomes.
Contribution Limits
The contributions limits established with the passage of the FECA of 1974 for
both individuals and PACs were as follows:
•

Individual contributions to a single candidate or that candidate's authorized
committee(s) could not exceed $1000 per election. Individuals were also limited
to a total aggregate contribution amount of $25,000 per year for all political
contributions, not just those which went directly to a single candidate's campaign.
In the 1974 law, there were no limits (other than the aggregate $25,000 limit)
placed on amounts which persons could donate to political parties or to any other
political committees (PACs) not directly related to a candidate's campaign.

•

Multi-candidate political committee13 contributions to a single candidate or
that candidate's authorized political committee(s) were limited to a total of $5000

13 A multi-candidate political committee was defined as one which meets the
following conditions: (1) has been registered under the act for six months, (2) has
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per election. Unlike the aggregate limits on individual giving, there were no such
limits, in the 1974 bill, on the amounts which any single political action
committee could donate to multiple candidates in any given year. Additionally,
PACs were not limited in the amounts which they could contribute to national
political party committees or to any other political committee.
•

Contributions from organizations or political committees not qualifying as
multi-candidate committees could not exceed $1000 per election. Again, there
were no limits on the amounts such organizations could give to national party, or
any other, committees. Total aggregate contributions per year were also not
limited.

•

Personal contributions by a candidate to his/her own campaign, for both
primaries and the general election, were capped at $50,000 for presidential
candidates. House candidates were to be limited to personal contributions from
their own funds of $25,000, and Senate hopefuls could not exceed $35,000 in
such contributions.

Spending Ceilings
The 1974 FECA amendments also included provisions which placed ceilings on
the amounts which could be spent by federal candidates in both primary and general
elections. Presidential candidates could spend up to $10 million in the primaries in
an effort to win the party nomination. The ceiling for general election spending was
set at $20 million whether or not the candidate accepted the public financing option.
Senatorial candidates were allowed to spend the greater of either 8 cents per eligible
voter or $100,000 in primary elections; the greater of either 12 cents per voter or
$150,000 in a general election. Candidates running in large states therefore would be
received contributions from more than 50 persons, (3) has made contributions to five
or more federal candidates.
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able to spend significantly more than Senate candidates in smaller states. Candidates
for the House were given a ceiling of $70,000 for each election, primary or general.
An annual cost-of-living increase in spending limits for all federal candidates would
be automatically triggered with a rise in annual inflation rates. An important
exemption from the spending limit ceilings was that which allowed for certain costs
associated with fund-raising efforts to not count against a candidate's spending limit.
These exempt fund-raising costs could not exceed 20 percent of the spending limits.
Additionally, legal and accounting services necessitated by the law's disclosure
requirements were exempt from inclusion in a definition of expenditures which fell
under the caps. So long as the accountant or lawyer was paid by his or her regular
employer and did not engage in any election campaign activities, the expenditures
associated with these services would not count as expenditures for purposes of
remaining within the ceilings.
Independent Spending
Independent expenditures, defined in the law as expenditures "relative to a clearly
identified candidate. ..advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate," 14were limited to $1000 per candidate per election. That limit applied
both to individual independent spending and such spending on behalf of a candidate,
but not tied to that candidate's campaign organization, made by political committees.
Independent spending reports must be filed by individuals and committees which had
contributed or spent over $100 in independent efforts outside of a candidate's
campaign. Those reports were to be filed on the same dates that all other disclosure
reports were due.

14 Definition is from the law PL 93-443, quoted in "Campaign Financing", p.l 13.
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Federal Election Commission
The 1974 law established a new government commission to oversee and enforce
compliance with its disclosure and contribution and expenditure ceiling provisions.
The Federal Election Commission was to be composed of six Commissioners, with
two each appointed by the President, the Senate, and the House. Terms were to be
staggered every year and appointments were for a six-year term. Authority to
prescribe regulations regarding disclosure requirements was given to the FEC, but the
Commission would not have the authority to alter the provisions regarding
contribution or expenditure limitations.
Any federal officeholder, federal candidate, or political committee had the right to
request an advisory opinion of the FEC regarding questions of compliance. Advisory
opinions issued by the FEC were to be restricted to the specific transaction or activity
of the requester and would not be interpreted as having any scope of authority beyond
the specific case in question. Any persons receiving an advisory opinion from the
Commission and then acting in "good faith" to comply or rely on such opinion, were
presumed to be in compliance with the law and, as such, not subject to any sanction
under the law.
The FEC was granted "primary" civil jurisdiction authority in matters of
compliance. The FEC was given the authority in the 1974 FECA to investigate any
and all complaints filed with it. Those persons or committees complained against
had the right to request a hearing before the Commission concerning the issue raised
in the complaint. The primary means of enforcement granted to the FEC emphasized
voluntary compliance as the language of the FECA encouraged the FEC to utilize
"informal means of conference, conciliation, or persuasion to settle cases."15

15

Language of the law PL 93-443, in "Campaign Financing", p.l 14.
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The FEC was, however, given the authority to commence civil action against
individuals or committees not in compliance with disclosure requirements. It could
either seek that action in court on its own or ask the Justice Department to seek civil
judgment. In cases involving a violation of the limitations provisions for
contributions or expenditures, the FEC was to refer those cases to the Justice
Department for legal action. If the FEC was unable to correct a violation of
disclosure requirements, that case could also be referred to Justice for redress. In all
cases coming before it, the FEC was barred from making public any information
concerning the case under investigation without the consent of the party being
investigated.
Penalties for reporting and disclosure violations consisted of a $1000 fine, or one
year in prison, or both. Convicted violators of the contribution and spending
limitations faced a fine of up to $25,000, and/or one to five years in prison, or both.

Buckley v. Valeo 1976
Immediately following the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, the new law was challenged in court. On January 2, 1975,
plaintiffs including Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-R, NY), former Sen. Eugene
McCarthy (D, Minn. 1959-71), the New York State Civil Liberties Union, and Human
Events magazine, among others, filed suit to contest the law's constitutionality.
The plaintiffs argued that the new law's placement of limits on the amounts that
could be contributed to, or spent on, a campaign for federal office was an
unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of expression of both contributors and
candidates. Because the dissemination of a candidate's message necessarily rested otl
an ability to buy advertising time and to otherwise purchase and procure the means by
which to communicate to the general electorate during the course of a campaign, any
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restriction on a candidate's receipt of contributions to be used for such information
dissemination was a constitutionally proscribed restriction on free speech.
Furthermore, limits on the amounts which candidates could spend to communicate
with the electorate via media advertising, direct mail, handbills and pamphlets, or any
other methods of expression, were, it was argued, another unconstitutional
infringement on rights of political free speech.
It was also argued that the limits placed on the amounts which could be
contributed by individuals to campaigns were restrictions on individual rights of free
expression. Wasn't a contribution to a political campaign a form of political
participation and, as such, an expression of constitutionally protected political
speech?
Plaintiffs in the suit also stated their opposition to the FECA’s imposition of limits
on the amounts which candidates could spend on their campaigns from their own
personal funds. Here too, the grounds for so arguing hinged on the constitutional
protection of an individual's right of free expression. Additionally, insofar as
independent spending by individuals or groups outside of a candidate's campaign
organization constituted an expression of political free speech, plaintiffs argued it
could not be restricted by an act of Congress. The First Amendment's constraint on
Congress's lawmaking powers in areas of free speech was seen to provide adequate
protection to the right of those who so desired to express themselves politically by
spending independently to seek the election or defeat of any candidate running for
federal office.
Buckley, et al., challenged, as well, the 1974 provisions which established a
scheme of public financing for presidential campaigns. It was the plaintiffs'
contention in this issue that such a scheme of public financing gave unfair advantage
to the nominees of the two major parties and discriminated against minor party
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candidates. Because the established legitimacy of the two major parties virtually
assured the parties, and their candidates, the maximum allowable amount of public
funds for campaign use; the public financing provisions, it was asserted, merely
served to perpetuate the two-party dominance of American federal elections. If, on
the one hand, contributions from private sources were to be limited in terms of
amounts which individuals, and individual PACs, could give to any one candidate, or
spend independently on his/her behalf, and amounts spent by candidates and parties
were to be restricted as well, and, on the other hand, third party receipt of public
funds was to be limited by a formula which allocated such monies on the basis of
proportional numbers of votes received in a past or current election, the ability of
third parties to amass the necessary funds to compete effectively was doubly
curtailed.
The suit also challenged the appointment by Congress of some of the members of
the newly created Federal Election Commission. Since the members of the FEC were
empowered under the Act to exercise executive powers, appointment by
Congressional officials was seen by plaintiffs to be in violation of the Constitution's
separation of powers and appointments clauses. Only the President, plaintiffs argued,
could constitutionally appoint members to the executive branch Federal Election
Commission. Consequently, the FEC as constituted under FECA needed to be
restructured in order to not violate the federal Constitution.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its ruling on the
case deciding, despite plaintiffs' contentions, that all of the Act’s provisions were to
be upheld.16 Plaintiffs appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court which handed
down its ruling on the case on January 30, 1976.

16

Buckley v. Valeo, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 519 F. 2d 821.
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The Court's decision upheld the provisions of the 1974 FECA that:
•

Set limits on contributions from individuals and political committees to
candidates and their campaigns.

•

Provided for public financing in presidential primary and general election
campaigns.

•

Required disclosure of all campaign contributions of more than $10 and
expenditures, either by a candidate or on his/her behalf, greater than $100.

However, the Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs in ruling to overturn provisions
of the law which limited spending in federal campaigns. The Court also struck down
the manner in which members of the Federal Election Commission were selected,
holding with the plaintiffs that the selection method was in violation of the separation
of powers clause of the Constitution.
In the matter of spending limits the Court found for the plaintiffs and essentially
accepted the argument that such spending ceilings were an unconstitutional
restriction on the First Amendment guarantee of free expression. The Court stated it
thusly:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.
This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The
distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper,
and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring
a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing
dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of communication
indispensable instruments of effective political speech.17

17 Excerpted from Supreme Court's percuriam decision in Buckley v. Valeo, in " The
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In so ruling, the Court was essentially equating money with speech in the matter of
campaign spending. But, having also ruled that the limits on contributions under the
FECA of 1974 were within the bounds of constitutionality, the Court drew an
important distinction between contributions and expenditures with regard to First
Amendment implications. While both the restrictions on contributions and spending
had similar First Amendment implications, the Court noted that the legislation's
limitation on political contributions was justified for the purpose of preventing the
actual, or even merely perceived, corrupting influence of large individual
contributions. There was a substantial government interest served by the limitations
on contributions - preventing potential and/or actual corruption. Expenditure limits,
on the other hand, were seen as falling into a different category in which they were
held to represent a substantial infringement on the rights of individuals, candidates,
and groups independent of a particular candidate's control, to engage in political
activities and to communicate political ideas.
The Court stated, "...expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe
restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its
limitations on financial contributions."18
Ceilings imposed by the law on independent spending were held to be
unconstitutional infringements of First Amendment rights of expression since, as the
Court wrote: "Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political
policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation."19 Independent

Law: Tested and Changed," in Dollar Politics. Nancy Lammers, ed.,Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982, Appendix, p.121.
18 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) at 20.
19 Ibid., at 48.
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spending ceilings, as for all spending limits, did not "serve any substantial
government interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the
electoral process,"20 according to the Court's opinion.
In the matter of candidates' personal spending in their own campaigns which the
law had limited, the Court sided with the plaintiffs and struck down any imposition of
limits on how much of their own money candidates could spend on their campaigns.
"The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage
in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own
election and the election of other candidates."21 Although this ruling made it possible
for a wealthy candidate to avoid contribution limits on how much others could
contribute to the campaign by allowing him/her to finance the campaign wholly from
personal funds, the Court stated that "the use of personal funds reduces the
candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive
pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the act’s contribution limitations are
directed."22
In a unanimous ruling regarding the method of selection for members of the
Federal Election Commission the Court said that the selection process violated the
Constitution and that the commission could only exercise those investigatory and
information-gathering powers which Congress is allowed to designate to
congressional committees. Hence, the commission was powerless to carry out its
administrative and enforcement responsibilities under the 1974 FECA provisions. In
order to be able to fulfill those responsibilities and conform to the Constitution's

20 Ibid., at 49.
21 Ibid., at 52.
22 Ibid., at 53.
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separation of powers and appointments clause, the members of the FEC would all
have to be presidential appointees subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Court stayed the effect of its last ruling for 30 days in order to give the
Congress time to reconstitute the FEC to conform to the directives of the Court.
Should the Congress not act within the allotted time, the commission would
effectively cease to function. As it turned out, the Congress took much longer than
thirty days to act and, in the end, Congress wrote a whole new campaign finance
reform bill incorporating the Supreme Court's Buckley rulings. As Senator Buckley
had noted following those rulings, the Court had left "a clearly unworkable set of
ground rules"23 in the area of campaign finance, and the Congress was forced to
consider new campaign finance legislation for the fourth time in the 1970s.

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976
With the 1976 presidential race in full swing, and in the wake of the Supreme
Court decision in Buckley, the Federal Election Commission found itself in the
position of not being able to continue to disburse public funds to the candidates so
long as some of its members were appointed by Congress. Since Congress was not
able to complete its reorganization of the FEC selection process within the Court's
allotted thirty day deadline, the Court extended its original deadline by three weeks.
Even this extension, however, proved too little time for Congress to complete work
on revising the 1974 law in order to achieve compliance with Buckley. As a
consequence of this delayed congressional action, the 1976 presidential candidates
did not receive the primary federal matching funds they had expected for two months
after the extended deadline date of March 22.
23 Senator James Buckley, one of the plaintiffs in the Buckley v. Valeo case, quoted
in "Campaign Financing", p. 109.
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In the end, Congress wrote an extensive revision of the whole of campaign finance
law rather than just a simple reconstitution of the FEC. The new law, enacted as a
series of amendments to the original 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, did
reconstitute the Federal Election Commission as a six-member commission appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The commission's authority was
extended to prosecutions in civil violations of the law and it was given jurisdictional
authority in matters of violation previously only covered in the criminal code. The
commission's enforcement capability was enhanced as a result of this expansion of
what constituted a civil violation.
The commission was to be limited to specific fact situations in its ability to issue
advisory opinions. Such opinions could not be used to enunciate commission policies
and could not be viewed as setting precedents for subsequent cases. Each case or
complaint was to be handled strictly on the basis of the set of facts in that particular
case and was not to be decided on the basis of previous opinions issued by the
commission. Furthermore, the commission could initiate investigations only after it
had received a properly verified complaint. Anonymous complaints were considered
insufficient grounds for investigation. An affirmative vote of four of the
commission's six members was required in order for the FEC to issue regulations and
advisory opinions and initiate civil actions and investigations.
As had been the case in the 1974 law, the commission was required to seek
resolution of complaints alleging campaign finance violations through conciliation
before going public with the substance of the case in any legal action. Penalties for
convicted violations were revised in the 1976 law such that an individual who
knowingly committed a violation involving a contribution or expenditure in excess of
$1000 was subject to a one-year jail sentence and a fine of up to $25,000 or three
times the amount of the contribution or expenditure in question, whichever was
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greater. Civil penalties of $5,000 fines, or an amount equal to the contribution or
expenditure involved in the violation, whichever was greater, were provided for
inadvertent violations. For violations knowingly committed, the fine imposed would
rise to $10,000, or an amount equal to twice the amount involved in the violation,
whichever was greater.
Upon signing the 1976 Amendments to FECA, President Ford appointed six new
members to the Federal Election Commission and public funds once again began to
go to the presidential campaign's primary candidates in May of 1976.
Included among some of the important revisions of existing campaign finance law
enacted in 1976, following the Supreme Court's Buckley ruling in that same year, was
the elimination of all language pertaining to spending ceilings for congressional
campaigns. Restrictions on the amounts that candidates could spend from their own
funds on their own campaigns, that were included in the 1974 law, were also
eliminated in the wake of Buckley.
In addition to finding the expenditure ceilings, the makeup of the Federal Election
Commission, and limitations on candidate personal campaign spending
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court had also ruled that the 1974 law's restrictions on
independent political spending were clear violations of First Amendment freedoms.
Many members of Congress, and concerned citizen action groups like Common
Cause, felt that this opened a potential loophole whereby group's operating as
"independent" entities were, in actuality, mere extensions of a candidate's campaign
designed to circumvent the law's contribution limits and/or contribution and
expenditure reporting requirements. It was argued that some mechanism for assuring
a group or individual's independent status, and verification of such status, needed to
be included in the new law so as to prevent such circumvention of the law's intent.
Accordingly, the Congress adopted a provision in the 1976 version of FECA which
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required that independent committees or individuals who made independent
expenditures of more than $100 advocating the election or defeat of a particular
candidate swear that the spending was not made in collusion with the candidate.
Many would argue that this provision had no teeth and was mere "window-dressing".
But, in light of the Supreme Court's decision affirming the rights of groups and
individuals to engage in this form of political free speech, it was seen as the only
legally permissible step which could be taken to define any parameters around
independent spending in federal campaigns.
The 1976 legislation also revised the 1974 law in the following ways:
•

Corporate fund-raising activities were curtailed insofar as company committees
were permitted to seek contributions from stockholders, executives, and
administrative personnel and their families only. Union political action
committees could solicit contributions from union members and their families
only. However, twice a year, union and corporate PACs could solicit all
employees for contributions by mail only. All such solicited monies were to be
received by independent third parties which would record the contributions
received and pass the funds on to the committees. All contributions received in
this manner were to remain anonymous.

•

Expenditures by labor union, corporate, and membership PACs of over
$2,000 per election for political communications to members which advocated
the election or defeat of a particular candidate were required to be reported. The
costs of the means of such communication (paper, postage, etc.) were not
required to be reported.

•

Records of all contributions greater than $50 were required of all candidates and
political committees.

38

•

Independent expenditures of more than $1,000 made within 15 days of an
election must be reported within 24 hours.

•

PAC proliferation was restricted by requiring that all political action committees
established by a corporation, union, or membership organization be treated as a
single committee for purposes of receiving contributions. Contributions from all
political action committees of a single company or union would be limited to
$5,000 overall to any one candidate in a given election. The reasoning underlying
this provision was to thwart the efforts of some organizations to form multiple
PACs with a similar political contribution agenda in order to multiply the amount
which could be legally given to a single candidate in any one election.

•

Spending by presidential candidates was limited to no more than $50,000 of
their own, or their family's, money if they accepted public funds in the financing
of their campaigns.

•

Subsidies to presidential candidates who had won less than ten percent of the
vote in two consecutive presidential primaries would be eliminated under the new
legislation.

The 1979 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
The only successful legislation dealing with campaign finance reform in the entire
nearly twenty year period since passage of the 1976 Amendments to the FECA of
1971 occurred in 1979, with the passage of yet another set of amendments to the
original FECA. These amendments however, were largely designed to correct noncontroversial logistical problems in the original law's paperwork requirements. The
1979 legislation was designed to eliminate much of the red tape created by the
original FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements and to facilitate and encourage
political party activity. Complaints that the original law imposed undue hardship and

39

burden on candidates and political committees in the costs of money, time, and
paperwork for disclosure and reporting compliance were non-partisan and
widespread. Additionally, there was widespread and bi-partisan agreement that the
law had the unintended consequence of stifling grass roots party-building activities
and volunteerism. Accordingly, agreement between Republicans and Democrats, and
between the House and the Senate, was not difficult to achieve. Passage was swift
and HR 5010, PL 96-187, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979
were signed into law on January 8, 1980.
PL 96-187 cut from 24 to nine the maximum number of reports which a federal
candidate had to file with the FEC during any two-year election cycle. The material
included in such reports need not be as detailed as had previously been required.
Itemization of contributions and expenditures was raised from $100 and up, to $200
and up. Candidates who raised or spent less than $5,000 in their campaigns need no
longer file reports at all. In the 1978 mid-term congressional elections 70 House
candidates - five of whom were eventual winners - spent less than $5,000 in their
campaign efforts.24
Complaints from leaders in both the Democratic and Republican parties that the
FECA of 1971 had undermined state and local party organizations in its restrictions
on spending and fund raising activities by the parties and their campaign committees,
had become loud and clear, and had caught the ear of congressional lawmakers by
1978. The 1979 legislation permitted state and local party organizations to purchase
campaign materials for volunteer activities on behalf of a party's slate of candidates.
The spending for such materials was not limited in any way and included spending
for such items as buttons, bumper stickers, yard signs, brochures, handbills and the
24 Congress and the Nation. Vol. V, 1977-1980, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1981, p.950.
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like. All party organizations could also conduct financially unlimited voter
registration drives and get-out-the-vote drives on behalf of presidential candidates.
The incidental reference to, or mention of, a presidential candidate in the literature of
local or state candidates was not to count as a contribution to the presidential effort as
had previously been the case.
Local party groups were now only required to report financial activity if their
annual spending exceeded $5,000, or if costs for non-volunteer activities exceeded
$1,000. Volunteer political activity was encouraged in a provision of the law which
raised from $500 to $1,000 the amount of money a person could spend for services,
such as food or travel, on behalf of a candidate without having to report such
expenditures.
The 1979 law sanctioned the use of state and local party "soft-money"
expenditures for these activities without any consideration for the potential for abuse
of such unregulated money in campaigns. The issue of "soft money" and its
expanding role in political campaigns as a legal loophole for campaign contributions
remains a topic of debate within the context of campaign finance reform. Reformers
rightly argue that there can be no complete campaign finance reform without an
examination of the uses, and potential or actual abuses of "soft money" contributions.
In addition to the provisions mentioned above, the 1979 law included the
following important provisions:
•

Voter registration and get-out-the vote drives by state and local parties on
behalf of presidential candidates were authorized by the new law.

•

A candidate's campaign committee must include the candidate's name in its
title.

•

Financial records were required to be kept by the campaign committee's
treasurer for three years.
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•

A "best effort" standard was established for the FEC to determine compliance
with the law. This eased the burden on committees to provide such information
as the occupations of contributors, which was required under the existing law.
Many candidates felt that it was unreasonable to require the filing of such
information when it had not been provided to them by contributors and therefore
posed particular problems in tracking down all contributors for a determination of
their occupations.

•

Categories of information required on registration statements were reduced
from eleven to six. Included in the categories eliminated was one which required
a political action committee to name all candidates it supported. Essentially, this
meant that committees had to compose and file lists of candidates who received
support even though that information had already been filed in contribution
reports.

•

Names of contributors were required to be reported if they gave $200 or more
instead of $100 or more as was the case under the existing law.

•

Independent expenditures which exceeded $250 must be reported. This
represented an increase in the threshold, up from $100.

•

Sources of complaints requesting advisory opinions of the FEC would now
include any individuals who had an inquiry, rather than just the candidates,
committees, and national parties as in the law as it stood in 1976.

•

FEC responses to advisory opinion requests must be issued within sixty days
instead of the "reasonable time" standard of existing law. If the request was made
within the two months before an election, the FEC was required to respond within
twenty days.
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•

Notification of alleged violation was to be given to any person who was the
subject of a complaint by the FEC within five days of receipt of such complaint.
The accused would have fifteen days in which to respond to the complaint.

•

Determination of "reason to believe" that a violation had occurred required a
vote of four of the six FEC members. An investigation would commence and the
accused would be notified that an investigation was underway. Any "probable
cause" determination required an affirmative vote of four FEC member votes.
The obligatory informal conciliation methods for correction of violations would
be mandated for at least 30, but not to exceed 90, days before civil or criminal
relief could be sought.

•

Retention of civil and criminal penalties for violations of the law which existed
in current law was affirmed in the new legislation.

•

Federal funds for the national nominating conventions of the two major parties
were increased in the new law from $2 million to $3 million.
Although numerous attempts would be made to revise campaign finance law again

throughout the 1980s and into the 90s, this 1979 Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments law was the last successful piece of legislation to come out of the
Congress in the area of campaign finance. Legislative history would be replete with
instances of proposals to extend public financing to congressional campaigns, to
reduce the soaring costs of federal campaigns through the imposition of either
voluntary or mandated (in conjunction with participation in some scheme of public
financing) spending ceilings, and to limit the contributions of special interests or
PACs. All have failed to gamer the requisite support to win passage. Presidents and
parties have taken different positions with respect to the various proposals for further
reform. Before examining these major proposals; and before making an assessment
of the likelihood of continued reform measures being enacted, it is helpful to
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continue looking at some of the political history of failed legislative reform efforts.
Common themes, agendas, coalitions, and results illuminate that history.

CHAPTER THREE
THE CONTINUING DRIVE FOR REFORM
Public Financing Efforts
In early 1977, following the first-ever publicly financed presidential primary and
general elections, the enthusiasm for the concept of publicly financed federal
campaigns was at its highest point. Proponents of extending public financing to
congressional races needed only to point to the contrast between the publicly
financed presidential elections of 1976 and the privately financed congressional races
of that same campaign season. It was argued that there was a difference in style and
demeanor between the hectic fund raising and spending preoccupations which
predominated in congressional elections and the more issue-oriented, publicly
financed presidential elections. Proponents posited that the provision of public funds
to presidential candidates had taken the campaigns away from the potential
corrupting influence of corporate, labor, or individual contributors which had
previously dominated presidential election campaigns. Those who sought the
presidency had been freed from the ever escalating chase for private financing which
took so much of a campaign's energy, time, and other resources.
As a result of the public funding in presidential campaigns, the corporate, labor,
and other special interest PAC money which had formerly been funneled into the
presidential campaign, now gravitated to congressional election contests. In 1976
record amounts of such PAC funds found their way into congressional candidates'
campaign coffers. Total spending, and spending by PACs in particular, continued to
soar. These developments spurred increasingly loud calls from campaign finance
44
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reformers to extend public financing to all federal elections. The argument was that
spending could only be contained in the context of public financing; and if curbing
the soaring costs associated with congressional campaigns was desirable, then so too
was the public financing necessary to effectuate spending ceilings. The Supreme
Court had ruled in Buckley that any spending ceilings in federal campaigns could
only be imposed concurrent with public financing. Therefore, any attempt to curb
spending in congressional races necessarily required some scheme of public funding.
Critics of public financing saw it as an attempt to give protection to incumbent
officeholders to the disadvantage of challengers. Public financing was viewed by
them as an unwarranted intrusion into the political sphere by an unwieldy government
bureaucracy, which would ultimately lead to the diminution of citizen participation in
the electoral process. If citizens could not participate in campaigns by providing
contributions to candidates of their own choosing to whatever extent they so chose,
then the most significant mode of participation in federal election campaigns, other
than voting, was being restricted.
With proponents and opponents in the Congress lining up on the issue, public
financing extension legislation was introduced in the Senate in early 1977.25 As
reported out of the Rules Committee on June 24, 1977, the bill would have extended
public financing to Senate general elections beginning in 1978.26 In conjunction with
the provision for public financing, the bill established a spending ceiling of $250,000
plus ten cents times the state's voting age population for each Senate candidate.

25 S 926 - S, Rept. 95-300.
26 This history of congressional action, and inaction, on campaign finance legislation
following the rewrite of the law in the 1976 FECA Amendments is illuminated in
greater detail in the series Congress and the Nation, published by Congressional
Quarterly, Inc. See specifically Volumes V, VII, and VIII (appropriate pages cited
supra 4).
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Major party candidates would receive 25 percent of their spending ceiling in federal
funding and would receive matching funds for all individual contributions of $100 or
less up to the limit. Other candidates would not receive automatic grants but would
become eligible for matching funds if they raised $100,000 or 10 percent of the
spending limit through individual contributions of $100 or less. Candidates could
spend up to, but no more than, $35,000 of their own personal funds while still
remaining within the ceiling. If a candidate was going to exceed either the personal
or the total spending ceiling, he/she was required to notify the FEC and all opponents
in the race. Opponents would then become eligible to spend up to 62.5 percent more
than the spending limits in matching funds. Monies to finance the extension of
public financing to congressional general election campaigns nationwide were to
come from the tax checkoff fund. Estimates were that the extension would cost
approximately $20 million in public funds for each election.27
The public financing bill was brought before the Senate on July 23, 1977. It never
came close to passage. On the first cloture vote to cut off a filibuster by Republican
and conservative Southern Democrat opponents of the legislation, proponents fell 11
votes short of the necessary 60 votes. When a third cloture motion failed by eight
votes, Democratic leaders in the Senate accepted an amendment to the legislation
which deleted the public financing extension provisions of the bill. The remaining
bill, which consisted only of certain amendments to the original public financing bill
dealing with remedies to disclosure anomalies and the costs of campaign
bookkeeping, passed the Senate 58-39. The House did not act on the Senate bill.
While public financing appeared dead in the Senate, the House was taking up the
matter in a piece of legislation which called for partial public financing of House
27 These provisions of the bill S 926 are outlined in Congress and the Nation. Vol. V,
1971-1977, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981, p.946.
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general election campaigns beginning in 1978’s general elections. This bill would
provide matching public funds of up to $25,000 for major party candidates who
would agree to limit their spending to no more than $150,000. Following a
candidate's raising of $10,000 in individual contributions of $100 or less, the public
funds would be made available. Spending ceilings would be lifted if one candidate
were to exceed the limit, and the candidate not exceeding the limit would become
eligible to receive an additional matching fund amount up to $50,000.
In referring the bill to the House Administration Committee for consideration, the
House leadership essentially doomed the bill. It soon became apparent that most of
the committee's members were opposed to "fast track" consideration of the bill.
What most clearly sealed the fate of the bill was the committee's acceptance of an
amendment which would extend public financing to House primary elections as well
as general elections. All Republican committee members, who were nearly
unanimously opposed to the concept of public financing, and many Democrats who
supported that concept, stated their intention to vote in favor of the amendment.
Knowing that an extension of public financing to all House races would raise the
costs of public financing to unacceptably high levels, not to mention the headaches of
administering such a plan, opponents of the bill were eager to see the committee
adopt the extending amendment. Proponents of the public financing concept,
knowing that the bill would not stand a chance of passage if the amendment were to
be accepted in committee, argued against its adoption. Many House incumbents,
Democrat and Republican, perceiving that the financing would create increased
competition in their upcoming races did not want to see a public funding bill come
out of committee to be voted upon on the House floor. As a result, the Chair of the
committee was persuaded to drop the bill from the committee's docket and public
financing died in the House as it had in the Senate.
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In a series of maneuvers throughout 1978, House supporters attempted to resurrect
public financing by attaching it as an amendment to other legislation dealing with
lowering of limits for contributions and expenditures by parties and political action
committees. In each instance in which a vote was taken to allow for the
consideration of public funding of federal campaigns, it was defeated, as were
attempts to consider the lowering of limits on party and PAC donations to
congressional campaigns.
A coalition of a majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats, and a
significant number of veteran, incumbent Northern and big-city Democrats combined
to defeat public financing legislation. Republicans, long in the minority in both
houses of the Congress, viewed public funding as a boon to incumbents and not in the
interest of fostering real competition. Paradoxically, many incumbent Democrats
thought that public financing would, in fact, foster too much competition. This same
paradoxical coalition was to hold together from the late 1970s until the present
whenever public financing legislation came before the Congress.
Perhaps the death knell for the idea of extending public financing - and by
association and implication, voluntary spending ceilings in congressional races - was
sounded in the 1979 session of Congress. Even though it enjoyed the support of
President Carter, the Democratic leadership in Congress, and a host of public interest
groups - chief among them Common Cause- the symbolically designated HR 1,
dealing with public financing for congressional general elections, was to suffer the
same fate as earlier legislative attempts. The bill was never reported out of
committee. The House Administration Committee killed the bill on May 24, 1979 by
voting 8-17 not to report it for floor consideration.
HR 1 had offered a voluntary plan of public financing for House general elections
only. But, when the markup of the bill began in the Administration Committee,
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proponents had to beat back an effort by opponents to extend the public financing to
primary elections as well. In 1977, the same committee sealed the doom of public
funding legislation by adopting exactly the same amendment. This time proponents
prevailed and the bill remained viable, if only for a short while. Republicans on the
committee tried to amend the bill by lowering the threshold for eligibility to
participate in the public financing system. They felt that the existing levels
constituted an incumbent protection plan and wanted to enhance the ability of non
incumbents to mount an effective challenge to incumbent officeholders. Although
unsuccessful in their efforts to amend the bill, there was no trouble defeating the
motion to report the bill.
Once again, the coalition that had blocked earlier public financing efforts held
together. Eight of the committee's 16 Democrats joined with all nine Republicans in
voting not to report the bill. Many of the Democrats who joined with Republicans to
defeat the bill represented safe, one-party districts and did not want to encourage
potential challengers.28 When House leaders announced that their own whip counts
showed that there was not enough support for the bill to consider other ways to bring
the bill to the floor for a vote, the official death knell had sounded. The defeat of HR
1 doomed a companion bill in the Senate29 which would have applied to Senate
general elections only. The Senate Rules Committee canceled hearings it had
scheduled on the bill when the House Administration Committee killed the House
public financing bill.

28 Committee Chair Frank Thompson made a statement to that effect and it is
attributed to him in Dollar Politics. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1982, p. 22.
29 S 623
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PAC Spending Limits
In conjunction with efforts to extend public financing to congressional general
elections, the Congress has witnessed attempts by some of its members to enact
legislation which would lower the limits on contributions and expenditures by
political parties and PACs. As was the case with public financing, these efforts were
unsuccessful.
Beginning in 1978 legislation was introduced that would have revised downward
the limits that PACs and parties could contribute to campaigns. Proponents of the
effort - mostly Democrats - argued that the lowering of these limits were necessary to
curb the increasing levels of party and PAC expenditures in House and Senate races.
Supporters cited the proliferation of PACs - from 608 at the end of 1974 to 1,261 in
October 1977 - and the rising amounts of money which both PACs and parties were
spending in congressional elections as indicative of the need to put the brakes on
contributions from these sources. According to Common Cause, interest group
spending had risen from $12.5 million in congressional races in 1974 to $22.6 million
in 1976.30
Spending by the parties was also rising at an equally fast pace. Democrats pointed
to the four special elections which were held in 1977 as being up for auction to the
highest spender. The FEC reported that, in those special elections, the Republican
party gave more than $400,000 to its candidates while the Democratic party was able
to donate only some $27,000 to its House candidates. The Republican candidate was
victorious in three of the four special elections, winning seats which were previously
held by Democrats.

30

Congress and the Nation. Vol. V, p.947.
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A 1978 bill devised by House Administration Committee Democrats would have
lowered the limits on party and PAC giving. But angry Republicans saw the attempt
as a threat to their ability to wage effective campaigns against entrenched incumbent
Democrats. They also viewed such limits as a blatant reaction to Republican
successes in fund raising and special election victories. The limits on party
contributions sought by Democratic sponsors of the bill would have reduced the
amount which a party (national, state, and congressional committees combined)
could give to a House candidate from $30,000 to $10,000. Just how seriously such a
change would have affected House Republicans is illuminated by an analysis of party
contributions to House candidates in 1976 and a compilation of 1977 party finances
by the FEC revealing the following:
In 1976, 39 percent of the Republican House candidates received more
than $10,000 each from party committees. Only 11 percent of the
Democratic candidates, in contrast, received at least $10,000 from
party sources....In 1977, while affiliated Democratic committees raised
$8 million through most of the year, Republican committees raised
more than three times as much, $24.3 million. The cash on hand
disparity was even greater, with Republican committees enjoying a
nearly 10-1 advantage over their Democratic counterparts, $8.2
million to $867,000.31
Interestingly enough, Republicans were not so vocal in opposition to proposed
cuts in PAC contribution limits. The proposed bill would have cut PAC contributions
to $5,000 from the $10,000 per candidate in an election year ($5,000 per election primary and general). That lack of opposition in this instance was probably due to
Republican realization that PAC cuts would affect labor union giving as much as it
would other PACs which traditionally supported Republican candidates. It was also

31

Dollar Politics, p. 21.
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apparent to Republicans that PACs, in general, tended to support incumbents (and
therefore, Democrats) more so than Republican challengers.
The bill obtained enough votes in committee to allow it to be reported out, but
once it came to a vote on the rule to allow floor consideration, the old coalition was
waiting to defeat it. Democratic leaders, knowing the vote on the rule was unlikely to
go their way, offered to remove the limitations on party contributions which so
incensed the Republicans. But, the partisan manner in which the bill was introduced
and reported out of committee alienated and angered enough Republicans to make
the offer unacceptable. In the end, the bill failed to survive a 198-209 vote to defeat
the rule allowing floor consideration.
In 1979, some members of the House again sought to curb PAC contributions to
House candidates. In a bill sponsored by Rep. David Obey (D., Wis.) and Rep. Tom
Railsback (R., 111.), supporters of the revision of PAC spending limits brought up the
issue on its own, without tying it in with limitations on party contributions which had
so polarized the House in 1978 along partisan lines.
The bill would have set aggregate limits on PAC contributions by prohibiting any
House candidate from receiving such contributions totaling more than $70,000 for
any given two-year election cycle. PACs would be allowed to donate $6,000 to any
one candidate in a year, down from the previous $10,000 limit. Of that $6,000, no
more than $5,000 could be taken by a candidate from a single PAC in any single
election - primary or general.
Debate in the House on the bill centered around arguments by its supporters that
PAC spending had risen precipitously in the few years since the FECA of 1971, and
that such spending created an impression of, if not an actuality, quid pro quo
arrangements of "undue influence." Opponents of the legislation again claimed that
the bill was little more than an incumbent protection act. According to Dollar
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Politics, published by Congressional Quarterly Inc., the facts were this: "Just under a
quarter of all money given to House candidates in the 1978 general election came
from PACs. While the share of PAC money in House races increased only slightly
between 1976 and 1978 -from 22.4 percent to 24.8 percent - the actual amount given
by all PACs to general election House candidates rose from less than $15 million to
nearly $23 million."32 Congressman Obey, the bill's main sponsor, stated that, "We
have a new arms race on our hands; only the arms, instead of missiles, are campaign
dollars. Whatever business does one year, labor does the next."33
But, Republicans saw the bill as a protection act for incumbents and an effort to
make it more difficult for challengers to raise the funds necessary to mount an
effective campaign. Minority leader John Rhodes said that the bill, "would reduce
the ability of the challenger to raise funds in the early stages of a campaign and
reduce the ability of PACs to participate in the political process."34
In an effort to gamer Republican support, the House adopted an amendment to the
bill which raised the aggregate PAC limit from the $50,000 first proposed in the
original bill to $70,000 and also raised the amount which a single PAC could
contribute to a candidate from an original figure of $5,000 to $6,000 for both primary
and general elections combined. The adoption of that amendment was instrumental in
the bill's eventual passage in the House. That becomes evident when one examines
the following facts from Dollar Politics: "Nearly a third of the House elected in 1978
- 138 - received more than $50,000. But only 51-34 Democrats and 17 Republicans
- topped the $70,000 mark."35

32 Dollar Politics, p.23.
33 Congressman David Obey quoted in Dollar Politics, p.23.
34 Congressman Rhodes quoted in Dollar Politics, p. 23.
35 Dollar Politics, p.23.
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The Obey-Railsback bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 217198, with Democrats voting in favor of its passage by a margin of 188-74, and
Republicans opposing it by a 29-124 division. This was to be a short-lived victory,
however, since the bill stalled in the Senate as Republican Senators Mark Hatfield of
Oregon and Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire threatened to conduct a filibuster
to prevent Senate consideration of the legislation. An inability on the part of the bill's
supporters in the Senate to gather the 60 votes necessary to cut off any threatened
filibuster sealed the bill's doom and it was removed from the Senate legislative
calendar.

Reform Efforts 1985-1990
With the failure of Obey-Railsback, and the subsequent passage of the 1979
Amendments to FECA, the "decade of campaign finance reform" came to an end.
The 1980s began with the election of a Republican president and a Republican
majority in the Senate. Given their long standing opposition to campaign finance
reform, it was not surprising that Republicans did not encourage the introduction of
legislation to that effect. Hopeful of winning a majority in the House to add to their
control of the Senate, Republicans were anxious to protect their fund-raising
advantage over the Democrats and to enhance prospects for challengers in the
upcoming 1982 elections. Democrats, cognizant of the fact that reform legislation
faced little hope of passage in the new Congress, did not reintroduce measures to
extend public financing to congressional campaigns or to revise the limits on party or
PAC giving.
When, in 1986, Democrats recaptured control of the Senate, the effort to continue
campaign finance reform began anew. Senator David Boren (D., OK), in early 1985,
offered a non-germane amendment to Senate bill S 655, an unrelated bill which dealt
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with low-level radioactive waste, which would have put caps on amounts that a
candidate could take from political action committees in the aggregate or singly.
Republicans countered with the introduction of an amendment by Senator Rudy
Boschwitz (R., MN) which would cripple PAC contributions to party organizations,
which the Democratic party relied on to a far greater extent than did Republicans.
According to Federal Election Commission reports:
In the 1984 congressional elections, national Democratic Party
organizations, such as the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
received $6.5 million in contributions from PACs, compared with
$58.3 million from individuals. ...Republican organizations, including
the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National
Republican Congressional Committee, received only $1.7 million
from PACs, compared with $262 million from individual
contributors.36
Boren's proposal would have limited overall PAC contributions to $100,000 for
House candidates and between $175,000 and $750,000 for Senate candidates,
depending on state populations. The ceiling on individual PAC contributions would
be reduced from $5,000 to $3,000, while the top limit on private individual donations
would increase to $1,500 from $1,000. The loophole in the law which allowed for
the "bundling" of individual donations by PACs in order to circumvent the limits, was
to be closed. And, in an effort to battle the effects of unregulated independent
expenditures, Boren's amendment would have required that television and radio
broadcasters provide free response time to candidates who were opposed by groups
engaging in independent opposition campaigns.

36 Congress and the Nation. Vol. VII, 1985-1988, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1990, p.893.
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The proposal put forth by Senator Boschwitz would have prohibited all PAC
contributions to the national parties. It would also have required that the parties
disclose any "soft-money" contributions which were received into their coffers from
corporations, unions, and any other donors, which were currently not reported. It was
Boschwitz's hope that both amendments would be approved, since he assumed that
Democrats would not want to act on the bill if it contained both measures. He was
right.
Although both amendments were approved, the bill to which they were attached
failed to meet the necessary threshold of support to move toward further
consideration. Despite the fact that Republican leaders were willing to join with the
Democrats to move the bill along toward passage, Boschwitz threatened to block the
vote. The Senate eventually decided not to bring the bill to a definitive vote and the
issues of campaign finance reform were postponed.
The unwillingness of Senators to bring the legislation on PAC contributions to a
final vote reflected the touchiness of the issues surrounding "special interest"
contributions. Democratic supporters of reform cited statistics showing the dramatic
increases in PAC growth and spending in congressional campaigns. According to
Congress and the Nation. "In 1974, PACs gave candidates for Congress a total of
$12.5 million. In the 1983-84 election cycle, House and Senate candidates received
$105.3 million from PACs. The total number of registered PACs - not all of which
gave to congressional candidates - had grown from 608 in 1974 to 4,009 in 1984." 37
A public perception that there existed a quid pro quo arrangement of favorable
treatment of special interest legislation in exchange for PAC campaign contributions,

37 Ibid., p. 892.
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had made congressional legislators nervous and defensive about charges of PAC
"undue influence."

The 100th Congress
The Senate of the 100th Congress of 1987-88 saw the reintroduction of campaign
finance measures designed to reduce the amounts of money being spent in
congressional campaigns. The bill (S 2), would have provided financial incentives
for senatorial candidates to adhere to campaign spending ceilings. These ceilings
were to be established on a state by state basis. Supporters saw this as necessary to
reduce the skyrocketing sums being spent in senatorial campaigns. Republican
opponents, as might be expected, viewed any spending limits as merely a scheme to
institutionalize the Democrats as the majority congressional party.
Of course, given the Supreme Court's Buckley ruling, it was mandatory that any
spending ceilings would have to be tied to some plan of public financing for Senate
candidates who agreed to abide by spending limits. Consequently, the Democratic
sponsors of S-2, chief among them Senators David Boren (D., OK) and Robert Byrd
(D., WV), saw public financing as essential to any imposition of spending limits in
senatorial races. Republicans, however, had always seen public financing as an
unwarranted government intrusion into the electoral process.
Having been reported out of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee
rather easily, the bill encountered immediate parliamentary maneuvers designed to
forestall its consideration on the Senate floor. Republicans began a filibuster during
floor debate on the bill which the Democratic leadership was unable to halt. Majority
leader, and one of the bill's chief sponsors, Senator Byrd, failed to invoke cloture on
the filibuster in seven separate attempts, falling at least seven votes short of the
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required sixty votes in all attempts. The seventh cloture motion vote made Senate
history: The Senate had never taken more than six cloture votes on a single issue.38
After three months of off-and-on debate and numerous attempts to end the
Republican filibuster39, the bill S-2 was shelved for 1987. It was to be re-introduced
in a modified version in the 100th Congress' second session in 1988.
Because of the likelihood of stalemate if the bill failed to gamer any significant
Republican support, Boren and Byrd modified the bill by scaling back its provisions
for public financing. The final version of the bill, when brought to the floor for
consideration in 1988, provided financial incentives including reduced broadcast
advertising and postal rates in order to entice compliance with a system of voluntary
spending limits. Public funds would be allocated only to Senate candidates whose
opponents did not abide by the spending limits in the bill. This was a change from
the language of the bill introduced in 1987 which would have distributed public funds
to all candidates who adhered to the limits. The new version of S 2 imposed limits
on the amounts PACs could contribute to Senate campaigns. No Senate candidate
could receive more than 30 percent of the primary spending limit set forth in the bill,
from PACs. The formula meant that the maximum allowable amount of aggregate
PAC donations for Senate candidates in the most populous states was $825,000.
Republicans did not like such an aggregate limit as they felt that it favored the
largest and most well-organized PACs that donated early in the election cycle. PACs
which could not donate early in the season would effectively be frozen out of the

38 Ibid., p.894.
39 The filibuster was able to continue even though other legislation was considered
because Majority Leader Byrd resorted to a parliamentary maneuver called "double
tracking" which permitted other legislation to be considered while the campaign
finance bill remained pending. This fact is noted in Congress and the Nation. Vol.
VII, 1990., p.894.
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process. Therefore, Republicans countered with a proposal to lower the existing
single PAC donation limit of $5,000 per candidate, per election, rather than
establishing an aggregate limit. Republicans argued that their proposal would allow
for increased participation while the Democrats' measure would restrict participation
to only the largest, long-established PACs. Some Republican Senators had even
begun to advance the notion of banning PACs altogether. Given the dominance of
PAC contributions to incumbent Democratic legislators, many Republicans had
concluded that PAC giving furthered the prospects of incumbent advantage in
election campaigns. Challengers, it was pointed out, received only a small portion of
PAC funds; and since it was Republican candidates who found themselves more
often running as challengers rather than incumbents, PAC funds did not generally
flow in their direction.
In an endeavor to break through the stalemate on the bill, Senator Byrd appointed
a bi-partisan Senate task force to look into the possibility of arriving at a consensus as
to what could be done about soaring campaign costs and concerns about PAC
influence. But, the effort failed to make any headway as both sides maintained their
positions on overall spending as non-negotiable.
Majority Leader Byrd made it clear that the bill would be fought out on the floor,
and warned Republicans that any attempt to filibuster the bill would not be allowed
to proceed as it had in 1987, when other business was conducted around the pending
bill. If the bill's opponents wished to engage in a filibuster, Byrd would require that
they be forced to hold the floor around the clock or the bill would be pushed to a
vote. On February 23, 1988 the filibuster began with Republican members repeatedly
calling for a quorum and then abandoning the floor. Democrats were forced to keep
enough supporters present to maintain a quorum in order to conduct the Senate's
business.
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When the bill's supporters came up one member short of a quorum late in the
evening of February 23, Byrd, using an arcane tool of Senate discipline, sought the
arrest of absent senators. The Senate's sergeant-at-arms located Oregon Republican
Senator Robert Packwood in his office. The senator had bolted himself in his office
and refused to come out voluntarily. He was eventually persuaded to walk from his
office to the Senate chambers in the Capitol but refused to enter onto the Senate floor
on his own power. He was then carried by members of the sergeant-at-arms' posse
feet-first onto the floor where he announced himself present, at last establishing the
required 51 member quorum.40
The next day saw a prolonged and vitriolic debate about the tactic which Byrd had
used. However, after the dust had settled, Democrats and Republicans agreed to
restrict debate on the second night and to schedule a final cloture try for February
26th. On that day, following an eighth attempt to invoke cloture on S 2 - seven
attempts had been made in late 1987-, the bill was pulled from floor consideration
when the cloture try failed by a margin of 53-41. Fifty of fifty-two Senate Democrats
voted for the cloture motion; thirty-nine of forty-two Republicans voted against
invoking cloture. Campaign finance reform was dead for 1988.

The 101st Congress
In 1989 momentum for reform again built as leaders of both parties in both the
House and Senate, and President George Bush vowed to press on with new campaign
finance measures. Republicans offered a legislative package in the House and
President Bush put forth his own plan for reform proposing what he called a

40 "A Senator's Arrest: Rare and Dramatic Event", in Congress and the Nation. Vol.
VII, 1985-1988, p. 895.
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"sweeping system of reform" for raising and spending money in congressional
campaigns41
The President's plan called for an elimination of corporate, union and trade
association PACs as well as all PACs formed by elected officials - so-called
"leadership PACs". The maximum contribution allowed for the remaining nonconnected PACs was to be cut in half - down to $2,500. Bush proposed that the
political parties be given an increase in the amounts which they could donate to
individual congressional campaigns. His proposal would have allowed the parties to
give up to two and one-half times more than they spent on congressional campaigns
through coordinated expenditures. Additionally, the plan would have curtailed the
incumbent's use of the franking privilege by banning unsolicited mass mailings from
congressional offices.
Not surprisingly, Democrats viewed the Bush plan as plainly partisan since it was
constructed in such a way as to maximize Republican party treasuries, through its
emphasis on increasing the party role in congressional campaigns, while
simultaneously removing the Democrats' advantage in raising money from political
action committees.
The Bush plan was introduced in the Senate, as S 1727, but became bottled up in
committee when it received little enthusiastic support from either party's
congressional membership. The legislation died at the end of the 101st Congress.
While the Bush plan was stymied in the Senate, House Republicans introduced
their own program of reform late in the first session of the 101 st Congress. The
House Republican package included:

41 Congress and the Nation. Vol. VIII, 1989-1992, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1993, p. 951.
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•

A reduction to $1,000 per election in the amount a PAC could give to a candidate.
That amount would, however, be indexed for inflation.

•

A prohibition on "bundling" of contributions by all corporate, trade association, or
union PACs. Non-connected PACs - those formed to advance specific causes would be allowed to continue the practice of bundling.

•

Candidates would not be permitted to form their own PACs. Candidates'
committees would be enjoined from donating to other committees.

•

Tax credits for individual contributions to home-state candidates up to $250
would be reinstated.

•

It would be required that at least half of a candidate's campaign funds be raised
locally.

•

All limits on party contributions and coordinated expenditures were to be
eliminated, but disclosure of such spending to the FEC was to be maintained.
By the start of the second session of the 101st Congress in 1990, both

congressional chambers were poised to begin a major overhaul of the federal
campaign finance system.
The Senate leadership of both parties established a bi-partisan advisory panel of
distinguished academics, lawyers, and party officials to review current proposals for
reform and to issue recommendations as to what should be done. The panel
announced its plan on March 7, 1990, which embraced "flexible spending limits voluntary, state-by-state limits that would be reasonably high and would allow
exemptions for party funds and in-state contributions. Candidates who accepted the
limits would get lower postal and advertising rates, and their in-state contributors
would receive tax credits for modest contributions."42 The panel also called upon the

42 Ibid., p.953.
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Congress to enact legislation which would mandate broadcasters to donate free time
to political parties and would increase the limits on party contributions to
congressional campaigns. Contributions from PACs would be disallowed once they
exceeded a certain percentage of total receipts; "bundling" by corporate, union, or
trade association PACs would be prohibited, as would independent spending by those
same PACs; and "soft-money" contributions would have to be reported to the Federal
Election Commission.
Both Democrats and Republicans praised the panel's efforts and set about to
design their own reform packages. Democrats managed to get through the Senate
Rules and Administration Committee (on a party line vote) a bill to reward Senate
candidates who abided by state spending guidelines with discounts on postal rates and
broadcast advertising. Those candidates who did not obey spending ceilings were to
be penalized by a tax dollar compensation to their opponents for amounts in excess of
the caps. The bill contained a provision for tax-paid television advertising, and one
allowing exemptions to the spending caps for in-state fund raising. Vouchers would
be provided to candidates equal to 20 percent of their general election spending
ceiling to be used to buy blocks of television time. An additional amount (up to 25
per cent of the limit) over and above the established limits could be raised and spent
so long as it was raised in small in-state contributions.
Republicans, meanwhile, had again renewed their opposition to any legislation
which would impose spending limits. President Bush vowed to veto any legislation
which came to his desk which included spending caps. Republicans wanted to re
focus the debate on the sources of contributions rather than spending . Consequently,
they fashioned their proposal around an elimination of "special interest" PACs. The
GOP measure would reduce to $500 the size of donations which candidates could
accept from out of state sources and it would place new restrictions on unions and

64

other tax-exempt groups' fund raising activities. Parties would be allowed to buy
large blocks of television time separate from any spending limits on monies spent on
behalf of candidates. Also, Republicans charged that the Democratic plan, which
would give participating candidates reduced mail rates, the lowest broadcast
advertising rates, and free television time, would cost the taxpayers tens of millions
of dollars in public funds.
In an effort to reach a bi-partisan consensus on the issue, Democratic leaders
reached across the aisle to embrace the Republican idea of PAC elimination in Senate
campaigns. But, in order to replace the money which would be lost, they added
public financing to their plan for general election spending limits. Democrats also
included a ban on the parties' use of soft money to fund get-out-the-vote and voter
registration activities.
Both Republican and Democrat sponsored measures were introduced and the party
leaders, Senators George Mitchell (D., ME) and Bob Dole (R., KS), attempted to
negotiate a way to iron out differences. It soon became apparent that the two sides
were too far apart on non-negotiable items and the reconciliation effort came apart.
Senate debate on the campaign finance reform legislation stretched over three
days, and Republicans, realizing that there was no hope of passing their proposal,
tried instead to offer it in pieces as amendments to the Democratic bill, S 137. Each
amendment failed, with the exception of an amendment offered by Republican
Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma to impose tighter restrictions on incumbent use of
the frank, and one offered by Senator Pete Domenici (R., NM) which limited
contributions from individuals who did not live in a candidate's state to $250 per
election. On August 1, 1990 the Senate passed the Democrat sponsored S 137 by a
vote of 59-40. Five of the Senate's 45 Republicans voted for the bill; only one Senate
Democrat voted to oppose the bill.
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In its final form the bill would eliminate PACs, limit out-of-state contributions to
$250, establish voluntary state-by-state spending ceilings, and offer participating
campaigns low-cost mail and broadcast rates, some free television time, and
additional public funds to counter opponents who exceeded the limits. Public
financing would pay for the system of communication vouchers in the bill as well as
the sums necessary to combat excessive opposition spending.
In the House, Democrats were engaged in intraparty disputes about the particulars
of their proposal for reform. Many Democrats from urban areas feared that the
proposed House spending limit of $550,000 for both primary and general elections
combined would be too little once much of it was used up in a tough primary fight.
In order to mollify these members, a $165,000 exception to the limit was added for
candidates who had won their primaries with less than a 66.7 percent vote total and
who faced major party general election competition.
For Democrats, the limitations on PAC contributions needed to be constructed in
such a way as to ensure that the clout of labor union and trade association PACs
which favored Democratic incumbents would be preserved. Accordingly, the House
Democratic bill created a two-tier system of PAC contribution limits. PACs which
took gifts of more than $240 a year from members (as did most corporate PACs
which tended to donate to Republicans) would be barred from giving House
candidates more than $1000 per election. Those PACs which received contributions
in amounts less than $240 from members (such as labor PACs which gave almost
exclusively to incumbent Democrats) would be able to contribute up to $5,000 per
election- the existing limit.
House Republicans, meanwhile, were at work drafting their own package. Their
bill would have limited all PAC contributions to $1,000, would have required that
candidates raise at least half of their funds from within the district and would have
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imposed no overall spending ceilings. Despite the fact that Republicans entertained
no hope of success in seeing their proposals enacted - they were simply outnumbered
by an overwhelming Democratic majority in the House - their proposal served notice
to the House that the Republican position against spending limits was non-negotiable.
In the end, the House adopted the Democratic bill (HR 5400) on a vote o f255155. Only 15 Republicans voted in favor of the bill. The conference committee to
iron out the differences between the Senate and House passed bills never met in the
1990 session and campaign finance reform remained unfinished business.

CHAPTER FOUR
REFORM PROPOSALS 1991 -PRESENT
The 102nd Congress
Pressure from several sources to finish the work of campaign finance reform
which had held so much promise in the last session of the previous Congress came to
bear on the 102nd Congress as it opened in 1991. Common Cause, the public interest
lobby organization, Ralph Nader’s group Public Citizen, and the labor affiliated
Citizen Action, all pushed for final reform action. Even the politically powerful
American Association of Retired Persons joined the coalition to overhaul the law so
as to provide for tax dollar replacement of PAC dollars.
The Keating Five investigation, and congressional hearings on the scandal,
revealed that money had a very definite influence on politics. Charles Keating, Jr.
had used his political fund-raising skills and strategic contributions to incumbent
lawmakers to gain access to legislators in key committee assignments and to
assemble some degree of clout in Washington. The hearings revealed the importance
to Senators of raising large sums of money to conduct political campaigns and the
degree to which at least an appearance of quid pro quo relationships between money
and influence existed in Washington.
A bill sponsored by Oklahoma Democrat Senator David Boren was reported out
of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee on March 20, 1991 which set the
stage for another floor debate over campaign finance reform. The bill reported out of
committee was essentially the same Senate bill which had passed in the 101st
Congress in late 1990. In its consideration of S 3, the Boren measure, the Senate
debate consumed seven days with numerous attempts by Republicans to amend the
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bill being turned away. Republicans objected to the bill's provision for spending caps
in Senate elections; once again labeling such limits as "incumbent protection" devices
which would hamstring challengers who needed to outspend incumbents in order to
win.
Because Democrats appeared solidly behind the spending limits idea, Republicans
turned toward an attack on the bill's public financing provision. Calling such public
financing "food stamps for politicians," Republicans sought to focus a wary public
eye toward provision of taxpayer funds for political campaigns - something they
thought the taxpaying public would balk at. The Republican point-man on this issue,
Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky offered an amendment to the bill designed to
strip it of its public financing and spending limits. The attempt was defeated on a 5642 party line vote in which each party's leadership made it clear that the vote would
be considered a measure of an individual's party loyalty.
After beating back numerous other amendment attempts by Republicans to kill
public financing but leave spending limits alone (something which would have
resulted in a law of dubious constitutionality given the Buckley ruling); to strip the
national party conventions of public funds; and even to discontinue the public
financing of presidential elections, the Senate passed S 3 on a party line vote, 56-42.
House action began in 1991 with a bill being written by a House Administration
Committee task force. In a meeting with House Democrats prior to the bill's
introduction to the floor, it became apparent that a significant number of them were
reluctant to support the public financing of their reelection campaigns. Provisions in
the bill would have provided up to $200,000 in public financing to House candidates.
The cost was estimated to be some $75 million every two years. Forty-six
conservative House Democrats signed a letter to the House Administration task force
asking that the public financing provisions be dropped from the bill. They wanted,
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instead, to offer 100 per cent tax credits for all individual contributions of $50 or less,
contending that, although this was simply another form of public financing, it was
much more politically palatable. Other House Democrats, those from rural and inner
city poorer districts which lacked wealthy Democratic constituencies, objected to the
bill's provision for an aggregate ceiling of $200,000 on PAC donations to House
campaigns.
The bill which eventually was reported out of committee on a strict party line
vote, 14-9, provided some political cover for Democrats worried about the political
effects of supporting public financing by insuring that the bill on campaign finance
reform did not actually raise the necessary money. That task would be left to a
separate tax bill. The language of the reported bill simply stated that the money for
public financing should come from limitations on the tax deduction organizations
took for lobbying. Conservative Democrats also won wording in the bill which stood
as code words for tax incentives for individual contributors; the bill required,
"incentives for individuals to make voluntary contributions to the candidate of their
choice."43
Following floor debate which lasted some five hours, the House approved the
committee bill on a party line vote, 273-156. Only twelve conservative Democrats
voted against the bill; only twenty-one Republicans were for it.
Without time left in the session to complete a conference committee resolution of
the two bills S 3 and HR 3750, campaign finance reform would have to wait for
completed congressional action until 1992.
The 1992 session of the 102nd Congress began with a whirlwind of activity
surrounding the need to get the two campaign finance bills merged through a

43 Ibid., p.962.
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conference committee compromise. A clear difference existed between the Senate
vision of what should be done by way of reform and the vision of House members.
Senators were generally less dependent on PAC money than were Representatives
and therefore willing to pass the PAC ban which was in the Senate bill. House
members, however, increasingly dependent on the large sums that PACs could, and
did, donate to their campaigns were less than enthusiastic about the Senate bill's PAC
ban. Many House Democrats openly opposed any conference report which would
send back a bill which accepted that Senate language. As a consequence of this
impasse between the House and Senate, conferees agreed early on that they would
write a conference report which would allow each chamber to design its own rules
regarding campaign financing. Hence, the House $200,000 aggregate limit on PAC
donations remained for House elections. The matching fund system of public
financing which the House had adopted would remain operational for House races
while Senate campaigns would feature publicly financed vouchers to purchase
television advertising.
Senators on the conference committee who had originally supported the
Republican initiative, later incorporated into the passed Senate bill, to ban all PACs,
began to fall away from that position. They offered a fallback provision which, rather
than banning PAC activity in Senate campaigns, would allow PACs to contribute no
more than an amount equal to 20 percent of the candidate's spending limit.
Democrats had earlier advanced this as an option if the PAC ban were to be
challenged in court and found to be an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of
expression and association.
The conference report, S 3, which essentially adopted the rules established in both
bills and applied them to each chamber accordingly, was quickly agreed to in the
House on a vote of 259-165, some twenty-four votes short of the necessary two-thirds
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required to override President Bush's threatened veto. The Senate approved the
conference report by a vote of 58-42, eight votes shy of a veto-proof margin.
As expected President Bush vetoed the bill stating, "In addition to perpetuating the
corrupting influence of special interests and the imbalance between challengers and
incumbents, S 3 would limit political speech protected by the First Amendment and
inevitably lead to a raid on the Treasury to pay for the act's elaborate scheme of
public subsidies."44 Campaign finance reform would have to wait until after the
November elections for a determination of its viability. Democrats vowed to make
Bush's "stealth veto" of S 3 an issue in the upcoming presidential campaign.

The Death of Campaign Finance Reform ? 1993-1994
With the election of Democrat Bill Clinton to the presidency in 1992, the push to
enact new campaign finance reform measures appeared to have gotten over a major
threshold. Unlike his predecessor, George Bush, President Bill Clinton announced
his support for reform during the fall general election campaign and made it a highpriority item for his administration. Meetings between the new administration and
congressional Democrats concluded with public pledges of cooperation on fashioning
campaign legislation to put on the President's desk for his signature. "I might just die
happy," said Senator David Boren (D., OK), a longtime advocate and sponsor of
campaign finance reform.45
Soon afterwards, however, the old divisions within the Democratic party regarding
spending limits and public financing resurfaced, leading many in the news media to

44 Ibid., p.963.
45 Senator Boren quoted in Donovan, Beth. "Clinton Courts Fellow Democrats In
Drive For Major Overhaul,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v. 51, n.6, Feb.
6, 1993, p.250.
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report on the inability of the Democrats to come together on the issues of campaign
finance reform. Spending limits clearly made some incumbent Democrats uneasy. In
1992, House incumbents who had won with less than 55 percent of the vote had
outspent their opponents by a margin of three to one, according to Federal Election
Commission reports.46 Proposals to limit PACs and their donations to congressional
campaigns also worried some incumbent House and Senate Democrats. Political
action committees had spent more than $180 million dollars in the 1992 election
cycle with nearly $82.4 million of that total going to the campaign coffers of
incumbent Democrats. If PAC contributions to all Democrats, incumbents and
challengers, were to be considered the total PAC giving to Democrats in 1992 was
some $116 million of the total $180 million - fully 64 percent of all PAC
contributions went to Democratic candidates in 1992.47
Conservative Democrats also balked at the cost of providing public financing for
federal campaigns - as much as $300 million per election cycle - in a time of budget
constraints and deficits. How to sell public subsidization of congressional campaigns
amidst budget cuts, and belt-tightening in government services, was a politically
unpalatable question from which many incumbent Democrats shied away. The
political feasibility of using public funds to finance congressional campaigns
concerned many House Democrats. Rather than supporting use of public funds to
finance a significant portion of federal election campaign costs, some Democrats
backed the idea of providing discounted postal rates and broadcast time as a way of
providing funding not nearly so visible and contentious as direct public subsidies.

46 Federal Election Commission press release, March 4, 1993. Also cited in Donovan,
"Clinton Courts Fellow Democrats...", p.250.
47 Figures are calculated from reports of the Federal Election Commission dated
March 4, 1993, issued in the form of a public press release listing 1991-92 Financial
Activity of All Senate and House Campaigns (January 1,1991 - December 31, 1992).
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The Democrat's election analyst Mark Gersch told members, as they met to
discuss legislative strategy for the 103rd Congress, that they could lose as many as 30
House seats in the 1994 elections48 (prophetic, but an underestimation of some 30
seats as things turned out). This prospect made a number of Democrats wary of
enacting reforms which might undermine their fund-raising advantage over
challengers.
These concerns, and White House inability to put together a comprehensive
package of campaign finance reform before the Senate Rules Committee began
markup on campaign finance legislation, created a situation in which Senate
Democrats simply approved a bill (S 3) which was identical to the one which
President Bush had vetoed in 1992. That bill would have provided public funds for
up to 33.3 percent of the spending limit for House candidates and 20 percent for
Senate candidates. House candidates would be restricted from spending over
$600,000, while such spending limits would vary for Senate candidates from $1.6
million to $8.9 million, depending on state population. The White House had
indicated that it might consider proposing public funding of up to 50 percent of new
general election spending limits.
The citizens lobby, Public Citizen, estimated that public financing of
congressional campaigns at the 50 percent level would cost taxpayers $350 million
every two years. The 1992 approach of S 3 would cost $209 million. The White
House indicated that it was considering a new mechanism for funding the expanded
public financing benefits by earmarking the receipts from a new tax on lobbying
expenses. The Clinton administration estimated that this new tax on lobbying

48

Donovan, " Clinton Courts Fellow Democrats...", p.250.
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(actually an elimination of the deduction which lobbying organizations could take for
expenses related to lobbying activities) would bring in $978 million over five years.
The administration was also reportedly considering what to do about "soft money"
in the context of reform. The issue was of considerable importance to Democrats and
to President Clinton as the Clinton campaign in 1992, in conjunction with the
Democratic National Committee, had raised record amounts of soft money
contributions. Debate within the White House and the Democratic congressional
delegation centered on how to limit soft money contributions to state and local parties
while still protecting funds for grass-roots registration and get-out-the-vote activities.
But, the White House plan was not ready for unveiling by the time the Congress
began its markup of new legislation and members were left to work out some
proposals of their own. Senator Diane Feinstein stated that she intended to offer a
floor amendment to S 3 to allow groups that do not lobby Congress to continue to
bundle candidate contributions. The bill, S 3, would have outlawed the practice
altogether. The amendment which Feinstein would offer was aimed at protecting
EMILY's List, a non-connected issue PAC which bundled millions of dollars from
member donations for issuance to Democratic women candidates who supported
abortion rights, and other women's causes, in their 1992 campaigns. But concerns
were raised by others that such an exemption might lead to a significant loophole in
the law.
By late April of 1993, the Clinton administration was putting the finishing touches
on its package of campaign finance reform. One of the areas of greatest contention
in fashioning a plan which could gamer the support of congressional leaders and
Democratic National Party operatives was the issue of what to do about "soft money"
contributions. Clearly this was an area of campaign finance which Democrats had
used to their advantage in recent elections. It clearly had also become a major
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loophole in existing campaign finance law as the dividing line between what
constituted "hard" and "soft" contributions had become nearly invisible.
Contributions for party "grass-roots" activities were not restricted and the definition
of what constituted "grass roots, party building " activities had been open to
expansive interpretation. Consequently, donors who would otherwise have surpassed
the limits of legal direct contributions could channel vast sums of money into
campaigns via the "soft-money" route. Democrats in the Senate wanted legislation
which would cap aggregate individual contributions at $30,000 per year ($60,000 per
two year election cycle) and would prohibit raising and spending soft money during
federal general elections. The Democratic National Party Chair David Wilhelm
argued for a vast increase in individual "hard money" contributions in exchange for
prohibitions on soft money.
A deal being tested by the White House with congressional Democratic leaders
looked like this:
An individual could give an aggregate of $60,000 per election cycle.
The Clinton proposal differs from S 3 in that it would establish
separate $20,000 annual sublimits for contributions to the national
party or state grass-roots campaigns, and a $20,000 two year sublimit
for federal candidates.49
The sublimit structure would keep an individual from making maximum
contributions to all three areas. Parties could still raise and spend money that
exceeded federal limits if the money was transferred directly to state parties and used
for state campaigns and administrative costs only. Also exempt were contributions
which were targeted specifically for party building funds which supported
construction costs and purchase or rent of party offices.
49 Beth Donovan, "Clinton Will Offer Plan Soon, But Deals Remain Up in Air,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v.51, n.17, April 24, 1993, p. 1000.
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The Clinton administration’s campaign finance reform plan was announced on
May 7, 1993. From the very beginning, it faced an uphill battle. In the Senate, five
key Republicans had signed a letter, on the eve of the President's announcement,
indicating their requirements for any campaign finance legislation. The letter
demanded lowering of limits for PAC contributions, lower limits on out-of-state
contributions, and similar rules for House and Senate campaigns. It also warned
against using taxpayer money to finance federal campaigns. Three of the five signers
had voted for the 1992 campaign finance bill which was vetoed by President Bush.
These Republican Senators were crucial to the success of the legislation because of
the likelihood that those who opposed campaign finance reform measures like those
in the Clinton plan, would stage a filibuster of the bill once it reached the floor.
With 57 Democrats in the Senate, two of whom voted against the 1992 bill50, it
was crucial that Majority Leader George Mitchell pick up those five Republican votes
in order to arrive at the necessary filibuster-proof majority.
Senate debate over the President's reform package was expected to be protracted,
with both Democrats and Republicans planning to offer scores of amendments, and
Republicans threatening to filibuster final passage. Prospects for swift action on
campaign finance reform in the 103rd Congress were dim.
In the House, growing numbers of Democratic lawmakers were becoming
increasingly unhappy with the public financing provisions of the legislation. Fortyseven House Democrats signed a letter to Speaker Tom Foley indicating their
intention to oppose such funding. Growing House opposition to public financing was
coupled with some House Democrats' uneasiness with the legislation's provision to
lower the limits on PAC giving. Additionally, there was mounting concern in the
50 Those Senators were Richard Shelby of Alabama, and Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina.
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House that the Senate would adopt the language of the 1992 bill which had outlawed
PAC contributions altogether. Fearing competitive challenges in the upcoming 1994
congressional mid-term elections, House Democrats were loathe to cut off the
advantage in PAC fund-raising they had traditionally enjoyed.
Senate Republicans made it clear that, although they did not try to keep the
legislation from coming to the floor for consideration via filibuster, they would not
hesitate to block final passage if public financing provisions remained in the
legislation. "If, at the end of the day, this bill still includes taxpayer funding of
elections, I don't think Democrats will be able to invoke cloture," said Senator Mitch
McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican floor leader on the bill.51
In a half-hearted effort to break the constitutional link between spending limits
and public financing, established by the Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in Buckley v.
Valeo, and thereby pick up the support of Senators and Representatives who were in
favor of spending limits but who balked at the idea of using public funds to subsidize
federal campaigns, the Senate accepted a sense of the Senate resolution, offered by
South Carolina Democrat Senator Ernest Hollings, in favor of an constitutional
amendment permitting the establishment of mandatory spending caps. The vote on
the resolution produced 52 votes in favor of its adoption, 15 votes shy of what would
be required to actually initiate such an amendment.
In the end, Senate Democrats and the White House understood that the only way
to get the campaign finance bill out of a reluctant Senate, and hopefully into a
conference with the House, assuming the House was able to pass a bill, was to gut it
of its public financing provisions. In adopting an amendment which would replace
substantial public funds with a new tax on the financial coffers of those congressional
51 Beth Donovan, "Delay, Controversey Certain As Senate Takes Up Plan,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v. 51, n.21, May 22,1993, p. 1273.
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campaigns not complying with spending limits (something of dubious
constitutionality, sure to be challenged if enacted52) the stalemate in the debate over
campaign finance reform was broken. But at what price?
The Senate had also insisted on including, as an amendment to the bill, an
extension to House campaigns of a 1992 Senate bill provision prohibiting all
contributions from PACs. This was clearly anathema to House Democrats. "We
cannot pass a ban on all PAC funding," said House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt
(D., MO).53 But, it was part of the price of winning a Senate cloture vote to cut off
debate on the bill and allow it to proceed to final passage. A vote on June 16, 1993
was 62-37 in favor of invoking cloture. The next day the Senate bill (S 3) was passed
60-38.
As passed, the Senate campaign finance bill would limit the amount that Senate
candidates could spend on primary and general election campaigns in exchange for
an exemption from the new tax on congressional campaign receipts. Further benefits
of compliance with expenditure caps would be made available to candidates in their
general election campaigns provided they had raised $250,000, or 5 percent of the
general election spending limit, whichever was less, in contributions of $250 or less
from state residents. Those benefits included postal and broadcast discounts, as well
as subsidies to complying qualified candidates who faced an opponent choosing to
exceed spending limits, or who were the target of opposition independent
expenditures. Political action committee contributions would be eliminated and fund
raising and spending by political parties in congressional campaigns would also be

52 See Beth Donovan, "A Constitutional Question", Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, v.51, n.25, June 19, 1993, p.1539.
53 Beth Donovan and Phil Kuntz, "Senate vs. House," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, v.51, n.25, June 19,1993, p. 1533.
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restricted. The Senate bill extended the PAC ban, and a ban on election year mass
mailings under the congressional franking privilege, to the campaigns of House
candidates. But the House would have its own bill to write.
"The notion that political action committees are some kind of an essential evil is
flat-out wrong," said House Speaker Tom Foley (D., WA). "The royal road to fairness
is public financing, and the fact that it is unpopular does not change its essential
merit."54 A large bloc of House Democrats were eager to include public financing in
the House campaign finance reform bill being drafted by the party leadership. Yet,
the Senate had had to discard it in order to pass a bill. Furthermore, many of those
same Democrats in the House saw public funds as necessary to offset the increased
restrictions on PAC contributions which appeared to be inevitable in any conference
bill. House members would never agree to a total restriction on PACs ( either in the
drafting of separate House legislation or in conference), as had the Senate, but there
was a resignation to the notion of some further scaling back of the PAC role in House
campaigns if any campaign finance reform bill were to come out of the 103rd
Congress.
The fact that the Senate legislation had already been approved by the Senate, and
was awaiting separate House action on campaign finance reform in order to proceed
to conference, weighed heavy in the minds of House bill drafters. Knowing that some
of the important provisions of the Senate bill would not appear in any House drafted
bill, the difficulty of writing legislation which would address the particular concerns
of House members and yet be acceptable enough to potential Senate conferees so as
not to result in conference committee gridlock, presented House leaders with a
daunting task. House Majority Leader Gephardt, speaking of the demands of Senate

54 Ibid.
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Republicans that any bill resulting from a House-Senate conference committee have
the same rules for House and Senate campaigns, said, "If the Republicans in the
Senate are saying that, we're not going to get a bill. We can't pass that."55
While House Democrats fretted about how to draft their version of campaign
finance reform law, House Republicans beat them to the punch and offered a plan
which was designed to accomplish two aims.56 First, the House GOP plan was
intended to make Republican challengers more competitive in election contests with
Democratic incumbents. In order to effectuate that competition, Republicans
proposed adoption of the Senate outright ban on political action committee
contributions to all congressional campaigns. While such an outright ban was
controversial within the rank and file House Republican membership, it was sold by
the GOP leadership as being ripe with potential for crippling embarrassment for
House Democrats. This would accomplish the second goal of the GOP plan.
Knowing that they did not have the votes to enact a Republican initiative, House GOP
leaders wished to announce their proposals before House Democrats in order to box
those Democrats into a comer. By taking a position in favor of the PAC ban, the
House GOP would isolate their Democratic counterparts as being protective of the
PAC system. With the Senate having voted without dissent to add the PAC ban to its
bill and, further, to extend that ban to House elections, and with House Republicans
now announcing their support of that ban, House Democrats were the only group
standing in the way of banning all PACs.
The question of whether or not such an outright ban of political action committees
was constitutional under the First Amendment's guarantee of free association,

55 Ibid.
56 Beth Donovan, "House GOP Plan Backs Ban on PAC Funds," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, v.51, n.42, October 23, 1993, p.2859.
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presented its proponents with the problem of having to include in the bill a fallback
plan should the courts decide to throw out the PAC ban. Accordingly, the House
GOP leaders included the fallback provision of lowering the limit on amounts which
PACs could contribute to House campaigns from the existing $5,000 limit to $1,000.
The Senate passed bill (S 3) had also included such a fallback plan with respect to its
PAC ban provision.
Also included in the House GOP plan was a requirement that all House candidates
raise the majority of their campaign funds from individuals within their districts.
Democrats countered that such a requirement would disadvantage women and
minority candidates who have a harder time raising money in their districts and
would discriminate against candidates who lived in districts which are predominantly
inhabited by voters of another party.
Republicans featured, in their bill, a provision that would have allowed party
committees to enhance the financing of challenger campaigns by contributing
matching amounts to a challenger who faced an incumbent candidate who had
amassed a substantial financial war chest. The provision clearly stood to benefit
Republican challengers more so than Democrats since Republican party treasuries
were so much better funded than Democratic ones.
Other provisions of the House Republican plan included: (1) A ban on all "soft
money" funds used to influence federal elections, (2) Registered lobbyists and
political action committees would not be allowed to continue bundling checks from
individuals to give to candidates, (3) Contribution limits would be lifted for
candidates facing wealthy opponents who spent more than $250,000 in personal
funds in their own campaigns, and (4) Membership dues from labor unions could not
be used for political purposes without the written permission of individual members.
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House Democrats, meanwhile, were still engaged in behind-the-scenes caucus
negotiations over just what to include, or omit, from their campaign finance draft bill.
The difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory proposal was underscored by a participant
in the talks who asked to remain anonymous stating, "An enormous number of people
are not addressing the merits of the bill but their own political profiles. The process
is maddening."57
The main issues of contention in the Democratic rank and file included the bill's
price tag for its public financing provision, and whether or not to include a tax on
contributions to candidates as one way to pay for federal funding. Concerns about
the public cost to taxpayers of federal campaign financing prompted many House
Democrats to propose sliding the public benefits available to qualifying candidates
down from $200,000 to $100,000 for general election expenses. Some senior House
Democrats, including caucus Chair Representative Steny Hoyer of Maryland, argued
that the contributions tax was unconstitutional and should not be included in the bill.
Other conservative Democrats, nevertheless, continued to press for a 35 percent tax
on contributions which exceeded the spending limits, even if the tax on all
contributions was excluded from consideration.
Another main issue, of course, centered on what should be done about PAC
monies. Few House Democrats supported either the Senate or House GOP plan to
eliminate the role of political action committees in their campaigns. But how to
address the issue so it would be clear to the Senate that the House would not
countenance such a ban remaining in any conference report, was more problematic.
An aggregate PAC limit of $200,000 (one-third of the $600,000 spending limit),

57 Beth Donovan, "Democrats On Hold," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
v.51, n.42, October 23, 1993, p.2860.
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applying to all House candidates whether or not they chose to comply with spending
caps, was seen as the likely House language on the issue.
When House Democrats finally began markup on their campaign finance plan in
the House Administration Committee on November 10, 1993, in the waning days of
the congressional session, it was under the pall of a Republican sweep of major
elections across the country. Although lacking in enthusiasm for campaign finance
reform legislation passage prior to the 1994 congressional elections, House
Democrats also felt that they could ill afford to look as though they were the group
responsible for the obstruction of those reform efforts. Consequently, the House
Administration Committee approved a Democratic version of the campaign finance
bill (HR 3; H Rept. 103-375, Part 1) on a partisan 12-7 vote, finally sending a
measure to the House floor for consideration. Under a massive House leadership
engineered campaign, Democrats rallied to pass the bill in the House on a 255-175
largely partisan vote.
The House package included public funding, up to one-third of the spending limit
of $600,000, for House candidates who chose to comply with those ceilings.
Spending limits would be indexed for inflation beginning in 1993 and certain legal
and administrative expenses would be exempt from inclusion under the caps. No
provisions were included to increase public funds for candidates facing non
complying opponents. PAC contributions would remain capped at existing levels of
$5,000 per election from any one PAC, but an aggregate limit of $200,000 (or onethird of the spending limit) was to be imposed. An additional one-third of the
spending limit could be composed of contributions from individuals giving more than
$ 200.

Unlike Senate bill S 3, the House bill, HR 3, would contain a provision whereby a
candidate who had won a contested primary election by twenty percent or less would
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become eligible for additional public matching funds. Both bills contained language
increasing funds to candidates who faced substantial opposition independent
spending. The House bill did not include any provision for funding the benefits it
sought to authorize. The tax on contributions idea was dropped from the bill's final
language. The Senate bill had repealed the tax exemption for campaign receipts and
disallowed deductions for lobbying expenses, as a method of funding its Senate
Campaign Fund. There was no inclusion of any such language specifying how
revenue for the House Make Democracy Work Fund would be generated.58 The
Senate had passed legislation in which candidates choosing not to comply with
spending ceilings would be subject to a new federal tax, equal to the highest
corporate tax rate of 35 percent, on all campaign receipts. The House version
contained no comparable provision.
With regard to bundling, House legislation corresponded to Senate bill S 3, with
one significant exception: The Senate had prohibited all PACs from bundling; the
House would outlaw the practice only for those PACs which were connected to
corporations, labor unions, or groups which engaged in lobbying activities. PACs
such as EMILY's List could continue to bundle member contributions for donation to
selected candidates under the House bill's provisions.
Senate bill S 3 would require national, state, and local party committees to pay for
all voter registration campaigns, get-out-the-vote drives, and campaign activity which
promoted a political party rather than individual candidates (generic party activity),
with "hard money" funds raised under federal guidelines. The House legislation
would have permitted subordinate party committees, for instance state legislative

58 See "Campaign Finance Bills Compared," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
v.52, n.5, February 5, 1994, p.262(8) for a point by point comparison of the two bills
S 3 and HR 3.
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party committees, to use soft money for generic party activities. In most other
important respects House and Senate language on restricting the use of soft money in
federal campaigns was comparable. Both would have established new state party
"grass roots" funds which could accept money raised in compliance with federal
guidelines to fund generic party activities, voter registration efforts, and get out the
vote drives, traditionally funded by soft money contributions. In the House bill PACs
could contribute up to $15,000 to such state grass roots funds. The Senate bill
contained a fallback provision, should its ban on PACs be ruled unconstitutional,
allowing for the same PAC contribution to state grass roots funds.
With President Clinton committed to signing a new campaign finance bill, and
with both the Senate and the House passing separate versions of campaign finance
reform measures, the long road to reform of existing campaign finance law appeared
to be finally arriving at its destination. It was not to be, however.
As the new congressional session began in 1994, President Clinton turned his
attention to other matters, apparently convinced that the ball now lay in the court of
the congressional conference committee to work out an acceptable compromise bill
which he would sign. Even though the likely legislation would not much resemble
the proposal which the President had announced on that sunny day in early May of
1993, Clinton was publicly committed to signing new campaign finance law.
Congress only had to get it to his desk.
Democrats in the House and Senate were badly divided over the bill. Democratic
party leaders spent a great deal of time and energy trying to fashion a back room
compromise which could gain support in both chambers. Just as it appeared that
Democratic leaders were ready to stitch together a compromise which could attract
sufficient Democratic support in both chambers, it became apparent that the deal
worked out amongst the Democrats could not get Republican votes. As a result, the
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campaign finance bill became one of the several bills which were filibustered to
death by Senate Republicans in the closing days of the 1994 regular congressional
session.
Republican Senators actually filibustered the normally routine motion to request a
conference with the House to iron differences between the separate versions of the
campaign finance bill. The Senate usually proceeds to conference with the House on
a three-part motion, each part of that motion requiring a separate vote, that, first disagrees with the House version of the bill, second, requests a conference, and third,
authorizes the appointment of conferees. Typically, each part of the motion is agreed
to by unanimous consent, but is technically subject to filibuster.59 That is what
Senate Republicans, under the floor leadership of Senator Mitch McConnell of
Kentucky, decided to do. "Gridlock is making a comeback," said McConnell, "The
American people are begging us to stop campaign finance."60
The Democratic cloture motion never stood a chance against a nearly unanimous
Senate GOP. On each of several separate attempts by Democrats to invoke cloture
over the Republican filibuster on the motion to request a conference committee,
Democrats failed to achieve the required threshold of sixty votes, never coming
closer than eight votes shy of the requirement. On the fourth such vote, again failing
to get the needed sixty votes, Democratic congressional leaders proclaimed the
campaign finance effort dead. House Speaker Tom Foley said of the unprecedented
Senate filibuster of a routine conference request motion61, "The worst case of
obstruction by filibuster by any party that I've seen in my thirty years in Congress."62

59 The procedure is outlined in Beth Donovan, "Republicans Plan Filibusters,
Imperiling Senate Schedule," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v.52,
September 24, 1994, p.2655.
60 Ibid.
61 Neither the Senate historian nor the parliamentarian could recall a precedent for
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It was ironic, however, that there wasn't even a bill to fight over. Democratic
leaders, by the time the request for conference motion was being filed in the Senate,
still had not worked out agreement amongst themselves about how to resolve the
differences in how to deal with PACs which separated the two bills. Even if such
agreement had been reached, congressional staff and conferees would have had to put
the finishing touches on a host of preliminary agreements worked out during the
previous ten-month period of negotiations. Democrats liked to point the finger of
blame at Republicans for the demise of campaign finance reform, when it had
become all too painfully obvious that they themselves could not seem to reach final
agreement on comprehensive reform measures. Both sides, Republican and
Democrat alike, were playing the issue of campaign finance reform with an eye
toward the upcoming congressional elections and each side was maneuvering to
maximize political mileage out of the stalemate on the bill.
Campaign finance reform was dead at the close of the 103rd Congress; and with
Republicans gaining control of both houses of the 104th Congress, the prospects for
reviving the corpse of campaign finance reform in the near future are practically non
existent. It is no secret that the new Republican majorities have not chosen to elevate
the issues of campaign finance reform to the top of their agenda for change. For now,
and for the foreseeable future, the status quo system, established with passage of the
1971 FECA and its subsequent amendments of 1974, 1976 and 1979, stands, flaws,
imperfections, unintended consequences, loopholes, and all, as the law of the land.62

the type of filibuster which took place in the Senate. It was, apparently, the first time
that a routine motion to go to conference had been the subject of a cloture vote in the
United States Senate. This fact is noted in Beth Donovan, "Republicans Plan
Filibusters...", p.2655.
62 Quoted in "Vote Studies," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v.52,
December 31, 1994, p.3647.
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Commonalities
When one examines the history of campaign finance reform, as has been done
here, one can not help but notice the commonality of the major issues, and proposals
to address those issues, which has prevailed over the years. All of the proposals, from
both Democratic and Republican perspectives, dealing with campaign finance reform
have focused on three major issue areas: (1) Whether or not to require candidates for
federal office to abide by mandated (or optional) spending limits, (2) Whether or not
the campaign financing operations of political action committees ought to be
curtailed or eliminated altogether, and (3) Whether or not it is desirable, or prudent,
to extend the system of public financing currently operating in presidential
campaigns, to all congressional campaigns. While many other issues, such as "soft
money", independent expenditures, bundling, and the like have arisen over the years,
these issues are all addressed within the context of seeking answers to the larger
issues of spending ceilings, public financing and political action committees.
First, the issue of skyrocketing costs for federal campaigns has led to questions
about what ought to be done to control those costs. Many proposals offered to
effectuate such control by requiring candidates to adhere to spending limits in their
campaigns for public office. The FECA of 1971 established spending limits for
presidential campaigns as a requirement for participation in the public financing plan
begun with adoption of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act in that same
year. The 1974 FECA Amendments sought to extend the concept of spending limits
to congressional campaigns; but those imposed limits were ruled unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley decision. From that day to the
present, reformers have continued to press forward with calls to institute spending
caps in congressional campaigns, either in conjunction with public financing, as
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sanctioned by the Court's ruling in Buckley, or by means of a constitutional
amendment overriding that ruling.
What would the effects of spending ceilings in congressional campaigns be? How
would electoral competition, and the democratic process, be affected by controlling
spiraling costs through mandatory (or voluntary) spending limits? These are
questions which require careful study before hasty enactment leads to unintended
consequences requiring even further legislative or judicial correction. Accordingly,
spending limits for congressional campaigns will be examined in the light of a
quantitative analysis of campaign finance data collected by the Federal Election
Commission for the years 1988 through 1994. A multiple regression analysis
modeled after a study undertaken by Gary Jacobson63 will attempt to shed some light
on the consequences and desirability of establishing spending limits for congressional
campaigns. The extent to which candidate (both incumbents and challengers)
campaign spending affects election results will be examined. Relationships between
campaign expenditures and percentage of the vote received will be analyzed in order
to discover any possible effects of spending on election results. If a relationship
between expenditures and votes received is found to exist, then it becomes crucial to
understand the implications of efforts to limit the amounts which candidates may
spend in their election efforts. If spending more means more votes, then what are the
consequences of limiting campaign spending? If spending more does not translate
into more votes, then limitations on candidate spending will have minimal or no
effect on electoral results and ought to be adopted forthwith to control exorbitant
costs.

63 Gary Jacobson, Money In Congressional Elections. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1980.
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Second, questions surrounding the role of political action committees in the
financing of congressional campaigns continue to imply all sorts of dastardly
consequences resulting from "special interest undue influence." The proliferation of
PACs in congressional campaigns, both in terms of growth in the numbers of
committees and in terms of amounts given to congressional candidates (in total
dollars and as a percentage of total campaign receipts), reveals the extent to which
PACs have become important players in the present campaign finance arena. But,
what exactly do PAC contributions buy? Are charges of a quid pro quo arrangement
of campaign money in exchange for favorable legislative treatment, substantiated by
the body of work examining this issue? What would an analysis of PAC
contributions to congressional campaigns reveal about their effect on election results?
Could one reasonably conclude that elections can be won or lost largely on the basis
of amounts of PAC dollars received? Is there any evidence to suggest that political
action committees enjoy any "undue influence" either on the outcomes of
congressional campaigns, or on legislative outcomes following elections? What
would be the political effects of banning PACs from participating in the electoral
process or curtailing the extent to which such groups can continue to operate in those
processes?
In order to seek answers to these questions it is necessary to review the literature
with respect to PAC legislative influence and to examine PAC contribution data in an
effort to understand their relationship to election results and legislative votes. Based
upon such a review, one ought to be able to enunciate a clearer understanding of the
nature of PAC "influence" in the democratic process. Examining the patterns of PAC
giving in congressional campaigns will serve to illuminate the potential political
consequences of either an outright PAC ban or a further limiting of PAC participation
in campaign financing.
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Third, hand in hand with the issue of spending limits is the question of the
desirability of extending public financing into congressional campaigns. Many
reform proposals examined above have included just such an extension. Republican
lawmakers have been vehemently opposed to using public funds to finance political
campaigns, calling any such plan "food stamps for politicians." Many Democrats
and citizen watchdog groups, such as Common Cause and Public Citizen, have
argued in favor of using public funds to finance congressional campaigns, calling it
the "surest road to fairness." Proponents point to the relative success of the system as
it has applied to presidential campaigns and say that the same success could be
achieved with public financing in campaigns for Congress. Opponents point to the
enormous costs of taxpayer funds which would be required to finance any system of
public financing, and say that it would be both unwise and imprudent to subsidize
political campaigns in an era of budget cuts and deficits.
What are the costs involved in proposals to extend the public financing system to
all congressional campaigns? What are the philosophical and political perspectives
which are brought to bear in partisan discussions over the merits of public financing?
Given those public costs, political considerations and public perceptions, what is the
likelihood of seeing public financing extended to congressional campaigns? An
analysis of the health of the current system of public financing for presidential
elections, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund income-tax checkoff procedure,
and the feasibility and constitutionality of some of the more popular proposals for
financing the public funds benefits to congressional candidates, will serve to
illuminate the probability of public financing in congressional campaigns being
realized.

CHAPTER FIVE
SPENDING CEILINGS
After World War II, the costs of running for Congress and for the presidency rose
ever higher with each successive federal election cycle. Spending in Senate races
reached into the millions of dollars and contests for many House seats witnessed
spending into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. As the costs associated with
those campaigns and the amounts spent by all candidates for federal office soared,
candidates turned to wealthy individuals, business and labor unions and other "special
interest" organizations for help in securing the requisite funding. Money, and lots of
it, became crucial to the successful campaign to a degree never before seen. The
purported influence of large contributors, in the election process and in matters of
public policy following elections, grew accordingly. But, to the extent to which
candidates and their campaign organizations were not required to disclose the details,
or even the actual amounts, of contributions to their election efforts, the public
remained essentially "in-the-dark."
Until the 1971 FECA, the basic law which had governed the financial activities of
federal campaigns, regulating spending and requiring disclosure, was the ineffective
and outdated Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. The Act set a spending maximum of
$25,000 for Senate campaigns and $10,000 for campaigns for the U.S. House of
Representatives. It was largely ignored and there existed no governmental authority
for enforcement. Candidates simply chose to report only those expenses which they
wished to report, often providing little revealing information about the actual
amounts and sources of campaign funds received and expenses incurred. All
92
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candidates for the U.S. Senate reported spending only $8.5 million in 196 8.64 But, as
figures filed after congressional passage of the 1971 FECA would show, this report of
$8.5 million was, in all likelihood, quite inaccurate. The comprehensive disclosure
requirements of the 1971 FECA, and its subsequent amendments, revealed that
congressional candidates (Senate and House candidates combined) had spent
approximately $90 million in 1972, $140 million in 1976, and almost $200 million in
1978.65
In the aftermath of Watergate, a scandal of governmental corruption in general,
and money in politics in particular, the significance of money's role in the federal
electoral processes became glaringly apparent. Investigations into the scandals
surrounding the Watergate affair revealed specific violations of campaign
contribution and spending laws, and violations of other criminal laws which were
facilitated by the availability of seemingly unlimited amounts of unregulated
campaign contributions. Although Congress had seen fit to begin to reform the
manner in which campaign contributions were collected, reported, and spent in
enacting the 1971 FECA, Watergate revelations spurred an angry public, and a
worried Congress, to demand stronger campaign finance legislation. The Federal
Election Campaign Act was therefore significantly expanded and strengthened in
subsequent amending legislation in 1974, 1976, and 1979. It is as a result of the
FECA, and its requirement of the submission to the Federal Election Commission of
detailed campaign financial reports, that we now are able to see the extent to which
money plays a significant role in federal congressional elections. According to Larry
Sabato, the new campaign finance laws had five objectives:

64"Campaign Financing", p.93.
65 Ibid.
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(1) to reduce the impact of "big money" and the influence of large
contributors; (2) to eliminate, as far as practicable, fraud and
deception in campaign finance; (3) to strengthen the position of the
political parties; (4) to encourage candidates to cast their financial net
widely, increasing participation in campaigns by broad-based appeals
rather than simply relying on the gifts of a few; and (5) to enable
people from all economic levels to seek public office, minimizing the
importance of personal wealth.66
From the evidence of congressional campaign spending in election cycles since
enactment of the FECA and its amendments, the means established in the legislation
to accomplish the objectives outlined above - those means being, limitations on
campaign spending, public financing of federal candidates' campaigns, and full
disclosure of amounts and sources of contributions and campaign expenditures - have
either been weakened or eliminated. In any case, federal campaign finance laws have
not lived up to original expectations.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court, in its Buckley decision, had upheld the
legality of spending ceilings for presidential campaigns precisely because those
ceilings were imposed in conjunction with a presidential candidate's voluntary
acceptance of public financing. Absent a provision for the extension of some plan of
public financing to congressional campaigns, spending ceilings can not legally be
imposed in congressional campaigns. However, calls for additional campaign
finance reform measures have focused on getting a hold on the reins of runaway
campaign costs. The costs and expenditures associated with present day
congressional campaigns have continued to rise precipitously. An analysis of the

66 Larry Sabato. The Rise of Political Consultants. New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1981, p.276.
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financial activity of all congressional campaigns from 1971 to 1992 reveals that the
costs of those campaigns have increased sharply.67
Table 1
Congressional Campaign Expenditures 1971-1992 (in millions)
1971-1972
1973-1974
1975-1976
1977-1978
1979-1980
1981-1982
1983-1984
1985-1986
1987-1988
1989-1990
1991-1992

77.3
88.2
115.5
194.8
239
342.4
374.1
450.9
459
446.3
678

14
31
69
23
43
9
21
2
-3
52

Source: Financing Politics

While Table 1 clearly shows a trend of sharply rising costs in congressional
campaigns, it is interesting to note that spending in congressional campaigns actually
showed a decrease in the 1990 election cycle, only to drastically rise again in 1992.
The percentage increase in spending column of Table 1 reveals that congressional
campaign spending has steadily increased (except for the 1990 cycle) by margins
from as low as two percent in the 1987-88 cycle to highs of 69 percent in 1977-78
and 52 percent in 1991-92.
It is important to note that the increases reported in Table 1 do not take inflation
rates into account. The figures in Table 1 are in actual (not constant) dollars, and if
inflation rates had been taken into consideration the increases would not be so stark.
While there is no question that rising inflation has contributed to the rising levels of
campaign spending, it can not be said to fully account for the precipitous ascent of

67 Figures are from Herbert Alexander. Financing Politics: Money. Elections, and
Political Reform. 4th ed., Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992,
p. 118, and Federal Election Commission press release reports dated October 31,
1989, December 10, 1991, and March 4, 1993.

96

overall campaign expenditures. Spending is on the rise in modem congressional
campaigns, and the most recent round of congressional mid-term elections is no
exception. Indeed, campaigning for Congress has increasingly become the province
of the individually wealthy who can afford to take time out from their private lives to
campaign for office.
Congressional campaign spending rose by 52 percent, from $446.3 million in the
1989-90 cycle to $678 million in 1992. According to a Federal Election Commission
review of campaign finance reports covering financial activity from January 1, 1993
through November 28, 1994, total congressional campaign spending had risen to
$693.5 million for the 1993-94 cycle.6869This represented an increase of two percent
(to November 28,1994) over the 1992 level. Of the total spending activity,
expenditures by the winning House and Senate candidates for the election cycles
1975-76 through 1993-1994 (to November 28,1994) were as follows:
Table 2
Total Spending of Winning Senate and House Candidates 1975-1992
Election Cycle Sena
House
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
1985-86
1987-88
1989-90
1991-92
1993-94

20.1
42.3
40
68.2
97.5
104.3
123.6
115.4
124.3
144.2

38
55.6
78
114.7
127
154.9
171
179.1
239.8
220.7

Source: Federal Election Commission69 (figures in millions of dollars)
Again, the trend is clearly manifest - costs are rising with each successive election
cycle for both House and Senate winning candidates.

68 Federal Election Commission press release dated December 22, 1994.
69 Federal Election Commission reports dated March 4,1993 and December 22,1994.
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Figure 1
Total Spending By Winning House and Senate Candidates
(Ten Election Cycles 1975-1994)
(Data from Table 2 above used to generate line graphs of winner's total spending)
Examination of the line graphs in Figure 1 reveals that total spending for
congressional winners has been rising with each election cycle. Except for the
decrease in Senate winner's spending which occurred in the 1990 (#8) cycle
(consistent with the overall trends in Table 1), Senate winners have spent increasingly
more money to win their races. House winners have also spent consistently more to
win election. Although the line graph of Figure 1 and the House data in Table 2
reveal a decrease in total spending for House winners in the election cycle ending in
1994 (#10), it remains to be seen if this represents a downward turn in the overall
trend of spending or merely a one-time aberration.
The point illustrated here is that increasing sums of money are being spent by
congressional candidates in the aggregate (winners and losers combined); and, in
order to win election to Congress, candidates have felt compelled to spend ever
greater sums.
To what extent does candidate spending determine the results of elections for
congressional office? Has the role of money in elections grown so large that we can
reliably predict who will win a given election simply by knowing who will spend
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what? Does what a candidate spends have a significant effect on the percentage of
vote received? Should campaign finance law be further amended to mandate ceilings
on the amounts that candidates can spend in their election campaigns, whether such
mandated limits require a constitutional amendment (in light of the Buckley ruling) or
are imposed in conjunction with public financing? These are all questions which
relate to current efforts to reform federal campaign finance policy. Many of the
concerns of those who advocate policy revisions in campaign finance reflect a desire
to impose ceilings on the amounts that can be spent in congressional races. It is
argued that the rapid and steady increases in spending by candidates for federal office
should not be allowed to continue unabated. The increasing expenditures associated
with a run for public office, it is argued, have effectively narrowed the range of
possible candidates down to only those who are either personally wealthy or are
beholden to special interests through their increased reliance on interest group (PAC)
monies. If this is so, then the original reform objective referred to by Dr. Sabato as
"enabling people from all economic levels to seek public office, minimizing the
importance of personal wealth," has been lost.
To illustrate the degree to which large fortunes have come to play an increasingly
important role in today's federal elections, advocates of spending ceilings need only
point to the examples of Senator Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin, who spent $6.5 million
dollars of his own money to win re-election to the Senate in 1994, and Michael
Huffington of California who spent an astounding $27.8 million dollars of his
personal fortune on his failed bid to win a California Senate seat in 1994.70
Huffington had spent some $5 million of his own money on his successful House bid
in 1992. That all citizens are not meaningfully able to run for public office is
70 Figures are from Federal Election Commission public press release dated
December 22, 1994.
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demonstrated by the exorbitant costs of campaigns for federal office. Jamin Raskin
and John Bonifaz have argued that the current regime of campaign finance has led to
a situation in which elected officials are compelled to spend a significant portion of
their time in office pursuing the requisite funds to finance their next election rather
than using that time more productively doing the public's business. It has also created
what they call the "wealth primary." This wealth primary is "...terribly costly, ...and
wastes extraordinary amounts of precious time that all candidates should spend
debating public issues and that incumbent officials should spend on their public
responsibilities. ..The exorbitant costs of campaigns for federal office have placed
candidacy far beyond the means not only of the poor, but also of ordinary working
people."71 Raskin and Bonifaz cite statistics from a database maintained by the
Center for Responsive Politics to buttress their assertions.
A winning campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992
cost, on average, $543,000, and the average rose to $730,000 in what
can be deemed close races. Forty-three House candidates each spent
more than $1 million on his or her campaign in 1992. Meanwhile, a
winning campaign for the U.S. Senate cost, on average, $3.9 million.
The top five Senate spenders in 1992 spent between $6 and $10
million.72
The authors go on to make the point that the high costs of modem congressional
campaigns would be irrelevant to the openness of the electoral process if the amount
of money spent bore no relation to a candidate's likelihood of electoral success. If
more money did not correlate with winning elections, or did not at least provide a
meaningfully competitive chance, then it could not be said that greater costs

71 Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, "The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections," Columbia Law Review, v.94, n.4,
May 1994, p. 1174.
72 Ibid.
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(spending) impeded the democratic process. But, Raskin and Bonifaz state that the
candidates who spend the most money are consistently the most likely to win.
In 388 of 435 House races in 1992, the candidate who spent the most
money won. In thirty-six Senate races, thirty-one of the winners
outspent their opponents, and twenty-four of them did so by a margin
of two-to-one or more. It is, of course, possible that election winners
tend to be fundraising champions simply because they are more
popular and more people want to give them money. If this were so,
money would not play a decisive role in determining the outcome of
election races. But, we have found that it is the amount of campaign
money received which is correlated with victory, not the number of
campaign contributions - the far more likely barometer of candidate
popularity. The fact is that the total amount of money raised, even if
from a small number of wealthy sources, makes a crucial difference in
contemporary electoral politics.73
In some expansive explanatory footnotes to their discussion of campaign finance
and their view of the current system's perpetuation of a "wealth primary" for
meaningful candidacy, Raskin and Bonifaz restate their evidence to make their
argument clearer.
To restate the figures just cited, 89% of all House winners outspent
their opponents, and 86% of all Senate winners outspent their
opponents (388 of 435 House races and 31 of 36 Senate races). Yet the
vast majority (77%) of all money raised in House and Senate races in
1992 came from less than one percent of the nation's population in
amounts of $200 or more. The support of a wealthy one percent of the
population cannot serve as a fair measure of a candidate's popularity
with the overall electorate. These numbers also show that the amount
of money available to a candidate frequently determines the outcome
of an election. The statistics indicate that a candidate who receives a
higher number of contributions than her opponent but loses in the
overall money chase (i.e. if many of her contributions come from
small donors) will still most likely lose. The key factor is the total
amount of money raised, not the total number of contributions.74

73 Ibid., p. 1175-76.
74 Footnote #49, p. 1175-76, in Raskin and Bonifaz.
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Spending limits proponents argue that by controlling spending in political
campaigns (either in conjunction with public financing proposals, via constitutional
amendment absent public financing, and/or limitations on aggregate PAC
contributions to any single campaign) the electoral process can be opened up to allow
greater participation for all those who wish to seek election to public office. The
imposition of spending limits would provide more choice - in terms of eliminating a
significant financial restriction for potential candidates - to the electorate. In short,
the process would become more democratic.75
Republican and other critics of spending caps argue precisely the opposite, taking
the position that spending ceilings would hinder rather than foster competitiveness in
congressional elections. They argue that spending ceilings amount to little more than
"incumbent protection" programs since it is felt that challengers must spend greater
amounts than incumbents in order to overcome incumbent name recognition, and
other, advantages. Therefore, any expenditure restrictions work to further the
advantages of incumbency by limiting the ability of challengers to spend sufficient
sums to gain the necessary degree of recognition. Rather than opening up the
electoral process by fostering real competition, expenditure limits would simply and
unfairly restrict meaningful challenger candidacies.

75 Arguments for the imposition of spending limits in conjunction with public
financing and/or limits on aggregate PAC contributions are provided in Fred
Wertheimer, "The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics," Arizona Law Review,
v.22, n.2, 1980, p.603-26, and Candice J. Nelson and David Maglesby, "Congress and
Campaign Money: The Prospects for Reform," The Brookings Review. Spring 1989,
p.34-41. Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz argue quite persuasively for limiting
spending via total public financing of congressional campaigns in "The Constitutional
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections,"
Columbia Law Review, v.94, n.4, May 1994, p. 1160-1203.
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It is, perhaps, paradoxical that some Democratic incumbents, as we have seen,
have also resisted efforts to adopt refonn proposals advocating spending ceilings.
Those Democratic opponents have not been receptive to the idea of spending ceilings
largely out of the fear of competition. They have argued within the Democratic
congressional caucuses that spending ceilings would hurt their chances for re-election
since they need to spend ever greater sums to combat competitive primary challenges
and maintain their general election competitive edge. It is their feeling that strong
primary challenges detract from their institutional incumbent advantages by calling
attention to their records and by turning the issue of incumbency on its head making
it a disadvantage rather than an advantage. Any imposition of spending ceilings in
these circumstances, it is argued, work to hamper an incumbent's ability to combat
strong challengers.
In order to responsibly address a policy of campaign finance reform which
includes spending limits proposals, it is necessary to examine the effects of
expenditures on election results. Does a candidate's level of spending have a
significant effect on his/her eventual share of the vote? Is the evidence which Raskin
and Bonifaz cite validated by more rigorous quantitative analysis of aggregate
campaign finance data? Is any possible effect more significant for incumbents or
challengers; and to what extent would any difference in effect between incumbents
and challengers shed light on the wisdom of reform proposals advocating expenditure
ceilings?
With the availability of congressional campaign expenditure figures from the
Federal Election Commission, made possible by the public disclosure requirements of
the FECA, political scientists have begun to examine the role of money in
congressional elections (Jacobson 1980, Maisel and Cooper 1981). In his 1980 study
entitled Money in Congressional Elections, political scientist Gary C. Jacobson
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concluded that, "congressional elections are affected much more by what challengers
spend than by what incumbents spend. The more spending by all candidates, the
better challengers are likely to do."76 His conclusions were reached through the
application of a multiple regression model of analysis with the equation:
CV = a + b-l(lnCEPV) + b-2(lnIEPV) + b-3(P) + b-4(lnVAP) + e
where: CV = challenger's vote percentage,
InCEPV = natural log of the challenger's expenditures, cents per voting age
individual,
lnlEPV = natural log of the incumbent's expenditures, cents per voting age
individual,
InVAP = natural log of the voting age population of the state, thousands,
P = challenger's party (1 if Democratic, 0 if Republican)77
The challenger's share of the vote was taken to be a function of what he/she spends,
what his/her opponent (the incumbent) spends, party affiliation, and the voting age
population of the state. Jacobson noted that the same equation with observations on
incumbents - incumbent's vote percentage as the dependent variable - "would
generate estimates which exactly mirror those derived from this model; either one
would support the same substantive conclusions."78
Jacobson examined U.S. Senate elections in the years 1972, 1974, and 1976, and
using his regression model on the campaign finance data collected for each of those
years, was able to reach conclusions about the effects of campaign spending in Senate
elections. He also applied the model to House campaign spending for the same
periods and those results mirrored the conclusions reached for Senate campaigns.
Jacobson's Senate results were as follows:

76 Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1980, p.219.
77 Ibid., p.43.
78 Ibid., p.39.
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Table 3*
Effects of Campaign Spending in Senate Elections 1972-76
Regression Coefficient
t-.mt.io
Standardized Regression
Coefficient
1972 CV=a
16.5
bl InCEPV
6.29
4.79
.88
b2 lnlEPV
-3.98
-2.36
-.40
b3 P
2.55
.89
.14
b4 In VAP
2.88
1.93
.33
(N=25)
1974 CV=a
24.4
bl InCEPV
3.40
2.96
.70
b2 lnlEPV
-.14
-.06
-.02
b3 P
8.26
5.12
.55
b4 In VAP
1.03
.75
.15
(N=22)
1976 CV=a
-18.4
bl InCEPV
7.42
5.20
.97
b2 lnlEPV
.67
.60
.10
b3 P
.51
.16
.02
b4 InVAP
5.37
3.57
.60
(N=23)
r2=.70
♦from Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, p.44.
Expenditures were divided by the voting age population of the states to control for
wide divergence in state population numbers. Challenger and incumbent
expenditures were entered as separate variables because their coefficients were
expected to be quite different. This was because it was hypothesized that money
would be more important to challengers than incumbents in congressional elections.
The amount spent by challengers was expected to have a greater effect on an election
outcome than the amount spent by incumbents. Analysis of the data for the Senate
elections examined clearly show that challenger spending had a statistically
significant and greater effect on an election outcomes. Results for House elections
likewise revealed a greater challenger spending effect. Jacobson chose the log form
for his equation because it fit his data better than did the linear form. Jacobson
indicates, however, that both the log and linear forms fit the data almost equally as

105

well ("...the R squares were identical for 1972 and 1974 with the linear form showing
a better fit for 1976"79). The log form allows for taking into account the diminishing
returns which must apply to candidate spending: no candidate can get more than 100
percent of the vote no matter how much he/she spends.
The current study attempts to apply the multiple regression model developed by
Jacobson to Senate races in which there was an incumbent and a major party
challenger for the election years 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994.80 This study differs
from the Jacobson approach in that the Senate races for the indicated years are
combined and examined in the aggregate, not for each individual year. Additionally,
the linear form of this data is utilized rather than Jacobson's log form since the
regression coefficients are more easily interpreted from the equation. Again, the
hypothesis is that the amount spent by challengers has a greater impact than
incumbent expenditures on the results of Senate elections that met the established
criterion. Adopting the Jacobson model, with the addition of a variable for the
percentage margin of victory by which the incumbent won his/her last election, and
assuming a linear relationship, the following equation is arrived at:
CY = a + b-1 (CEPV) + b-2 (IEPV) + b-3 (P) + b-4 (VAP) + b-5 (MV) + e
where: CV = challenger's percentage of the vote,
CEPV= challenger's expenditures, cents per voting age individual,
IEPV = incumbent's expenditures, cents per voting age individual,
P = challenger's party (1 if Democratic, 0 if Republican),
VAP = voting age population of the state, thousands,

79 Jacobson, p.40.
80 Only those Senate races for the years examined in which there was an elected
incumbent who was challenged by a major party candidate, and in which each
candidate spent more than one dollar on his/her campaign, were included in the data.
This criterion eliminated, for instance, the 1992 Indiana Senate race since Sen. Dan
Coats was an appointed incumbent, and the 1990 Virginia Senate race because the
Democratic challenger to Sen. John Warner reported spending no money on the
campaign. No "open seat" races were included.
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MV = incumbent's percentage margin of victory in his/her last race.
The party variable is included in the model since it is a possible indicator of
partisan inequality with respect to the ability of the challenger to raise and spend
money and thereby secure a greater percentage of the eventual vote. It could be
hypothesized that being a Democrat has a significant effect on the eventual
percentage of the vote received since there are more self-identified Democrats than
Republicans in the electorate. Given the Republican advantage in terms of national
party treasury funds, it may be hypothesized that party affiliation would play a
significant role in a Republican candidate's ability to spend sufficient sums to realize
an electoral advantage, or, at least, a competitive position, with respect to a
Democratic opponent. But, since we are primarily concerned with the effects of
campaign spending, this party variable serves principally as a control in this equation.
The margin of victory by which the incumbent had won a previous race for the
Senate was hypothesized to be an important determinant of incumbent strength (or
electoral popularity) and would therefore tend to have a detrimental effect on a
challenger's ability to gamer votes. The margin of victory variable is also included as
an indicator (though imperfect) of an incumbent's name recognition advantage. The
greater the incumbent's margin of victory in the previous race, the more a challenger
would have to overcome by way of an incumbent's "popularity." If a significant
relationship was found to exist between a candidate's previous margin of victory and
present election outcomes, it might lend some support to the nervousness of those
incumbent Democrats who faced strong competition in their last campaigns, thereby
making them skittish about adopting spending ceilings in future election campaigns.
The greater the margin of victory by which the incumbent had won his/her last race,
the smaller the challenger's vote percentage would be expected for the current race - a
negative relationship. In order to combat that incumbent advantage (should the
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hypothesized relationship be validated), the argument could be made that spending
caps would restrain a challenger's ability to do so. The regression equation would test
these hypothesized relationships as well as that of the challenger's expenditures
having the greater effect on election results (vote percentage received).
The data were collected from the following sources: (1) For the percentage of
vote breakdowns of Senate election results in all years studied (1988, 1990, 1992, and
1994), the Almanac of American Politics, and Federal Election Commission press
releases provided the pertinent data. (2) Likewise, expenditure totals were obtained
from the same two sources. These total dollar figures, both incumbent and challenger
totals for each separate race, were then divided by the voting age population of the
states for the year in which the election was held, in order to arrive at the cents-pervoting-age-individual data. (3) The state voting age population numbers for the years
1988 and 1990 were gathered from The Book of the States 1992-93 Edition, while the
1992 figures were found in America Votes 20: A Handbook of Contemporary
American Election Statistics. 1994's figures were obtained from estimates in the
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994. provided by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. (4) The candidate party affiliation and margins of victory variable values
were obtained from relevant editions of The Almanac of American Politics.81

81Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, Almanac of American Politics. 1982, 1984,
1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994 editions, Washington, D.C.: National Journal, Inc.,
1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995.
Federal Election Commission press releases dated October 31, 1989, December 10,
1991, March 4, 1993, and December 22, 1994.
The Book of the States 1992-93 Edition. Lexington, Ky.: Council of State
Governments, 1994, p.281-282.
Elections Research Center, America Votes 20: A Handbook of Contemporary
American Election Statistics. Washington, D C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1993,
P-9.
Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1994. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994, p.289.
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The multiple regression model, when run with the variable values collected,
yielded the following equation:
CV = 36.9218 + ,03884(CEPV) - ,00290(IEPV) + ,00584(P) + ,0004(VAP) .11356(MV)
Although some problems with the accuracy and reliability of the model for predictive
purposes are apparent - the standard error of the estimate, for instance, is rather large
(6.558) indicating an unacceptable predictive accuracy level of plus or minus
approximately 13 percent when attempting to predict the challenger's vote percentage
- the explanatory results (see Appendix 1 for multiple regression results) essentially
support the hypothesis that the challenger's expenditures had a greater (and positive)
effect on the percentage of the vote received than did incumbent's expenditures.
A scatterplot of the residuals versus predicted values of the dependent variable
(challenger's percent of the vote) reveals the appropriate dispersion to indicate no
problems with heteroscedasticity - the error terms appear to be randomly distributed
and independent of one another. (See scatterplot accompanying regression results in
Appendix 1). The Durbin-Watson statistic value achieved (2.075) is appropriate to
insure against autocorrelation. The multiple correlation coefficient (R) value of
.5565 could be seen to indicate a moderate linear relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, but it does not indicate a strong linear
relationship. Although there is undoubtedly a degree of multicollinearity in the
independent variables, since it is readily agreed that there exist relationships between
the independent variables in the model, the fact that that is expected and that it is
taken into consideration when using the model to explain hypothesized relationships,
is sufficient to guard against drawing too broad a conclusion as to the model’s overall
reliability. One fully expects that incumbent and challenger spending are related to
one another. Most particularly, one would expect that incumbents faced with a
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strong challenger spending campaign would feel compelled to spend greater amounts
in response. Incumbent spending is seen to be reactive: it increases or decreases in
response to challenger spending levels. One might also expect that Senate candidates
in larger states (with greater numbers of potential voters) would spend more than
candidates in smaller states. Accordingly there undoubtedly exists a relationship
between the independent variables VAP (voting age population) and both CEPV and
IEPV (challenger and incumbent expenditures, respectively). Since we are, however,
interested strictly in the relationship between spending levels and votes received and
are not attempting to extrapolate beyond that narrow focus to make definitive causal
statements about what determines electoral success, concerns about the model's
overall reliability are minimized. The limits of this particular model are
acknowledged. As Jacobson notes regarding his findings:
These findings...conform to theoretical expectations, but they cannot
be accepted as definitive because they ignore one essential
consideration...That is, money may flow to a candidate for the same
reason that votes do; both variables - expenditures and votes - might
be determined by a set of external factors. ...Or the relationship
between expenditures and votes may be reciprocal. The expectation
that a candidate will do well may bring campaign contributions.
...ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions...are inappropriate for
estimating reciprocal relationships; a simultaneous equation system is
required.82
Yet, it is important to note that Jacobson's simultaneous equations supported the
conclusions reached with the OLS model.83
What is initially apparent from the coefficients obtained in the current study is the
support evidenced for the direction of relationships which were originally

82 Jacobson, p.49-50.
83 See Jacobson, Chapter 5, "The Effects of Campaign Spending: The Full Model,
p.136-162.
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hypothesized. The positive coefficient for the independent variable "challenger's
expenditures per voter" (CEPV) lends support for the hypothesis that as a challenger's
spending increases his/her percentage of the vote received also increases. The partial
coefficient of .03884 for the variable CEPV with a standard error of .0082 yields a tscore value of 4.733 which is statistically significant even at the .01 level of
significance. For each one-cent per voter increase in challenger spending there is a
corresponding increase of better than one-third of one percent in votes received; each
dollar per voter spent by the challenger corresponds to a nearly 4 percent share of the
vote.
Although this may not appear to be very substantial, it must be viewed within the
context of comparison to the revealed effects of incumbent spending. Incumbent
spending appears to have no effect on a challenger's vote percentage, and
consequently little effect on the eventual outcome in Senate races. There is clear
support for the hypothesis that the level of a challenger's spending has a greater effect
on the outcomes in U.S. Senate races than does spending by the incumbent. It is
revealing that the incumbent's level of spending produces the expected negative
coefficient, indicating that a challenger's share of the vote would decrease as the
incumbent's spending rises and would be diminished by the partial coefficient factor
of -.00289 which is associated with incumbent spending. But, that coefficient value
is so small that the resulting t-score ratio of -.4067 approaches utter statistical
insignificance. It is obvious that the amount an incumbent spends has little impact
with regard to the eventual share of the vote that a challenger will receive.
Conversely, since an identical model equation which substituted incumbent's
percentage of the vote (IV), for challenger's share (CV), as the dependent variable
yielded the same basic results achieved when CV was dependent, it can be concluded
that an incumbent’s expenditures have comparatively little effect on his/her eventual
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vote percentage. In fact, when an equation was run using IV as the dependent
variable, and including the same independent variables used in the model with CV
dependent, the results showed that the level of spending by the incumbent actually
had a negative relationship to his/her share of the vote. It is also noteworthy, that in
this equation, results showed, once again, that the amount spent by the challenger is
the most significant factor in determining election outcomes. The challenger's
spending was revealed to have a negative effect on an incumbent's share of the vote.
The reverse (incumbent's spending having an effect on challenger share) was not
demonstrated by the CV dependent model. (See Appendix 2 for the relevant results of
the dependent incumbent vote share model.)
In both equations the party variable (P) was shown to be statistically insignificant
and therefore no support for any hypotheses regarding partisan advantage was
obtained. The independent variable incumbent's margin of victory in last Senate
election (MV) is shown to be statistically significant at the .05 confidence interval (tscore -2.757) for the CV dependent model and consistent with the hypothesized
negative relationship. In other words, a one-point increase in the incumbent's
previous margin of victory will result in a corresponding decrease of the challenger's
percent of the vote by the partial coefficient factor of -.11356. This would indicate
that electoral popularity plays a significant role in election outcomes and would tend
to lend support to the idea that challengers need to find ways to overcome a popular
incumbent's recognition advantage. However, the same independent variable is not
statistically significant at the .05 level in the IV dependent model, (t-score 1.911)
indicating that incumbents cannot always rely on their previous popularity to give
them an advantage.
Altogether, the changes in the independent variables in the regression models
account for some 30 percent of the change in the dependent variable. The coefficient

112

of determination (R-squared) value of .31 for the CV dependent model, and .29 for
the IV dependent equation, indicate that nearly 30 percent of the percentage of vote
received by either an incumbent or a challenger for the Senate contests in 1988, 1990,
1992 and 1994, could be explained by the combination of independent variables in
the model. In both instances, the significance of a challenger's spending was evident.
The same could not be said, however, of an incumbent's campaign expenditures.
A much more sophisticated model is ultimately necessary to explain election
results. A more complex model which might include a more perfect
operationalization of a candidate's "recognition" factor, some measure of prior
political experience, party (partisan) breakdown on the state or district level (an
indicator of relative party strength), relative media market (TV advertising, etc.)
costs, and other relevant variables, is undoubtedly required to explain both candidate
spending levels and their relationship to electoral results. It is, likewise, indisputably
true that any candidate's share of the vote can not simply be explained as a mere
function of what his/her campaign spends, or other directly quantifiable factors.
Some accounting for the various "intangibles" associated with a candidate's
"likeability", or "electability", and other personal qualitative characteristics like
integrity, sincerity, approachability, and the like, must surely be made in any effort to
explain candidate electoral success. Perhaps a factor analysis, which might seek to
explain candidate evaluation by an electorate in terms of party identification levels,
ideological agreement, issue alignment, personal contact, participation levels and
types, or consistent "exposure", could yield indices which may then be used in a more
sophisticated regression model to explain either candidate vote shares, expenditure
levels, or both.
It must be recognized that, although federal campaign spending has
unquestionably risen over the years (recall Table 2, Figure 1), one must be careful in
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interpreting too broadly from those graphic results. Inflation rates, consumer price
indices, television and radio advertising rates, and the like, have also increased over
the same time period. The increases in the costs for such campaign necessities as
postal rates, paper and supplies, polling and professional campaign consultants, travel
expenses, etc., have undoubtedly contributed to the rapidly rising costs of running for
public office at any level. Increases in congressional campaign expenditures must be
viewed in that context.
That notwithstanding, as the results of these regression models clearly
demonstrate, congressional elections are affected much more by what challengers
spend than by what incumbents spend. Money buys attention for lesser known
challengers and provides them with the means for effectively communicating with an
electorate to which they (challengers) are largely unknown. Any campaign finance
reform proposal which calls for the imposition of spending limits ought to be
examined carefully. On its surface it may appear to be an attractive proposal in its
concerns over the "obscene" levels of spending in modem congressional campaigns.
But, any reform which establishes spending limits without careful attention to the
implications and consequences for electoral competition is shortsighted and perhaps
even contrary to the professed aims of campaign finance reformers. Limits on
expenditures would affect challengers much more than incumbents. In that regard,
Republican critics are right. Given the results of the most recent round of
congressional elections in November of 1994, past incumbent Democratic critics may
see less support in these regression results for their contention that spending ceilings
would damage their competitiveness vis-a-vis challengers, but they may seek some
solace in the knowledge that such proposals did not pass when they last held
congressional majority status.
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Because challenger spending is a crucial element in determining his/her
competitiveness, and even the eventual share of the vote, "...expenditure ceilings, in
most circumstances, will favor incumbents and make it even more difficult for
challengers to defeat entrenched legislators."84 The average challenger begins a
campaign at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the incumbent, in terms of name
recognition and ability to raise the necessary funds to compete meaningfully. Large
expenditures by challengers are usually necessary to compensate for this institutional
incumbent advantage.
Political scientist Larry Sabato cautions that spending ceilings, which restrict
individuals and PACs from giving directly to candidates after spending ceilings have
been reached, will simply redirect monies, which would otherwise have gone to
candidates, to independent spending efforts on behalf of, or in opposition to, certain
campaigns.85 With independent spending being the least accountable form of
campaign contributions and expenditures, it may be wise to consider the probability
that a reform with good intentions, like spending ceilings, might very well result in
undesirable unintended consequences.
Sabato notes two additional concerns which must be addressed before enacting
spending caps as part of any campaign finance reform. The first of these concerns
the degree to which an imposition of ceilings would undermine respect for the
campaign finance system. In his words:

84 Larry Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees. New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, p.197.
85 Ibid.
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Inevitably, ceilings will lead to creative accounting practices and other
methods that will have the effect of "stretching" the ceilings. This has
already occurred at the presidential level. The effect is to undermine
respect for the campaign finance system generally. Why build into the
law artificial devices that almost unavoidably lead to barely legal
cheating and encourage non-compliance?86
Secondly, Sabato argues that ceilings which have as a goal the reduction of
special-interest influence on government, may actually increase the influence of
already powerful groups which can make substantial campaign contributions early in
the election season before any ceiling levels have been reached, thus effectively
"freezing out" smaller groups which are less capital rich early in a given election
cycle. Sabato concludes, "Since officeholders are especially likely to give access to
those who have donated money to their election campaigns, spending ceilings may
also have the unintended consequence of granting more access to the haves and less
to the have-nots."87
To the extent that spending limits would effectively discourage competition, and
therefore close-down, rather than open-up, the electoral process, they ought to be
considered warily. Imposition of spending limits absent a careful and fair
consideration of formulas necessary to guard against institutionalizing even further
the advantages of incumbency is a bad idea. Spending ceilings, if they are to be
considered at all, must be instituted in conjunction with public financing and
constructed not in the interests of creating a level playing field (for leveling only
serves to disadvantage challengers), but with an emphasis on establishing minimum
levels of campaign financing to challengers, and in conjunction with reforms to limit
the institutional advantages of incumbency (reforms such as curtailing the

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., p. 198.

116

congressional frank) so that challengers can begin to conduct more meaningful,
competitive campaigns.
Proposals to reform current campaign finance practices must be evaluated
carefully with an eye toward discovering possible undesirable unintended
consequences, lest the result of their adoption bring a "closing down" rather than an
"opening up" of the democratic electoral processes. Despite all the good intentions
which underlie proposals to impose spending limits on candidates for federal office reduction in the skyrocketing costs of modem day campaigns, reducing the influence
of "big money" contributors, making candidates and their campaigns (and elected
officeholders once in office) spend more of their time debating the public's business
(or doing the public's business) rather than spending that time seeking new and
improved ways of raising campaign funds - imposing limits on what candidates can
spend may, in fact, do more harm than good.
If the issue of rising campaign expenditures raises concerns, perhaps those
concerns are more aptly connected to the sources of current private funds for modem
congressional campaigns. Complaints about the levels of spending which have been
attained in recent congressional campaigns are essentially complaints about the
influence that large private contributions may have on the decisions of elected
lawmakers. Complaints about the "undue influence" of interest group (PAC) money
in congressional elections, or in congressional decision-making, are really objections
to private financing. If complaints are raised about the continuation of unfettered
campaign spending, that, too, is a feature of private funding. Accordingly, any
investigation of campaign finance reform must examine the primary funding sources
of current privately financed campaigns. Calls for an extension of public financing to
congressional elections generate from a distrust of big-money influence in electoral
and legislative processes. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the prevalent sources
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The next section will investigate the role of political action committees as primary
sources of major donations to modem congressional campaigns. Although aggregate
PAC funds are second to individual contributions in terms of actual amounts donated
to congressional campaigns, the concern that those PAC funds represent
concentrations of "interested money" given in expectation of some legislative reward
is paramount in the minds of campaign finance reformers. The questions of whether
or not quid pro quo relationships exist between PAC money and legislative votes, and
whether or not PAC funds are crucial to electoral success, will be considered in order
to reach rational conclusions as to the role of PACs in modem congressional
campaigns and legislative decisions. A thorough analysis of the role of political
action committees in modem congressional campaigns and legislative policy making
is called for in order to determine whether PACs should be outlawed, or further
limited (either in the aggregate amounts which individual candidates can accept from
PACs or in the amounts which individual PACs can give to individual candidates or
to all candidates), as sources for candidate finance.

CHAPTER SIX
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES - WHAT DO PACS BUY?
Definitions
Before beginning an examination of political action committees, a definition is in
order. Larry Sabato has stated that:
...a PAC is either the separate, segregated campaign fund of a
sponsoring labor, business or trade organization, or the campaign fund
of a group formed primarily or solely for the purpose of giving money
to candidates. Party committees do not qualify as PACs; in this sense
all PACs are "non-party", i.e., they are not formed by or directly
connected to a political party even if all of their money is contributed
to the candidates of a single party.88
Political action committees are often classified under the labels of the kind of
organizations which generate them. Hence we see PACs referred to as (1) Corporate
(business) PACs, (2) Labor PACs, (3) Trade/Membership/Health PACs, (4) Nonconnected (independent) PACs, and, (5) Cooperative and Corporate Non-stock PACs
(often grouped together in an "Other" category).
PACs can be grouped or categorized by a number of different identifiers. Lee Ann
Elliott, a former Republican member of the Federal Election Commission, classifies
all PACs into six sub-groups and four categories.89 Group One PACs are those
formed as an extension of the lobbying arm of any union, corporation, or trade
association. This group constitutes the bulk of all PACs registered with the FEC in
any given year. Group Two includes those PACs which have been formed as a matter

88 Ibid., p.7.
89 The following classification scheme is one outlined by Elliott in "Political Action
Committees: Precincts of the 80's," Arizona Law Review. 22, n.2, (1980) p.546-48.
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of convenience, to deflect solicitation efforts by candidates directed at top union,
corporate, or trade association executives toward political action committees formed
expressly for the purpose of dealing with those solicitation efforts. This group does
not often engage in a great deal of actual contribution activity. Group Three PACs
are formed to support a particular piece of legislation on a specific policy issue, and
are inherently temporary - they exist only so long as the legislation is being
considered or until the timeliness of the issue has passed. The health care debate of
1993-94 witnessed the formation of many such PACs on all sides of the health care
issue. Most have since disbanded in the wake of the failure of health care legislation
in the 103rd Congress. Group Four contains those PACs which exist chiefly as
symbols of prestige for executives or members of unions, corporations or trade
associations. These PACs are seldom given either the necessary resources or
attention from their parent organizations to be really effective political committees.
They exist largely in name only. Group Five PACs have been instituted by
independent citizen groups to attempt to effect a change in the ideological philosophy
of the Congress. These PACs tend to have more longevi ty since they tend to espouse
positions on many different issues, from their own unique perspectives, and tend to
base their patterns of giving on a particular candidate's "rating".90 These "nonconnected" PACs have been among the fastest growing group of political action
committees in recent years - second only to corporate PACs in number. Group Six is
composed of PACs concerned about the electoral system and formed largely to
90 Many interest groups which maintain PACs as part of their lobbying effort assign
scores to all congressional members (and candidates who desire to become members)
based on their support for or against particular pieces of legislation in which the
group has an interest. These scores are then used to determine a PACs criteria for
donations to a candidate's campaign. These "ratings" are also widely publicized so
that other like-minded individuals and groups can tailor their donations and votes
accordingly.
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educate citizens as to the nature of the politics and to effect political participation.
These PACs almost never engage in donating money to candidates for federal office.
In the same way that PACs can be classified according to their function, they can
also be classified according to their patterns of giving: their "support focus."91
Category One PACs send the bulk of their contributions to incumbents, congressional
committee and subcommittee chairs, members of influential House and Senate
committees, and members of both parties in leadership positions. Category One
PACs tend to "play it safe" with their contributions. Category One contains the great
bulk of all corporate, labor, and trade/ membership PACs. Those PACs in Category
Two often become financially involved in open seat races hoping to elect someone to
office whose philosophy or ideology coincides with that of the committee. Category
Two PACs take greater risks with their contributions than PACs in the first category.
Ideological, non-connected PACs fit this pattern of support, although any political
action committees may, from time to time, focus their giving along ideological lines.
Category Three PACs often support promising challengers, incumbents thought to be
vulnerable, and candidates in open seat races. They take risks like PACs in Category
Two, but those risks are more calculated. PACs in this category must have sufficient
resources of money, time, skill and energy to devote to political campaigns in order to
achieve success. Established independent PACs seem to fit in this category.
Category Four political committees will support candidates who may not have a
realistic chance of winning in their first election but show promise as "up-andcoming" candidates. These PACs are committed to a more long-term development of
candidates and issues. They may also contribute to these promising newcomers in

91 Elliott, p. 548.
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order to grab the attention of the incumbent forcing his/her attention back toward the
home district and its particular interests.
None of these groupings or categories is mutually exclusive; and an individual
PAC may exhibit a combination of motives and focuses in any given election season
and may change emphasis from year to year, or even from race to race. Since not all
PACs are the same in terms of size, resources, membership, internal organization and
management, methods of communication and solicitation, and patterns of
contributing, they can be grouped on the basis of any one, or a combination of
characteristics.92
Any examination of political action committees must appreciate the widely
divergent community of PACs. That community is not a homogenous, monolithic,
coordinated entity, but, rather, a multi-varied and disparate, disjointed "stew" of
competing interests. PACs do sometimes act in concert with one another to effect
changes in legislation, or to attempt to affect election outcomes which they feel are in
their own best interests, but the majority of PAC activity would seem to be focused in
the interests of individual PACs, often in competition with one another. Political
scientist Michael Parenti, however, cautions against drawing any firm conclusions as
to PAC diversity and counterbalance.
It is claimed that since PACs are so numerous and diverse, they cancel
each other out. To be sure, sometimes they do conflict, and organized
labor's PACs certainly represent a countervailing (albeit weaker) force
against the corporate tide. But more often, rather than canceling each
other out, corporate PACs move in the same direction with cumulative
impact. Meanwhile, the homeless, the hungry, the unemployed, the

92 Frank J. Sorauf, for example, in "Political Action Committees in American
Politics", in What Price PACs? . New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1984,
identifies what he sees as: "The four ideal types of PACs - the money channelers, the
quasi-parties, the issue-brokers, and the personal PACs. ..defined not by internal or
organizational characteristics but by their external links to other political activities."
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unattended sick, the migrant workers, the small fanners - and on most
issues, the ordinary citizens and consumers - have no PAC
connections, certainly none with the muscle of the corporate PACs.93
The extent to which PACs represent and exacerbate certain inequalities in the
electoral context may indicate at least an appearance of, if not "undue influence,"
perhaps an overrepresentation of corporate and wealthy interests vis-a-vis "ordinary
citizens and consumers." To what degree can that claim be supported by empirical
evidence? This is the central question of the effort to substantiate the rationale
behind reform proposals designed either to eliminate PACs altogether, or to further
limit PAC aggregate or individual donations to congressional campaigns.
Accordingly, it is the focus of the next few sections.

The Purported Problem
It must be made clear at the outset, that the ultimate source of all political
contributions is the individual. Whether the individual chooses to give directly to a
candidate or chooses, instead, to give to a PAC or interest group, contributions
represent individual political participation. In the age of the "new politics," with
traditional grass-roots activities virtually non-existent, donating money to causes and
candidates is, perhaps, the only readily accessible means of participation (other than
voting) available to individual citizens which does not require the expenditure of a
great deal of time and energy, or even money. By combining their relatively small
individual contributions with hundreds or thousands of others, all for the same
interest group, PAC, or candidate, American contributors implicitly recognize the
"strength-in-numbers" economies of scale in political finance. Americans apparently

93 Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few. 5th edition, New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1988, p.217.
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feel that the interest group, or PAC, armed with the contributions from thousands of
individual contributors, will be able to represent their interests more effectively than
would be the case if individuals had to fend for themselves in isolation.
Contributing to congressional campaigns as a form of political participation may
indeed be a good thing. However, too much money coming from one source is often
viewed negatively. It raises concerns that those who give much expect much in
return. Although PACs are limited in what they may give to any single candidate
($5,000 per election), there is no limit on either the aggregate amounts which PACs
may donate to many different candidates or on the amounts which an individual
candidate may collect from many different PACs. Consequently, the concerns being
raised in the current debate focus on those PACs which by virtue of their superior
size, organization and resources, are presumed to exert an "undue influence" on
either, or both, election outcomes and legislative decisions. Questions of "interested
money" and its "undue influence" are essentially questions concerning the integrity of
government and its elected officials who campaign for office backed by a system of
private finance. Jeffrey Berry, author of The Interest Group Society, writes,
"Maintaining the integrity of government means that we must somehow balance the
need to fund campaigns, the desire to have people actively involved in elections, and
the obligation to keep government from being unduly influenced by those with the
most money to contribute."94
Maintaining the proper balance among these values is the goal of campaign
finance reformers. In determining limits on how much individuals and interest
groups may contribute to congressional campaigns, campaign finance reform
legislation has always sought to insure a proper equilibrium in order to protect
94 Jeffrey Berry, The Interest Group Society. Glenview, I'll.: Scott, Foresman & Co.,
1989, p.117.

124

governmental integrity and the integrity of elected officials. The degree to which
public perception and condemnation of undue influence by interest groups has
generated at least a rhetorical concern for the integrity of Congress cannot be
overstated. The history of campaign finance reform efforts since the 1970s is
evidence of the attention paid by members of Congress to the issue, even though no
legislation has been successfully enacted since 1979. In any case, the history of
modem campaign finance reform efforts outlined above indicates a continuing debate
over the proper formula for attaining the balance between "the need to fund
campaigns, the desire to have people actively involved in elections, and the
obligation to keep government from being unduly influenced..."95
The major amendments to the campaign finance reform legislation of the 1970s
(FECA) came about, in large measure, as a result of the revelations of campaign
financial improprieties related to the Watergate scandal. Concerns today center on
the growing importance of political action committees in the electoral processes.
Berry summarizes the task of today's campaign finance reformers as one which must
necessarily begin with an assessment and evaluation of the role of political action
committees:
Their growing importance in the electoral process is forcing
Americans to confront again the classic dilemma of interest groups in
a democratic society: How can the freedom of people to pursue their
own interests be preserved while prohibiting any faction from abuse of
that freedom? The difficulty of choosing an appropriate policy
involves not only the abstract question of conflicting rights but also the
problem of assessing the effect of campaign contributions. What
exactly is the effect of interest group money on both election results
and legislative decisions? Would-be reformers must not only try to
determine the answer to these questions, but must also try to assess the

95 Ibid.
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future consequences of their actions - consequences that are not
always easy to foresee.96
It is the task of those seeking to reform the present system of campaign finance by
enacting new restraints on PACs to demonstrate any effects of PAC money on either
election results or legislative decisions as a rationale for reform. Modern-day
reformers need be reminded that it was, after all, largely as a result of the reforms in
campaign finance during the 1970's "decade of campaign reform" that we
experienced the "PAC decade" as well. But what were the factors which led to the
proliferation of PACs in the modem campaign? Why is it said that the decade of the
1970s was the "PAC decade"?

Background
Certainly the nature of the modem political campaign, characterized by a
candidate-centered "new politics" of paid political consultants, heavy reliance on
modem media advertising, and technological methods of direct-mail, polling, and
voter identification, both coincided with, and contributed to, the decline of the
importance of grass-roots political parties as facilitators of a candidate's election. In
the wake of party decline, political action committees came to the fore to effectively
usurp the traditional party role. The party had been ideally suited to the kind of mass
politics of an earlier day, one in which low levels of information and awareness
combined with a "benefits" orientation toward voting behavior to generate the
function of the political party as a "cue" upon which voters could rely to simplify
their electoral decisions. With the development of the modem media (particularly
television), the dawning of the new "information age", the rapid transformations of

96 Ibid., p.117-118.
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modem technology, and an increasingly mobile society, the role of the political party
as mediator and facilitator was significantly diminished. As Americans became more
politically aware, through the increased ease of information access; as they became
more issue-oriented rather than benefit-oriented, Americans began to vote more
selectively and independently. Loyalty to parties declined in strength and their
traditional function as voting cue diminished in importance.
The advent of television and technological advances which culminated in the
modem computer age, virtually foreordained the death of traditional grass-roots
politics. An increasingly mobile electorate began to participate less in social
organizations and institutions which were associated with particular geographic or
political divisions. The political party as a social institution suffered a decline in
active membership as did churches, PTAs, and other civic and private institutions, as
a result of an electorate not tied to a specific place. Through an evaluation of the
most efficient management of limited resources, and the need to bring the campaign
process up-to-date, traditional grass-roots campaign efforts were largely abandoned in
favor of the new concentration of time and resources on independent professional
campaign organizations, television advertising, direct mail, professional polling, and
the like. Sophisticated political consultants, professional pollsters, candidate "image
makers", media consultants, "spin doctors" and campaign "hired guns" were
increasingly employed by candidates to fill the void in political campaigns created by
party decline. This "new politics" virtually usurped the party role in congressional
campaigns.
In order to compete effectively in the new politics, candidates were forced to meet
the rising costs associated with the technological and professional developments of
campaigns. The hiring of professional political consulting firms, the buying of
television time and print media space, the need to employ expensive computer
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technology to generate voter lists for direct mail campaign efforts and to stage and
orchestrate campaign "photo-ops" and rallies, all required ever increasing sums of
money. Parties, which used to provide those resources - via grass roots volunteer
organization and effort - in a simpler, less costly time, were in no position to provide
the requisite funds to finance such complex and costly new procedures. Furthermore,
the amended FECA legislation limited the amounts which either individuals or PACs
could donate to parties.97 Candidates began to rely more and more on contributions
from individuals and organizations sympathetic to their campaigns. Frank Sorauf, in
his background paper for the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political Action
Committees, describes this development quite succinctly writing about party decline:
At the same time, a new breed of experts, drawing on new knowledge
and technologies, began to assume the parties' old roles in campaigns,
but at the price of having to raise large sums of cash for the new nonparty politics. PACs, political organizations dealing both in cash and
selectivity in issues, quite easily grew and came to maturity in such a
political environment.98
The environment of the "new politics" was pregnant with possibilities for PAC
development and operation. All that remained to effectuate a major role for the
political action committee was the statutory and legal sanctioning of such activity.
As the importance of ever increasing sums of money necessary for financing ever
more professional campaign organizations grew, so too did the cries for campaign
finance reform. Throughout the twentieth century there had been efforts to impose

97 Those limits allowed individuals to donate no more than $20,000 per year to a
national party committee and PACs were limited to an aggregate donation of $15,000
per year to a party committee. (As of 1979 FECA Amendments)
98 Frank Sorauf, "Political Action Committees in American Politics: An Overview," a
background paper prepared for the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political
Action Committees, in What Price PACs?. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
1984, p. 76.
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some sort of regulation on the contribution patterns of individual "fat cats" as well as
those of corporations and labor organizations." It was, however, not until the
campaign finance reform proposals, legislative enactments, and legal interpretations
of the 1970s that the issue of money and its role in federal elections was most directly
and effectively impacted. And, it was largely as a result of those legislative and legal
enactments that the seeds of explosive PAC growth were planted.
Enactment of the FECA and its amendments in the 1970s instituted limits on
campaign contributions from individuals, from multi-candidate political committees,
and from party committees. The FECA required periodic disclosure reports from any
group which organized as a political committee for the purpose of supporting
candidates for federal office and was not authorized by the candidates or a political
party. It is these political committees which were specifically legitimized in the
FECA legislation. The act explicitly granted the right of both labor unions and
corporations to form "political committees", to administer them, and to raise funds
for them. All organizational expenses for such committees were authorized to be
paid out of corporate or union treasuries.
The FECA insured that the presidential campaign could now be funded at public
expense, eliminating the need, at that level, for large scale private contributions from
individuals or organizations. The modem congressional campaign, on the other hand,
required ever increasing financial resources in a climate where there were no
limitations on the amount of money which a candidate could raise and spend. With
the FECA and its subsequent amendments, and in the wake of the Supreme Court and
FEC rulings which further legitimized them, PACs existed as legitimate political
committees authorized to make contributions either directly to candidates for federal*
" See Chapter 3 "The Drive for Reform", in Herbert Alexander, Financing Politics.
p. 24-29, for a more extensive treatment of early reform efforts.

129

office, or on behalf of those candidates through independent expenditures. With their
role in presidential politics essentially limited to early pre-primary activity, PACs
began to concentrate the bulk of their financial activities on the congressional races.
But, how did PACs come to play such a large and important role in modem
congressional campaigns such that they have become the subject of a great deal of
today's campaign finance reform debate?

A Turning Point - PAC Growth
Perhaps the most significant legislative development concerning PAC activity
occurred with the passage of the 1974 FECA amendments. Prior to that time,
government contractors were prohibited from forming political action committees
and contributing to federal elections. This provision had effectively stymied
businesses from forming and operating PACs because few major corporations don't
do at least some business with the federal government. Labor unions had, however,
long been involved in the PAC business, collecting voluntary membership donations
and passing them on to labor endorsed candidates. The AFL-CIO Committee on
Political Education (COPE) was the most well-known and established PAC, having
been formed in July of 1943 by the Congress of Industrial Organizations "to collect
and disburse the voluntary political contributions of union members."100
Labor was concerned that court litigation by corporations seeking to get into the
PAC business would lead to an erosion of labor's ability to continue its PAC activity.
Corporations were interested in forcing labor PACs to live under the same restrictions
which enjoined corporate government contractors from engaging in widespread PAC
activity. Corporate litigants sought a court ruling outlawing labor PAC activity on the

100 Sabato, PAC Power, p.5.
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grounds that labor unions were also beneficiaries of federal largesse and, therefore,
ought to be enjoined, as corporations were, from operating PACs to influence federal
elections. Because of their concerns, organized labor (AFL-CIO) sought
modifications in the original FECA of 1971 designed to lift the prevailing ban on
PAC activity by government contractors. With labor leaders believing that business
would not form large numbers of PACs, and confident of sustaining their
organizational lead, labor was willing to take the risk of allowing government
contractors (and thereby many corporations) to begin to organize and operate
political action committees. With both labor and business support, Congress adopted
changes to the FECA in 1974 which, among other things, lifted the prohibition
against government contractor PAC formation.
Following passage of the 1974 FECA Amendments, Sun Oil Company sought an
advisory opinion from the newly formed Federal Election Commission concerning
administration of its political action committee, SunPAC. The FEC ruling, handed
down on November 25, 1975, declared that corporate PACs could solicit donations
from stockholders and employees, and could use general corporate funds to
administer both its PAC and to solicit contributions. The SunPAC ruling, in
conjunction with the 1974 FECA Amendments, greatly expanded the opportunities
for corporate PAC activity in the electoral process.
Labor's worst fears had been realized. Ironically, labor's support for changes in the
law precipitated a sharp and sustained growth in corporate PAC activity, while labor's
PAC numbers were to remain essentially at a constant level in the years following the
1974 FECA amendments. Trade membership PACs also experienced growth
following the 1974 modifications. Figure 2 indicates the explosive growth of
corporate activity following the Amendments and the 1975 SunPAC ruling. One can
easily contrast the relative static labor PAC growth with the substantial aggregate
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growth of corporate PACs and the moderate sustained growth in trade membership
PACs.

Source: Federal Election Commission
Figure 2: Numbers of PACs 1974-94
Another important development pertaining to campaign finance and PACs
occurred in 1976 with the Supreme Court's Buckley decision. It has already been
pointed out how that decision ruled that FECA provisions proscribing limits on both
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PAC and individual contributions were constitutional. Most important for its PAC
growth implications Buckley held that provisions of the Act which limited
"independent expenditures" were unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and
association. This legal validation of spending on behalf of candidates by political
groups independent of a candidate's campaign organization led to the rise of what
would come to be known as "non-connected", or independent, PACs. Those PACs
were formed at a rate paralleling the rise of corporate PACs.
Figure 2 illustrates the steep growth in corporate and non-connected PAC activity
following the 1974 FECA Amendments, the 1975 SunPAC decision, and the Buckley
ruling in 1976. The proliferation of political action committees in the modem
congressional campaign was a direct result of - albeit most likely an unintended
consequence of - the reform efforts of the 1970s. Labor's support for campaign
finance revisions in 1974 quite unintentionally contributed to an environment of
explosive PAC growth - most particularly corporate PAC growth - throughout the
1970s and 80s. It has been noted that "if the labor movement has suffered a worse
self-inflicted political wound, it does not come readily to mind."101
While Figure 2 clearly delineates the expansion of PAC activity throughout the
years from 1974 to the present, it also indicates a recent plateau in PAC numbers. In
fact, the numbers of both corporate and aggregate PACs have seen an actual decline
in recent years. Whether or not PAC growth has permanently plateaued and will
show an actual sustained trend toward decline remains to be seen. This plateau may
simply reflect a law of diminishing returns with respect to PAC formation and
operation. Perhaps the campaign finance marketplace has reached a point of PAC
saturation. Table 4 delineates, in numerical terms, the precipitous rise and recent

101 Mark Green, "Political PAC Man," The New Republic. December 13, 1982, p.24.
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plateau of PAC growth illustrated in Figure 2. Table 4 indicates that the total number
of PACs reached a high of 4590 in 1990. While growth in the 1980s was explosive
(from 2571 registered committees in 1980 to 4590 by 1990 - an increase of some 56
percent) consistent declines in numbers for both corporate and non-connected PACs
have led the way toward the recent aggregate PAC decline.
Table 4
Y ears

C o rp o rate L abor
89
433
784
1197
1496
1763
1834
1986
1937
1988
1990
1939
1893
1992
1994
1848

1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984

N on-C onn M em ber
201
224
217
305
389
430
409
394
370
365
368

165
377
794
1175
1233
1200
1288
1303
1260

318
489
451
608
655
684
735
820
783
818
833

O ther

Total

36
84
145
191
210
227
210
206
204

608
1146
1653
2571
3479
4243
4421
4578
4590
4585
4513

Source: Larry Sabato, PAC Power, p. 12-13, and FEC Press Release of Sept. 19, 1994.
One should be wary of those who would use the aggregate PAC count as
indicative of PAC strength because many PACs are quite small and give only modest
or small amounts (far below the legal limits) to congressional candidates. According
to Herbert Alexander:
Correlating the number of PACs to productivity may be misleading.
The top 100 PACs in the 1989-90 cycle contributed $74.5 million to
federal candidates, or 46.7 percent of the total given by all PACs.
Some 64 PACs reported at least $1 million in total receipts, while 669
raised $100,000 or more. However, 870 PACs had no dollar activity,
and 1,054 spent $5,000 or less. These figures indicate that large
amounts of money are handled by relatively few PACs.102
Recognition of their status as "small fish" may have led some PACs to close up shop.

102 Alexander, p.60.
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Duplication of purpose and a recognition of economies of scale have also led
some individual PACs to consolidate under larger umbrella PACs. Alexander notes
this and other possible reasons for PAC decline:
No clear reasons exist for why...the number of PACs has diminished.
Corporate mergers and buyouts have led to the combining of some
PACs. Some suggest that PACs are victims of their own unreasonable
expectations or that PACs already have fulfilled their potential and
that the law of diminishing returns gives some PACs, especially small
ones, less incentive to stay involved in the political process. Others
believe that media criticism, the so-called "PAC attack" has made
sponsors and participants wary.103
Despite the recent decline in PAC numbers, one should not underestimate the
extent to which PACs remain financially involved in federal campaigns. PACs
contributed $169.5 million to federal candidates in 1993-94, an increase of 5 percent
from 1992 levels of $161.9 million. By comparison, PACs contributed $55.2 million
in 1979-80. For the 1994 congressional elections, Senate candidates received 16
percent of their net receipts from PACs. House candidates, however, received nearly
37 percent of their total campaign receipts from political action committees. For all
Senate and House general election campaigns in 1994, PAC contributions represented
28 percent of the total $611.5 million in net receipts.

103 Ibid.
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Table 5
Financial Activity of Genera Election Campaigns 1988-1994
H ouse
Y ear

#C an R eceipts Individuals
1988 813 $238.90 $113.2 47.4%
1990 804
243.9 110.4 45.3%
1992 851
309.8 150.5 48.6%
1994 824
344.7 179.2 52%
Senate
Year
#C an R eceipts Individuals
1988
66 $179.60 $117.4 65.4%
1990
67
176.95 115.6 65.3%
1992
69
181.1 118.7 65.5%
1994
70
263.1 154.7 58.8%

PACs
$98.3
102.9
117.2
126.7

41.2%
42.2%
37.8%
36.8%

C an d id ates

Loans

$1.3
2.6
6.6
4.1

$12.3
11.4
21.5
22.9

.54%
1.1%
2.1%
1.2%

PACs
C an d id ates
$44.3 24.7% $6.4 3.6%
40.6 22.9% 1.7 .93%
44.4 24.5% 3.6 2.0%
42.5 16.1% 22.5 8.5%

5.2% 1
4.7%
6.9%
6.6%

Loans
$4.1 2.3%
7.8 4.4%
6.5 3.6%
32.0 12.2%

Source: Federal Election Commission Press Release, December 22, 1994. (Dollar
figures in millions)
Table 5 shows the percentage of candidates' net receipts represented by individual
contributions, PAC dollars, candidate contributions, and candidate and other loans,
for general elections for both House and Senate from 1988-1994.
Clearly, individual contributors represent the largest single source of candidate
campaign funds. This is most particularly true for the Senate, comprising some 58 to
65 percent of net receipts in the last several election cycles. House figures reveal that
the percentage of receipts represented by individual contributions has been
significantly lower than Senate numbers, but still constitute some 50 percent of
receipt totals. What is not immediately apparent, however, is the fact that although
individuals contribute far more dollars to congressional candidates than PACs do,
understanding who those individuals are, and how many they number, is crucial to
understanding campaign finance. Herbert Alexander cites a study by Citizen Action
completed in 1990 which concluded that:
...two-thirds of the $516 million that House and Senate candidates
raised in the 1987-88 election cycle came in the form of large
individual contributions- defined as gifts of $200 or more. Twentyseven percent came in the form of gifts that were at least $500. ...The
Citizen Action report also found that a great number of large
individual donors gave gifts to candidates running outside their states.

136

Donations were tracked by zip code, and ten - which included the
wealthiest addresses in the country - accounted for 12 percent of all
large contributions. The top one-hundred zip codes accounted for 25
percent of all large individual gifts. A subsequent Citizen Action study
confirmed the trend by showing that, in the 1990 federal election
cycle, a single Manhattan zip code (10021) contributed $3.5 million
more than all the large donors in twenty-eight states.104
The figures in Table 5 above may show that individual contributions constitute the
greatest percentage of congressional campaign receipts, but those same figures hide
the fact that an extremely significant portion of those individual contribution dollars
come from an extremely small percentage of wealthy contributors. Large aggregate
dollar amounts do not necessarily coincide with widespread individual participation.
Again, the evidence seems to point toward an "overrepresentation" of wealthy
interests in the arena of campaign finance. As such, concerns about "interested
money" from a few wealthy sources impacting federal elections may be justified.
Insofar as the great bulk of campaign finance funds come either from wealthy PACs
or wealthy individuals, concerns about the ability of those groups or individuals
without great wealth to impact the electoral and legislative processes are raised. Of
course, what remains to be seen is whether or not PAC funds, or individual donations,
have any demonstrable effect on election outcomes in either Senate or House races.
If any effect can be empirically verified it would lend support to the thesis that
wealthy interest overrepresentation in campaign finance has significant consequences
in determining who is ultimately elected. It might be suggested as well, that if a
significant relationship between "interested" money and election or legislative
outcomes can be demonstrated, elected candidates, might be beholden to the

104 Ibid., p.63-64.
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individuals and PACs which enabled their victory and might conform their legislative
behavior in order to insure reelection financial support from those same interests.
This study will examine the donation patterns of PACs and analyze any effects
those PAC donations may have on either election outcomes or legislative decisions.
While an examination of large individual campaign gifts might also be undertaken to
determine the effects, if any, of money on election outcomes and legislative
decisions, the present study examines PAC gifts both because the information on
PAC activity (both individually and in the aggregate) is more readily available and
because it is hypothesized that PAC donations are more easily understood in terms of
their "investment" nature. In other words, PACs are seen to donate to political
campaigns, not out of any particular sense of loyalty or ideological affiliation (which
might be a more important motivating factor in donations from individuals) but
primarily because they seek to "invest" in election outcomes and legislative decisions.
But, to whom do PACs donate? Are PAC dollars spread out among many competing
congressional candidates? What are some, if any, patterns of PAC giving? What do
those patterns reveal about why PACs give and the nature of their "investment"
quality?

PAC Donation Patterns
It is important to note that the number of individual House members receiving at
least half their total campaign funds from political action committees had, up until
the 1994 elections, been growing steadily. In 1978 sixty-three House members
received 50 percent or more of their funds from PACs. By 1986 that number had
grown to 194. But, an analysis of 1992 house races reveals that some 213 of that
year's 851 candidates received 50 percent or more of total receipts from PACs, with
26 of those candidates going down to defeat at the polls. That left a total of 187
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House members who had been elected having received at least 50 percent of their
total campaign funds from political action committees. This number was slightly
below 1986 levels. The downward trend continued in the 1994 elections with 201
House candidates getting at least 50 percent of campaign funds from PACs. Of those
candidates, 33 were defeated, leaving 168 House members who had reached the 50
percent threshold.105 While this number represents a significant reduction in House
members who had received 50 percent or more of total contributions from political
action committees, it is too early to tell whether or not this is a continuing trend.
PAC funds, as indicated in Table 5, play an even less important role in Senate
campaigns, constituting only little more than 16 percent of 1994 aggregate Senate
campaign receipts. In 1988 only eight of sixty-six Senate candidates reported
receiving 50 percent or more of total receipts from PACs. By 1994, seven (out of 70)
candidates for the U.S. Senate were in that category; only four of them were actually
elected. It is interesting to note, however, that of the 20 Senate candidates who were
"PAC millionaires" (those who took in over $1 million in PAC campaign funds), only
two were unsuccessful in their quests for Senate seats in 1994.
Table 6 below outlines PAC contributions, by category, to House campaigns, by
type of campaign, for the elections from 1988 to 1994. Certain patterns are readily
apparent: (1) Incumbents are favored over challengers by wide margins by all PACs.
(2) Non-connected PACs give more of their funds (as a percentage of their giving) to
open seat races than do other PACs. (3) Corporate PACs give the greatest aggregate
amount to House candidates, followed closely by Trade/Membership PACs. Labor is
third in aggregate giving. (4) Labor and Non-connected PACs contribute to both

105 The numbers cited above were derived from FEC press releases dated March 4,
1993 (for 1992 figures) and December 22, 1994 (for 1994 figures).
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challengers and open seat races more so than do other PACs. (5) Corporate PACs
give proportionately less to challengers and open seat races than do any other PACs.
If these patterns are any indication of future fortunes, things certainly would seem
to bode well for the GOP after the 1994 elections, at least in the House, where PAC
contributions have traditionally appeared to be more substantial. Clearly, PACs have
exhibited a proclivity to contribute the vast bulk of their dollars to the campaigns of
incumbent national legislators. Inasmuch as the GOP has captured control of both
houses of the 104th Congress following the 1994 mid-term congressional elections, it
may be interesting to see if the traditional Republican proposals to outlaw all
corporate, labor, and trade association PACs will be offered in the 104th
congressional session now that PAC dollars will begin to flow more heavily in the
direction of incumbent Republican members of Congress. If one examines the data
in Table 6 above, the trend of giving to incumbents is unmistakable across the
spectrum of PACs. While Table 6 deals specifically with House races, the same trend
is seen for Senate races as well. The Federal Election Commission has reported that
for the last election cycle of 1993-94, of the $109.9 million contributed to federal
candidates through June 30th of 1994, incumbents received $91.1 million,
challengers were given $5.5 million, and open seat candidates, $13.3 million.106

106 federal Election Commission press release dated September, 19,1994 entitled
"PAC Contributions Track 1992 Levels".
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Table 6
PAC Contributions to House Campaigns by Type of Campaign
(through June 30 of the election year)
Incumbents . Challengers..._Qp.eii_Se.ats ..Total Contributions
Corporate
1994
93.44%
1.86%
4.70%
$26,276,961
1992
92.18%
2.16%
5.63%
$25,462,030
1990
92.41%
1.52%
6.07%
$22,947,310
1988
96.12%
1.20%
2.67%
$19,477,934
Labor
1994
79.43%
7.68%
12.89%
$18,551,476
1992
77.17%
8.57%
13.72%
$16,696,160
1990
79.89%
6.08%
14.03%
$16,438,363
1988
79.00%
13.64%
7.36%
$14,724,000
Non-Connected
1994
77.53%
7.33%
15.14%
$4,974,862
1992
71.58%
9.65%
18.72%
$5,072,161
1990
72.66%
8.02%
19.33%
$4,705,750
1988
77.68%
11.28%
10.94%
$4,852,218
Trade/Membershi p
1994
87.20%
3.35%
9.44%
$20,815,857
1992
85.65%
4.16%
10.17%
$20,848,112
1990
89.75%
2.09%
8.16%
$19,223,522
1988
93.75%
2.30%
3.92%
$16,029,169
Cooperatives
1994
93.64%
1.02%
5.34%
$1,463,482
1992
95.85%
1.34%
2.81%
$1,127,305
1990
96.15%
0.78%
3.07%
$1,328,325
1988
96.83%
1.17%
2.00%
$1,032,513
Corp. w/o Stock
1994
87.19%
4.57%
8.23%
$1,598,891
1992
87.70%
4.16%
8.14%
$1,513,800
1990
90.73%
2.30%
6.97%
$1,479,642
1988
91.45%
2.07%
6.49%
$1,228,723
Source: Federal Election Commission press release, "PAC Contributions Track 1992
Levels," September 19, 1994.
Republicans are, not surprisingly, benefiting from the GOP landslide in the
1994 mid-term elections. PACs are dramatically shifting their donations from
Democrats, who used to control the Congress, to Republicans who now do. Table 7
illuminates this shift toward Republicans in post-election giving as contrasted with
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overall contributions for the election cycle 1993-94. It is apparent that PACs
immediately begin to align their patterns of giving with the majority party in the
Congress. Table 7 lists fifteen of the top twenty PACs in order of their post-election
contributions to congressional candidates. Incumbency is clearly of primary
importance for PACs; whether Democrat or Republican, those in power receive the
lion's share of funds.107

PAC Sponsor

Table 7
Post-Election PAC Giving
Overall 1994
Post-Election 1994
Total
%D %R
Tota
%]D

N ational R ifle A ssociation
AT&T

$1.8m il
$1.2m il
Nat'l. Assoc, o f Life U nderw riters $1.3m il
Nat'l. A utom obile D ealers Assoc. $2.0m il
U nited Parcel Service
$2.6m il

23
61
51
29

In f 1. A irlin e Pilots Assoc.
Nat'l. Assoc. Fed. C redit U nions
A m erican B ankers Assoc.
Am er. S ociety A ne sth e sio lo g ists

$.77m il
$1.2m il
$.40m il
$.40m il
$.96m il
$.51 mil
$1.3m il
$.47m il

53
64
24
56
59
89
61
48
58

N orthrup-G rum m an Corp.
A m erican C rystal S ugar

$.31 mil
$.58m il

59
67

Am er. Acad, o f O ptham ology
Nat'l. B eer W h o le sa le rs Assoc.
A m eritech
BellS outh

77
39
49
71
47
36
76
44
41
11
39
52
421
41
33

$84,892
$79,745
$76,500
$69,000
$67,625
$55,500
$48,500
$44,000
$39,500
$39,000
$26,500
$25,900

4
20
0
0
2
21
1
22
18
9
2
4

$25,000
$24,500

8
18

$20,500

20

%R
96
80
100
100
98
79
99
78
82
91
98
96
92
82
80

Source: Federal Election Commission, National Republican Congressional
Committee.107

107 From a table published in "To the '94 Election Victors Go the Fundraising Spoils",
Johnathon D. Salant and David S. Cloud, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
April 15, 1995, p.1058.
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PAC Spending and Election Results
Whether or not PAC spending, per se, has any significant effect on election
outcomes is difficult to verify empirically. While the earlier discussion of spending
totals demonstrated a statistically significant association between a challenger's
percentage of the vote received and his/her total campaign expenditures, incumbent
total spending was seen to have a statistically insignificant association with
incumbent's vote percentage (and was, in fact, even negatively correlated to that
percentage of the vote). Certainly, spending money in the modem campaigns of the
"new politics" is a necessary component of any successful election effort, whether
that effort is an incumbent's or a challenger's; but the extent to which it is directly
related to the outcome of any given election (measured by percentage of the vote
received) is at best only minimally important for incumbents. In fact, high levels of
total spending by incumbents may well signify electoral vulnerability vis-a-vis a wellfinanced strong challenger.
Since it has been noted in Tables 6 and 7 above, that the vast majority of PAC
money goes to the campaign coffers of incumbent members of Congress who seek reelection, and since incumbent expenditures appear to have little effect on election
outcomes, it would seem to follow that PAC dollars, as a component of incumbent
spending, would logically be found to be statistically insignificant when related to an
incumbent's election percentages. Any hypothesis which posited that incumbent PAC
dollars and incumbent vote percentages are insignificantly related may or may not be
borne out in an empirical analysis of the relationship between PAC dollars and
incumbent vote percentages. What may be more revealing, however, as to the
question of PAC influence on election outcomes, would be an analysis of the
relationship of those PAC dollars and election percentages for all candidates -
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incumbents and challengers, Republican, Democrat and independent non-major party
candidates.
Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this study is: Aggregate PAC donations, as a
component of a candidate's total campaign expenditures, are unrelated to that
candidate's eventual percentage of the vote received. Any effort to prove or disprove
the alternative research hypothesis (one often advanced by reformers seeking to
further limit PAC activity) that PAC donations, in and of themselves, are significantly
related to (or exert an "undue influence" on) election results necessarily begins with
an empirical examination of actual PAC contribution and vote percentage data for
individual candidates in various congressional election contests.
Because they receive the greater proportion of aggregate PAC monies (see Table 5
above), and because PAC dollars represent a larger share of their total expenditures,
House candidates were randomly chosen from the Federal Election Commission
disclosure lists for the general election campaigns of 1992 and 1994. A random
sample of 356 individual House candidates (21% of the 1675 individual House
candidates in 1992 and 1994 combined) and their corresponding PAC contribution
totals were examined via the Pearson's R measure of association. The R value
obtained - .3906 (See Appendix 3) indicates that a moderate linear relationship does,
in fact, exist between PAC dollars and election results as measured by percentage of
the vote received for the House candidates surveyed. This result might indicate that
the null hypothesis of no relationship between PAC monies and eventual vote
percentages cannot be rejected. It should be noted, however, that this correlation
coefficient value lends only tepid support for the notion of either PAC "undue
influence", or of any strong linear cause and effect relationship between percent of
the vote received and PAC donations - both would seem to require an association R
value of at least .50. Therefore, any attempt to predict a given candidate's eventual
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percent of the vote, based solely on the knowledge of contributions to his/her
campaign from political action committees, would be highly inaccurate.
In order to further evaluate the validity of such a conclusion, the House data were
subjected to a regression analysis with candidate's percentage of the vote
(PERCENT) as the dependent variable, and political action committee contributions
(PAC$) as the independent variable. The regression coefficients obtained buttressed
the conclusions reached via the correlation analysis. While the adjusted R square
value o f . 15016 (R square = .15255) may indicate that some 15 percent of any given
candidate's vote percentage may be predicted or explained by his/her PAC receipts,
the model's standard error value of 15.3995 requires that one be wary of any attempt
to predict vote percentages based solely upon knowledge of PAC receipts. The
predictive range of plus or minus some 15 percent (a 30 percent range) is far too
expansive to be considered reliable for either predictive or explanatory purposes.
(See Appendix 3 for regression data)
Certainly, many other factors - among them incumbency, total spending,
incumbent's previous margin of victory, constituency characteristics and issue
alignment, voter turnout, etc. - must be considered in any effort to predict a
candidate's eventual, or to explain a candidate's actual, vote percentage. PAC
contributions appear to be but one of many possible factors relevant to election
results, certainly not the primary, or even, perhaps, among the most important factors.
A multiple regression analysis with percent of the vote as the dependent variable and
PAC receipts as one of a number of independent variables would be necessary to get
a more complete picture of what influences election results.
The results obtained in this empirical study provide no support for an hypothesis
which posits that PAC donations significantly affect election results. Those who
would argue that position as a rationale for reforming political action committee
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campaign finance activity by claiming an inordinate level of "undue influence" of
PAC money on election results are arguing against the tide of available evidence to
the contrary.
The potentially more damning criticism leveled against political action committee
contributions is that their purported "undue influence" extends to the realm of
legislative decision making, that it is in the legislative arena of fashioning tax codes,
regulatory requirements, and statutory compulsions that PAC money plays its most
crucial (and purportedly sinister) role. The charge is that individual PAC money buys
a member's vote on issues of importance to that PAC - a quid pro quo relationship of
money for votes. The following section will examine whether there is empirical
evidence to support such a charge. Can an empirically verifiable association between
PAC donations and legislative decisions be demonstrated to support a charge of
"money-for-votes" as a characteristic of political action committee "undue
influence"?

PAC Money and Legislative Decisions
The previous analysis of political action committee donation patterns, and an
appreciation for the important fund-raising role of PACs in modem congressional
campaigns, leads one to ask the questions of why PACs give and why they give to
whom they give. Are PACs acting rationally in deciding to whom they will
contribute? What do they hope to achieve by being willing (or even reluctant)
sponsors of particular candidates? Does the concentration of contributions to
incumbents, committee chairs, House and Senate leaders of both parties, and even the
occasional donations to challengers perceived as "up and comers", happen merely by
chance, or is there some rationale behind those patterns of giving? Do the efforts of
PACs in centering the majority of their contributions around competitive contests
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rather than "safe" races (or even the fact of PAC contributions to incumbents who
have no serious competition) tell us anything about the expectations of those PACs?
Surely the most recent realignment of PAC donations from Democrats to Republicans
following the 1994 GOP congressional takeover exhibited in Table 7 bears witness to
a preference toward donating to those in power. Why would such a shift in PAC
beneficiaries occur?
Because of the relative constancy of PAC contribution characteristics, and because
of the assumption of PAC formation as a rational act, there is an implicit presumption
that PACs expect something in return for their donations. PAC giving takes on the
characteristics of an "investment". The mere fact that so many organizations have
seen fit to organize and operate PACs and to "get into the game" by contributing to
congressional campaigns, is testament to the importance those organizations attach to
campaign contributions. Why bother to donate at all if a contribution gained
nothing?
According to Fred Wertheimer, president of Common Cause, "PAC contributions
have a legislative purpose. They are generally made by interest groups that have
specific legislative goals and conduct organized Washington lobbying programs. In
addition, they have a special 'investment' quality...".108 That quality of PAC giving as
investment can be seen in the substantial sums given to safe-seat incumbents.
PAC money contributed to safe-seat incumbents is, by definition, not a
necessity for financing their campaigns. Its investment nature is even
clearer than PAC contributions to more competitive incumbents.
...When PAC givers make contributions to safe incumbents, with both
the donors and recipients aware that the funds are not really needed for

108 Fred Wertheimer, "The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics", Arizona Law
Review. 22, n.2, (1980) p.605.
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immediate re-election purposes, the contributing can only be
considered of an investment nature.109
PAC money is seen as interested money given to candidates potentially beneficial
in furthering the legislative cause or interest of the PAC. Incumbents, committee
chairs, those in leadership positions, and those on committees with specific
jurisdiction over an area of interest to a given PAC are recognized and rewarded by
the PAC. But what exactly do those PAC campaign donations buy? Is there, in fact,
a demonstrable quid pro quo exchange of money for votes?
Political scientists who have examined this question do not have a clear answer.
The available evidence from various research models is often conflicting with regard
to the quid pro quo issue. John R. Wright, a leading scholar on this issue has written,
"Empirical evidence about the influence of PAC contributions on congressional
voting is filled with ambiguity and apparent contradiction."110 A number of studies
conclude that PAC contributions have no apparent effect on congressional voting
decisions, or only have a minimal and marginal effect on some, but not many, votes.
Other studies done on particular pieces of legislation reveal a more substantial
empirical finding of PAC money's influence.
Common Cause regularly issues "correlation studies" purporting to show that PAC
contributions are directly correlated with Senate and House roll-call votes. Professor
Larry Sabato explains this technique by stating:
Common Cause has cited the defeat of President Carter's Hospital
Cost Containment Act of 1977 as an example of AMPAC's influence.
Of the 234 House members who voted for a crippling amendment to
the act, 202 had been given $1.65 million in contributions during their
1976 and 1978 campaigns, with an average receipt of over $8,100 per
member. While 122 of the members voting against the crippling

109 Ibid., p.610.
110 Quoted in Berry, The Interest Group Society, p.132.
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amendment had also been given contributions, their average gift was a
much lower $2,300 each.111
Jeffrey Berry cites an example about money donated by the National Association
of Automobile Dealers:
Prior to the 1980 elections, its [NAAD] PAC gave roughly $1 million
to congressional candidates of both parties. The leading issue for the
auto dealers in the next Congress was the Federal Trade Commission’s
consumer protection regulation for used cars. The regulation required
used-car dealers to list known mechanical defects and warranty
information on a window sticker. A legislative veto resolution was
subsequently introduced in both houses. In the House, 186 of the 216
representatives who cosponsored the resolution to overturn the
regulation had received contributions from the auto dealers in the
previous three years. Sixteen members became cosponsors within ten
days of receiving their contributions. The average donation members
received was $2,300.112
Congress passed the veto resolution.
Larry Sabato wisely notes that although this type of analysis tends to seem
conclusive on the surface, "there is no 'smoking gun'; a correlation does not prove
causation."113 While this is certainly true it does not explain away or completely
discredit the ample findings of PAC donation and floor vote correlation. Causation
need not be the only standard by which concern over PAC influence is measured.
Causation is extremely difficult to prove; particularly in an area which requires some
accurate knowledge of what factors weigh in the minds of those members of
Congress who are called upon to decide the fate of many legislative proposals on a
widely diverse number of issues. Still one need be careful in drawing too expansive a
conclusion from evidence of correlation. Such a technique fails to consider a great
many potentially important factors which might influence how any particular member
111 Sabato, PAC Power, p. 132.
112 Berry, p.132.
113 PAC Power, p. 132.
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has voted. Rarely is a decision of importance made by human beings solely on the
basis of one solitary factor. Sabato points this fact out rather succinctly:
There can be many explanations for a congressman's [sic] vote for or
against any given bill. His party might strongly favor or oppose a
measure. The bill might positively or negatively affect his constituents
in some way. The legislator's long-held beliefs might predispose him
one way or the other. Or, as Common Cause and others claim, he
might be thinking of PAC support for him, or his opponent, at election
time.114
PAC Money and Floor Votes - Other Studies
A number of political scientists have begun to analyze the factors influencing floor
votes through the use of much more sophisticated statistical techniques other than
simple correlations and chi-square associations. Political scientist Henry Chappell
conducted a study of possible causal effects of PAC contributions on seven different
legislative measures and was able to demonstrate a significant positive relationship
between PAC donations and the vote results in only one of the seven cases examined
- a vote on the B-l bomber appropriation and contributions from Rockwell
International, the primary beneficiary of government contracts to build the
controversial plane. Chappell's study did note a positive, but not significant,
relationship in five other of the seven cases.115
Diana Yiannakis's 1983 study of votes on the windfall profits tax measure of 1979
and the Chrysler bailout bill of that same year, found little support for the assertion of
PAC money's influence on roll call voting in these instances. Members of Congress

114 Ibid.
115 Henry W. Chappell, Jr., "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A
Simultaneous Tobit-Probit Model," Review of Economics and Statistics, v.64,
(February 1982) p. 77-83.
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were found to have followed their party and their own ideological leanings much
more than PAC contributions.116
A study by Thomas Stratmann examined the possibility of a causal relationship
between PAC contributions and roll call votes on the floor of the U.S. House of
Representatives.117 In the study Stratmann analyzed the relationship between ten roll
call votes in the House relating to "six specific amendments to the Farm Bill [1985],
the Farm Bill itself, and three votes relating to Farm Credit measures", and
contributions from PACs that are "sponsored by associations from the farm sector or
are associated with agricultural interest groups."118 The issues chosen were of low
visibility, not subject to the concern of numerous competing groups, and relatively
non-partisan. (This is much different from the kind of partisan dynamic which quite
obviously colored the climate surrounding the cloture votes analyzed above.) In
contrast to earlier findings by Chappell and Yiannakis, among others, it was found
that eight out of the ten coefficients estimated from Stratmann's simultaneous model
indicated a significant causal relationship between PAC money and votes.
Specifically, in one of the findings, although it was demonstrated that "the vote of
Republican congressmen [sic] was guided by the Reagan administration's opposition
to sugar price supports...the positive impact of a $1,000 sugar contribution on voting
behavior more than offsets the negative impact of Republican party affiliation.

116 Diana Evans Yiannakis, "PAC Contributions and House Voting on Conflictual
and Consensual Issues: The Windfall Profits Tax and the Chrysler Loan Guarantee,"
prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, Illinois, Sept. 1-4, 1983, summarized in Sabato, PAC Power, p.133.
117 Thomas Stratmann, "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy?: Deciphering Causal
Effects of Money and Votes", Southern Economic Journal, v.57, n.3, (Jan. 1991)
p.606-14.
118 Stratmann, p. 611 and 612.
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Moreover, a $3,000 sugar PAC contribution maps into a yes vote with almost
certainty."119
Stratmann concludes that "the statistically significant contributions coefficients
suggest that campaign contributions are an important determinant of a congressman's
voting decision in eight out of the ten votes analyzed."120 The vote on the 1985 Farm
Bill itself showed less of an impact because, Stratmann concluded, it was of higher
visibility where party influence is exerted more forcefully and it becomes more
subject to opposition from competing interest groups.
Another investigation by John P. Frendreis and Richard W. Waterman examining
whether or not systematic linkages existed between PAC contributions and Senate
votes to deregulate the trucking industry, concluded that there indeed was such
linkage. The study further concluded that legislative votes were subject to the
influence of PAC campaign contributions for particular kinds of issues where other
possible factors of relevant influence are minimized.121 The issue was not of great
importance to party concerns, nor was it of headline-grabbing quality to the media or
a wide constituency of average Americans. The linkage demonstrated in the study
showed a relationship of PAC contributions to votes that was stronger than any
relationship between votes and party affiliation, or constituency alignment factors and
vote. It was demonstrated that the linkage was strongest for those senators whose
seats were up for re-election in 1980.

119 Ibid., p.615.
120 Ibid., p.618-19.
121 John P. Frendreis and Richard W. Waterman, "PAC Contributions and Legislative
Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation", Social Science Quarterly, v.66,
(June 1985) p.401-12.
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Two other studies, one by Frank L. Davis122, and another by Alan Neustadtl123
demonstrate the many conditions under which votes are affected by PAC
contributions. Many factors must be taken into account in order to determine to what
extent votes are subject to substantial (statistically significant) influence by PAC
contributions. These studies posit that whether an issue is of high or low visibility
has a direct bearing on whether or not campaign donations will be seen to have a
significant determinative effect on a member's decision with respect to any particular
issue. Additionally, the saliency of the issue at hand to constituents in a member's
home district, the relative strength of organized opposition to the issue by various
groups (an expanded scope of conflict), the parochial or national character of the
issue, the strength and influence of party discipline and leadership, ideological and
philosophical proclivities, and presidential support or non-support, all affect the
extent to which a member of Congress will base his/her vote on a campaign
contribution. The degree to which a quid pro quo - money for votes - relationship can
be shown to exist, at a statistically significant level, depends on the degree to which
that particular issue is visible and salient to a member's constituencies, the degree to
which it is controversial or partisan, and the degree to which it is relevant or
meaningful in terms of a member's ideology or philosophy. When all or most of these
factors are minimized, much of the available empirical evidence points to a
statistically significant causal connection between PAC contributions and voting
decisions.

122 Frank L. Davis, "Balancing the Perspective on PAC Contributions: In Search of an
Impact on Roll Calls", American Politics Quarterly, v.21, n.2, (April 1993) p.205-22.
123 Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign
Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces, v.69, n. 2,
(Dec. 1990) p.549-64.
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PAC Money and Floor Votes - An Analysis of Association
In order to get an idea of the degree to which any relationship between PAC
campaign contributions and floor votes could be empirically measured, this study
undertook to examine the votes of United States senators, in the final session of the
103rd Congress, on two issues which might logically seem to have particular
relevance and importance to political action committees. Both the campaign finance
reform cloture vote and the vote to invoke cloture in the debate over lobby reform
which occurred in late 1994124 were floor votes which, it was widely understood,
were the key votes senators would cast to decide the ultimate fate of either reform
effort in that session of Congress - and quite possibly for a long time.
The yea or nay votes of 91 senators (The votes on the questions by nine retiring
senators were not included in the analysis since it was presumed that there would be
no reason for these senators to feel compelled to consider PAC contributions in
determining their votes since they were not planning on running for re-election.) on
those two motions were crosstabulated with the contributions from political action
committees each had received for the election year 1994. Those contributions had
been collapsed into categories in order to facilitate a chi-square analysis with the
lobby reform cloture vote and the campaign finance reform vote as the dependent
variables in two separate crosstabulations. The chi-square values obtained for both
crosstabulations revealed no statistically significant relationship between PAC
donations received and votes for or against the two cloture motions. The chi-square
value obtained for the crosstabulation lobby reform vote by PAC dollars was 11.244
with 9 degrees of freedom. This value was seen to be statistically insignificant at a

124 The vote to invoke cloture on the debate over campaign finance reform legislation
took place on October 6, 1994, while the cloture vote on lobby reform was on
September 30th of that year. Both cloture attempts failed by identical margins of 5246.
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level of .25932, well below the required 95 percent confidence interval. Likewise,
the value of chi-square for the crosstabulation campaign finance reform vote by PAC
donations ( chi square = 5.11057) was also statistically insignificant at a level of
.82457. Naturally, all of the chi-square based measures of association for both
crosstabulations were consistent with a finding of no statistically significant
association between the two variables. (See Appendix 4 ) It is quite obvious from
these results that PAC contributions and these particular floor votes are not related in
any significant way.
It was thought that in the case of these two particular votes perhaps the member's
party identification would be a much more reliable predictor of a member's vote.
Accordingly, the votes were crosstabulated with party identification and the resultant
chi-square value and its related measures of association all revealed a high level of
statistical significance and association.125 (See Appendix 4 immediately following
the data on PAC$ and these votes for the relevant data on the relationship between
party and vote.)
Another possible relationship between these votes and PAC contributions was
examined in this study. It was thought that perhaps one might be able to observe a
significant relationship between the votes of those senators who were up for reelection in the 1994 mid-term elections and PAC contributions to their campaigns. It
was posited that those senators, faced with the necessity of raising significant
campaign monies from PACs and other sources, may have felt compelled to vote
against the two cloture motions in order to secure favor from PACs which had lined

125 In all cases within this analysis the coding for senator's votes was such that a
value of 1 was assigned to a yes vote, while a value of 0 indicated a no vote.
Likewise, in all cases in which party identification is relevant the value of 1 was
assigned to Democrats, 0 to Republicans.
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up in opposition to lobby reform and campaign finance reform efforts. In this
instance, however, such a relationship was not proven to be statistically significant.
In fact, here again the relationship between party identification and how a particular
senator voted was seen to have a great deal of statistical significance and association.
But, no such relationship between PAC donations to these senators facing impending
re-election races was discovered. (See Appendix 4 for the relevant values associated
with this analysis.)
It is quite apparent that in the case of the two floor votes examined in this analysis,
other factors were of greater import to senators than PAC donations to their campaign
coffers. One could certainly not draw a conclusion that PAC donations held sway
over a member's floor vote on these two issues which were of some significant
concern to the future of PAC operations. No charge of a quid pro quo association
could be supported in these instances.
Yet, is an empirically verifiable association between money and floor votes the
only way to demonstrate PAC influence in the legislative process? Could PACs have
influence in areas of that process other than floor votes? Many reformers cite
evidence of PAC accessibility to the crucial stages of legislative development as
cause for concern about real or perceived inequities of access to the policy process.
PACs are seen to enjoy an inordinate access by virtue of their ability to donate vast
sums to the campaigns of members of Congress. Those groups or individuals who
cannot contribute find their access to crucial policy stages diminished. To what
extent is this assertion verified by empirical examination? This is the question to
which this study will now turn.
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The Concern Over "Unequal Access"
Perhaps more directly relevant to concerns over PAC contributions is the access to
legislators those contributions afford. While a quid pro quo of money for votes may
be difficult to empirically establish, or to consistently demonstrate, there appears to
be relative agreement among scholars and officeholders alike that PAC contributions
do, at a minimum "open doors." That access advantage enjoyed by interest groups
that can contribute large sums to the election efforts of congressional candidates and
incumbent legislators causes many to have concern about the degree to which
legislative questions are analyzed within parameters established by the moneyed
interests. If access is unequal, it is likely that only those groups to whom the doors to
members' offices are opened will be able to bend the ear of legislators when issues
are up for decision. Candice Nelson and David Magleby put it this way:
One need not argue that PAC money buys votes in order to posit that
PACs have altered the way in which interest groups shape
congressional behavior. No matter what they might say publicly,
members of Congress are more inclined to listen to an organization
that has contributed to their campaigns. On matters not directly
affecting their constituents, the same members will think long and
hard before voting against the interests of those PACs.126
While recognizing the inequalities of accessibility, Richard L. Hall and Frank W.
Wayman adopt the premise of PAC rationality in the electoral and legislative arenas.
PACs are seen as rational actors seeking to maximize their accessibility to legislators
in order to influence issue outcomes which have the potential to affect them either
beneficially or adversely. Hall and Wayman take issue, however, with the standard
emphasis on attempting to predict causal relationships between PAC money and

126 Candice J. Nelson and David B. Magelby, "Congress and Campaign Money: The
Prospects for Reform," The Brookings Review. (Spring 1989) p. 36.
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floor votes.127 They surmise that in looking for the effects of money, one should
look more to the politics of committee decisions than to those of the House or Senate
floor. Hall and Wayman focus on the committee level participation of particular
members, not on their roll call votes. The intended effect of PAC contributions in
this context is to buy a member's time and attention and thereby to mobilize bias in
congressional committee decision making. According to Hall and Wayman, "...the
behavior most likely to be affected is members' legislative involvement, not their
votes."128
These authors develop a model of committee participation that permits a direct
test of whether, and to what extent, PAC money can mobilize bias in committee
decisions. An analysis of data regarding action from three separate House
committees on three distinct pieces of legislation led the authors to conclude that
PACs act in such a way as to mobilize action by committee members for or against
particular proposals within the committee's deliberations and markups. A careful
analysis of PAC contribution behavior led Hall and Wayman to determine further that
PACs do indeed act rationally in furthering their own interests by rewarding their
supporters - even those who are not in danger of losing their "safe" seats incumbents, party leaders, and members of what the PAC sees as important
committees. They are able to do so insofar as their contributions are not intended to
"buy" votes directly in any sort of quid pro quo arrangement, but are instead
"intended to accomplish something different from and more than influencing
elections or buying votes."129 Specifically, PAC money is allocated to mobilize

127 Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science
Review, v.84, n.3, (Sept. 1990) p. 797-820.
128 Ibid., p.797.
129 Ibid., p.800.
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legislative support and favorable action by congressional members at the most crucial
points in the legislative process (or at least to demobilize vocal and active
opposition). It is at the level of the committees and subcommittees that much of the
groundwork of important legislation is established. The parameters of public policy
are delineated at this stage, as is the scope of both problem and goal definition of a
given issue. In gaining a certain measure of influence at this stage of legislative
decisions through the access that PAC contributions allow, PACs are able to secure
and perhaps alter a member's pattern of legislative involvement - "the goal is not
simply to purchase support but to provide incentives for supporters to act as
agents...".130
Hall and Wayman argue for the following conclusions: (1) "...while members'
voting choices are highly constrained, how they allocate their time, staff, and political
capital is much more discretionary."131 This is the essence of "agency" which PACs
seek - creating the conditions wherein members see fit to use the resources of their
offices to work for goals the PACs would like to see realized. (2) The member's level
of involvement is something a PAC can reasonably expect to affect. Outright
purchase of votes is unlikely to occur and is viewed by both PAC officials and elected
officeholders as ethically reproachable. PACs do not presume to purchase the floor
votes of public officials since they implicitly realize that how a member may vote on
the floor, or on highly visible, salient, or partisan questions, is subject to a rigorous
calculus on the part of that member of many competing factors. But the degree to
which a member will choose to work in committee on behalf of, or in opposition to, a
PAC interest can reasonably be affected by PAC financial support or the threat of
non-support. (3) A purposive view of PACs is demonstrated such that their behavior
130 Ibid., p.802.
131 Ibid.
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of supporting their friends, incumbents, party leaders, and members almost certain to
win re-election, is rational since it is precisely one's supporters, incumbents, party
leaders, and members certain to return to the Congress that any PAC wants to
mobilize in committee. Finally, (4) access is the most crucial goal of PAC
contributions, for access is central to being able to stimulate agency on the part of
members of Congress. Inability to secure access to members leaves a PAC unable to
lobby most effectively for its position with those members at the crucial stage of
committee deliberations.
That access is crucially important to gain a position of potential legislative
influence is best demonstrated by the not uncommon PAC practice of donating to
both candidates in a congressional race. In nine 1986 Senate races, some 500 PACs
contributed to both the Democrat and the Republican candidates.132 Sometimes
PACs which have contributed to a losing candidate will then give to the winner after
the election. (Recall the switch of PAC contribution patterns following the 1994
elections revealed in Table 7 above.) It is clear that these PACs care less about who
wins then they do about having access. Berry states: "When gifts from PACs go to
both candidates in a race, it stretches the justification for PACs as a means of
facilitating participation in politics by rank-and-file citizens. Interest groups are
simply using their wealth to gain advantages over those that do not give."133
Jeffrey Berry summarizes the facile distinction made by those (such as PAC
directors) who argue that buying access is not equatable with buying influence:
PAC directors freely acknowledge that money buys access while
categorically denying that it buys influence. Dividing access and
buying influence into two entirely separate phenomena is a convenient
rationalization for PAC officials that absolves them from any

132 Berry, p.135.
133 Ibid.
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impropriety. But, access is [emphasis his] a form of influence. If
congressmen and their staffs favor those who contribute with greater
access, that cannot help but influence their perceptions of the public
policy issues before them. The conversations that legislators and
staffers have with a group's lobbyists and the documents they read
prepared by that organization all work to reinforce the group's message
about what needs to be done. The more access a lobbyist has, the more
chance he or she has to define what the policy problems are.134
Congressman Barney Frank, referring to members of Congress, has stated that,
"We are the only human beings in the world who are expected to take thousands of
dollars from perfect strangers on important matters and not be affected by it."135
Yet, it is surely true as well that legislators and their staffs see the work they do on
behalf of these groups which contribute to them as being nothing more than
constituency service for a cause they care about. What is troubling, perhaps, about
this apparent reasonable attention to constituency is that it is also undoubtedly true
that legislators do not have the time, resources and energy to work equally as hard for
all constituency groups which approach them. Consequently, it would seem to be
almost inevitable that the greater amount of attention will go to those groups, which
by virtue of having made a sizable campaign contribution, are better able to secure
initial access and to foster member agency on behalf of their goals.
Of course the key question concerning this access process might be: What
difference does it make? Does the accessibility of PAC interests at the committee
stage of legislative development have undesirable implications for public policy? To
help answer this question Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott, in their
book entitled Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence, note that in a

134 Ibid.
135 This statement by Rep. Barney Frank is widely quoted in the literature on the
issues of campaign finance reform. Here, it is quoted from Jeffrey Berry, The Interest
Group Society, p. 134.
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survey of top corporate PAC officials they had conducted while researching for the
book, those officials, when asked to provide an example of what it is their
organizations were trying to accomplish by contributing to federal political
candidates, "about 90 percent described a tax loophole they had won."136
Clearly, the playing field for access is not level. Not all groups or individuals have
the resources of large corporate, labor, and trade association PACs and consequently,
not all are equally able to get in the game. Access may be available to all, but it is
available at a price which many are either unable, unwilling, or both, to pay.
As has already been noted, the influence of PAC contributions on legislative
decisions has been most consistently demonstrated on issues of low visibility and
little widespread public saliency. PACs understand that it is foolish to expect that a
member of Congress can be persuaded, against the direct wishes of major constituent
groups, party leadership, or personal ideology, among other relevant factors, to vote
differently than he/she otherwise would simply because of a contribution from a
single political action committee. Accordingly these access-oriented PACs have a
different purpose and style. Clawson, et al., explain:
Their aim is not to influence the member's public vote on the final
piece of legislation, but rather to be sure that the bill's wording
exempts their company from the bill's most costly or damaging
provisions. ...the aim... is to be sure that the law has built-in loopholes
that protect the company. The law may say that corporate tax rates are
increased and that's what the media and the public think, but section
739, subsection J, paragraph iii, contains a hard-to-decipher phrase.
No ordinary mortal can figure out what it means or to whom it applies,
but the consequence is that the company doesn't pay the taxes you'd
think it would. For example, the 1986 Tax "Reform" Act contained a
provision limited to a single company, identified as a "corporation
incorporated on June 13, 1917, which has its principal place of

136 Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott, Money Talks: Corporate PACs
and Political Influence. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1992, p.95.
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business in Bartlesville, Oklahoma." With that provision in the bill,
Philips Petroleum didn't mind at all if Congress wanted to "reform" the
tax laws.137
Although an explicit causal model for determining the degree to which the PAC
contributions from Philips Petroleum to members of the tax writing committees138
could be found directly responsible for the provisions of tax exemption which the
corporation was able to effect is not available, it does not diminish concerns about
"unequal access." It is the ease of access to members which is enjoyed by corporate
contributors (and other big contributors) which affords them the opportunity to gain
such favorable treatment. The fact that these provisions are buried in subsections of
the bills and phrased in such obscure, convoluted language as to be incomprehensible
to most, is tantamount to an admission of their dubious desirability within public
policy. It must be fairly certain that they would face greater opposition were they to
face the light of public scrutiny.
The costs associated with these tax loopholes, which are, in effect, gained through
the purchase of access by campaign contributions, are extraordinarily high. Clawson
et al., quote from the work of two Pulitzer prize-winning journalists, Donald L.
Barlett and James B. Steele of the Philadelphia Inquirer, who tackled the job of
uncovering the loopholes in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Noting their distrust of the
Congressional estimate of revenue loss through the tax loopholes contained within
the 1986 law, put at some $10.6 billion, Clawson et al., state:

137 Ibid., p.91.
138 Although many tax loopholes are written into tax laws, many others are hidden in
various other pieces of legislation. If a particular measure is rejected by the tax
committees, it can be slipped into a bill which deals with an entirely different subject.
In this way corporate PACs are able to advantage themselves of a multiplicity of
venue options; all gained through the strategic use of well-placed contributions
designed to open the doors of access.
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...this number is taken seriously only by those who still believe in the
tooth fairy. Consider Barlett and Steele's estimates for the losses
incurred by just one loophole:
"The cost of one break was originally placed by the Joint Committee
at $300 million. After passage of the legislation, the figure was
adjusted upward to $7 billion. That worked out to a 2,233 percent
miscalculation, a mistake so large as to defy comprehension. It would
be roughly akin to a family who bought a house expecting to pay $400
a month on its mortgage but who discovered, belatedly, the payments
would actually be $9,332 a month."139
Or consider the cost of the special tax provision to help the Long
Island Power Authority buy and shut down the Shoreham nuclear
power plant. This provision was buried in what Congress referred to as
a deficit reduction measure. The Joint Committee on Taxation
originally said the bailout would cost $1 million, then revised that just
a tad to $241 million. The true cost is estimated at $3.5 to $4
billion.140
Not only do the advantages achieved by corporate, and other resource rich
interests affect tax policy and cost readily quantifiable amounts of potential public
revenue, but, even more insidiously, these monied interests have had an undesirable
effect on public perceptions about the policy process in ways which are not so easily
quantified. Public distrust of "special interests" PACs and the influence of money on
Congress has been reflected in numerous opinion polls. A 1985 ABC NewsWashington Post poll found that 70 percent of Americans agreed with the statement,
"Most Members of Congress care more about special interests than they care about
people like you."141 A 1985 Gallup poll revealed that fully 79 percent of Americans

139 Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, "The Great Tax Giveaway," special
section of the Philadelphia Inquirer, including articles that originally appeared April
10-16 and September 25-26, 1988, p.4.
140 Clawson, et al., p. 95-96.
141 Cited in Candice Nelson and David Magleby, The Money Chase: Congressional
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agreed that "Money is the most important factor influencing public policies."142 It is
not without some justification that Americans have come to distrust PACs and to
distrust the motivations of their own elected representatives. Widespread public
feelings of inefficacy, cynicism toward, and alienation from, the democratic electoral
and public policy processes continues to grow in an environment of "interested
money" gaining an unequal advantage in access to those processes.

PACs and Reform - Summary
While the evidence cited above may suggest the need for reform of current
campaign finance practices campaign finance reform proposals either to limit the
amounts which individual PACs could legally contribute, to limit the aggregate
amounts which an individual candidate could receive from all PACs, or to ban PACs
altogether, which rely on an assertion of PAC "undue influence" on election results as
a rationale for their adoption can not be supported by empirical evidence. This study
demonstrated that although the null hypothesis of no relationship between PAC
money and a candidate's share of the vote could not be rejected, there was little
support for any hypothesis that that PAC money had an "undue influence" on the vote
percentages of those candidates examined.
However, the assertion of influence over certain legislative decisions does seem to
have some grounding in empirical observation. As outlined above, the degree to
which PAC contributions are seen to weigh importantly in the minds of members of
Congress is directly related to the visibility and saliency of the legislative issue
involved. For issues of high visibility, with a great degree of partisan, ideological, or
constituency saliency, PAC contributions appear to have little direct bearing on the
Campaign Finance Reform. Washington, D C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990, p.75.
142 Ibid.
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way in which a member votes. This was the case with the two floor votes this study
analyzed. Both the campaign finance cloture vote and the lobby reform cloture vote
examined here were issues of great visibility with a high degree of partisan
polarization. Party identification appeared to be a much more significant factor in
determining a given member's vote than were PAC contributions.
There is, however, a significant body of scholarly work which demonstrates that
on low-visibility, non-controversial (in the partisan sense), more technical issues - the
kind often decided in committee rather than on the floor - PAC contributions do,
indeed, play an important role in consideration of members' actions in support of the
particular contributing PAC's legislative agenda.
Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, the extent to which access to members of
Congress is facilitated by sizable campaign contributions - the kind which only wellfinanced, large PACs and wealthy individuals can give - is cause for significant
concern. The more access a lobbying group has the more chance that group has to
define what the parameters of a policy problem are. In a process of unequal access,
in which favorable tax and other legislative treatment is gained by those with
sufficient resources to donate large sums to the campaign coffers of incumbent and
aspiring legislators, certain direct and indirect costs are incurred. Both the direct
costs arising out of tax loopholes granted to specific interests and the indirect costs of
public inefficacy and citizen alienation from electoral and policy processes seen to be
dominated by "moneyed special interests", raise legitimate concerns about the role of
political action committees in the democratic processes.
That said, however, it is the judgment of this author that piecemeal reform
proposals of the type advocating either limitations on the size of individual PAC
donations, limits on the amounts a candidate can accept from all PACs, banning PAC
activity altogether, or setting federal campaign spending limits, if done without a
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systemic overhaul of the current regulatory system of campaign finance cannot hope
to accomplish the goals of real reform. Rather than opening up the system to allow
more equitable access to legislators to facilitate greater opportunity for participation
in the policy process, most piecemeal reforms would either fail to accomplish those
goals or, even worse enhance rather than reduce current inequities.
With respect to each of these:
•

Limits on the size of individual PAC donations - The intent of current campaign
finance law is to limit the size of political action committee contributions to an
amount that is so small that it cannot influence the behavior of legislators.
Accordingly, PACs are allowed to contribute $5,000 per candidate per election - a
total of $10,000 to a candidate facing both a primary and a general election.
Proponents of further limiting the amounts which PACs can contribute argue that
the existing limits are too high and consequently exert an "undue influence" on
the behavior of members of Congress. This runs contrary to available evidence
which seems to belie the importance of single PAC contributions as determinant
of a member's votes on major, visible, controversial issues. Yet, smaller
contributions are often enough to secure access to members in order to get the
"minor" changes in legislation which would be beneficial to the PAC interests
who make those contributions. Just how low would individual PAC contributions
have to be set to thwart this access process? Average corporate PAC donations in
1988 were $925 to House members and $2,472 to members of the Senate.143
Proposals to limit the size of individual PAC contributions would have to set such
limits even lower than these levels if the desired goal of reducing "influence" or

143 Corporate PACs represent the single largest category of PACs and the group
which tends to donate in larger amounts than other PACs. Figures quoted are from
FEC reports on all PAC activity for the 1988 election cycle.
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unequal access is to be achieved. Current proposals generally seek to reduce by
half the amounts which PACs may contribute. They would seem unlikely to have
any effect in reducing PAC accessibility.
•

Limits on the aggregate amounts which candidates could accept from PACs.
This restriction has been offered for congressional consideration a number of
times. It passed in the House, but not the Senate in 1979. The Senate again
considered it in 1986 and then passed it in 1991 as part of a campaign finance
reform package eventually vetoed by President Bush. Just exactly how this would
work out in practice is unclear, but it would seem probable that it would simply
encourage PAC contributions early in the electoral cycle in order that those PACs
could get their donations in before members had reached their limit. This would
seem to favor access oriented donations by the large resource rich committees,
squeezing out contributions from groups which could not contribute so early in
the process. The effect would be to heighten the influence of the largest
corporate, labor and trade association PACs at the expense of smaller citizen
PACs. Unequal access would then be exacerbated rather than reduced.

•

A Total Ban on Corporate, Labor, and Trade-Association PACs. It must first
be noted that there are some very real constitutional problems with a direct ban
on PAC contributions. In light of the Supreme Court's Buckley ruling, it is far
from certain that any proposal to ban PACs would withstand certain legal
challenge. Devoid of any other measure designed to work in conjunction with
such a proposal (such as an elimination of all, or most, forms of private financing
of congressional campaigns, a ban on independent spending, or soft-money
contributions) a ban on corporate, labor, and trade association PAC donations to
congressional candidates, is unlikely to achieve anything other than enhancing the
current Republican advantage in raising money from individuals. Furthermore,
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since PACs arose out of the 1970's reform efforts to reduce the influence of large
private, individual contributors, any "reform" which sought to revert to a reliance
on individual private sources of campaign funds fails to consider the kinds of
abuses which the 70's FECA legislation sought to address. Corporations, labor
unions, and trade associations would find ways to circumvent the ban on their
organized PAC activity either by using the means of independent spending, softmoney contributions, or bundling of large scale individual contributions to insure
continued access to members of Congress. All of these forms of financial activity
are not as easily scrutinized as are legally disclosed PAC contributions. The most
likely unintended consequence of a ban on PAC contributions to candidates
would be less public disclosure of fund sources leading, perhaps, to the kinds of
secret abuses which existed prior to 1970's reforms.
•

Spending Limits. As with the ban on PACs, spending limits established without
a concurrent plan of public financing would not stand up under legal challenge.
The Supreme Court explicitly ruled in Buckley that such limits are
unconstitutional unless tied to public financing. The only avenue open to
reformers who would advance this proposal without including with it a plan of
public financing for congressional campaigns, is a constitutional amendment
circumventing the Court's order - something of dubious feasibility. It has already
been demonstrated that spending limits without additional changes would amount
to little more than an incumbent protection program. In order to overcome the
distinct advantages enjoyed by incumbents (name recognition, publicly funded
staffs, free postage, "newsworthiness", etc.) challengers need to spend substantial
sums of money. If the costs of campaigns is restricted at a low level incumbents
will be even more difficult to unseat. Competition will suffer; contrary to what
reformers desire.
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If true reform is to be considered it must be considered comprehensively. The
only comprehensive campaign finance reform proposal which is inherently designed
to enhance electoral competition, reduce unequal access to members of Congress and
foster equal representation, create opportunity for more equitable participation in the
policy process, and, at the same time, actually save money, is public financing of
congressional campaigns. The current regulatory model of campaign finance, in
which wealthy individuals and PACs can use their money any way they want so long
as it is not proscribed (or regulated) by law, has not worked. Because money is so
unequally distributed and can be used in so many different ways in helping to finance
federal campaigns, and because the regulatory body charged with oversight - the
Federal Election Commission - has been underfunded and politically organized so as
to thwart real enforcement, rules are often evaded and regulators fall behind those
who constantly look for new and more creative ways to circumvent the law.144 Any
new reforms must appreciate the necessity of an overhaul of the FEC to create a
workable enforcement system which will protect the integrity of both current and
future campaign finance laws.145
Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott have described the current
regulatory model of campaign finance reform as being somewhat similar to a balloon:

144 Clawson, et al., cite evidence of such willfull disregard for, and FEC failure to
enforce, the law by noting both the Democratic and Republican winners of the 1988
Iowa caucuses had surpassed the primary spending limits established by law. Richard
Gephardt (D-Mo), the Democratic winner, "...exceeded his spending limit by almost
$500,000, and the Republican winner, Robert Dole (R-Kan.) exceeded his limit by
$306,000. It was more than three years later before the FEC completed its audit of
these campaigns - long after the presidential nominations were decided." Clawson, et
al., p.209.
145 See, for, instance Brooks Jackson, "Off Guard: Election Commission Set up as a
Watchdog, Has Become a Pussycat," Wall Street Journal. October, 19, 1987, at Al.
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If people and PACs pump money into it, it will expand. Regulators
occasionally push on the balloon to try to make it go down. With some
effort they can push the balloon down in one place - but that makes it
pop out farther somewhere else. If people focus only on the area of the
balloon that has been pushed in, they conclude the reform has worked.
However, if you get a look at the back of the balloon, it becomes
evident that it has popped out even farther somewhere else. This
regulatory model of campaign finance reform will not work. It leads to
a multiplicative increase in regulations combined with an exponential
increase in ways of avoiding the regulations. Some alternative strategy
must be found.146
That alternative strategy might well involve public financing of congressional
campaigns. The cases both for and against such a system will be made in the next,
and final section of this paper. Arguments for the extension of public financing to all
congressional campaigns will be analyzed in light of all of the foregoing analysis.
The principle argument against public financing - its cost and what is seen to be
public unwillingness to pay those costs - will be evaluated, along with other major
arguments of opposition, in order to determine the effectiveness of public financing
at alleviating some, or all, of the concerns outlined above, its public desirability, and
its political feasibility as well.

146 Clawson, et al., p. 196-197.

CHAPTER SEVEN
PUBLIC FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS
Because most complaints about the current regulatory system of private campaign
finance are centered around the sources of funds for political campaigns, public
funding has been the ultimate goal of many reformers who seek to alter
fundamentally the field of campaign funding sources. It is the logical conclusion of
the current cycle of campaign finance reform and, perhaps, the most problematic.
Even so, Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause, an early and tireless advocate of
further campaign finance reform, has stated the issue thusly: "Comprehensive
congressional campaign finance reform is needed to curtail the influence of specialinterest money, to create a competitive electoral process, and to help restore public
confidence in our political system. A new system of public campaign resources and
spending limits should be established for congressional races."147
But, in order to reach valid conclusions as to the desirability of any comprehensive
reform of current campaign finance laws involving the adoption of a system of public
funding for all federal election campaigns, various arguments, both pro and con must
be examined more completely. This will be the focus of this final section as an
evaluation of both the present system of private campaign finance and a completely
new system of full public financing is initiated. Which system is more in keeping
with constitutional and practical criteria of desirability? What might some of those
criteria be? These questions will be answered herein; but first the arguments.

147 Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes, "Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy," Columbia Law Review, v.94, n.4, May
1994, p. 1149.
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Arguments in Opposition
The central arguments advanced by opponents of any extension of public
financing into the arena of congressional campaign finance can be summarized into
four general themes:
•

First, any plan of public funding is essentially a plan of incumbent protection
inasmuch as such plans are coupled with an expenditure ceiling. Competition
would therefore be restricted, rather than enhanced, under a system of public
finance. Challengers would not be able to overcome the substantial electoral
advantages of incumbency since they would be precluded, under public financing
schemes, from raising and spending the large sums necessary to do so. Those
who make this argument point to the kind of studies, in this work and elsewhere
(Jacobson), which empirically demonstrate the need for challengers to raise and
spend vast sums of money to become viable, competitive candidates.

•

Second, there are constitutional issues and questions of democratic principle.
Some argue that public funding runs counter to the democratic principles of
political liberty and participatory democracy in that it, in effect, forces people to
finance candidates and campaigns which they may find repugnant, and inhibits
voluntary participation in politics by destroying an important link between
constituent and representative. By using taxpayer funds to finance all
congressional campaigns, any plan of public finance compels indirect funding of
candidates to which individual voters may be opposed. Inasmuch as the act of
contributing to candidates and their campaigns constitutes a form of political
participation, any plan of public financing which would eliminate or significantly
reduce the ability of individuals to participate in politics through the mechanism
of the campaign contribution, constrains, rather than enhances, participatory
democracy.
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•

A third, and certainly the most often advanced argument against public funding
of congressional campaigns, concerns the costs associated with such a scheme. In
an era of severe budget restraints and deficits, there appears to be little appetite
within the Congress or the electorate at large for an increase in government
spending for political campaigns. Inasmuch as budget cuts are affecting
government programs across the spectrum, widespread public and political
support for targeting taxpayer funds to congressional political campaigns is highly
improbable. Opponents of public financing often refer to such plans as
amounting to "welfare for politicians." The use of such rhetoric, and its
acceptance in the general public lexicon, is emblematic of the "politicized" nature
of the issue. The costs of public financing plans, estimated at or near some $150
million per election cycle (as in Clinton's plan) to as much as $500 million per
cycle, are seen as exorbitant and prohibitive.

•

A final objection to public financing is that even if a plan of public funding
sounds reasonable and may appear desirable, it is not the panacea for current
system ills that its proponents claim. Those individuals and groups with
sufficient resources, and the will to do so, will find ways to corrupt and
circumvent the system. In essence, the balloon theory of campaign finance
regulation, advanced by Clawson, Neustadtl and Scott, and referred to above, is
legitimized by this argument. Public financing as simply another regulation of
campaign finance will only result in such unintended consequences as "...a
multiplicative increase in regulations combined with an exponential increase in
ways of avoiding the regulations."148

148 Clawson, et al., p. 139.
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Each of these arguments will be examined in turn. Each will then be reviewed in
light of arguments by supporters of public campaign financing in order that
thoughtful conclusions about the desirability of such a system may be reached.
In light of the analysis of the effects of spending in congressional races provided
in this study and elsewhere, any plan of public financing must take note of the
empirical evidence which overwhelmingly points to a need for challengers to be able
to raise and spend substantial sums of money in order to overcome significant
incumbent advantages. Professor Gary Jacobson has analyzed the likely effects on
competitiveness in election contests of public funding and has found that any plan of
public funding which includes (as most such plans do) a cap on expenditures as part
of its implementation, would work to the detriment of challengers.149
In his analysis, Jacobson adopted, as models of what a possible public financing
scheme would look like, the 1977 House bill 5157, and the Senate's 1977 bill S 926,
both bills which would have provided partial public financing, in the form of
matching grants to candidates, had they been adopted in the 1977 congressional
session. The Senate bill would have provided for the establishment of a general
election spending limit of $250,000 plus 10 cents times the voting age population of
the state for all Senate campaigns. Major party candidates were automatically
eligible for 25 percent of this total in flat grant allocations. Contributions of up to
$100 per donor would be matched by federal funds up to the set limit in each
particular race. Candidates who accepted public funds would be restricted from
spending more than $35,000 of their own money on their campaigns. Third party and
other non-major candidates would not be eligible for the flat grant funds but could
receive matching grants if they met the threshold levels of raising 10 percent of their
149 Jacobson, Chapter 7, "The Future of Campaign Finance Regulation: Public
Funds?", p.201-226.
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spending lim it, or $100,000, whichever was less, from individual gifts of $100 or
less. Primary elections were not covered under the proposed legislation.
House bill 5157 required that House candidates gather a minimum of $10,000 in
private contributions of $100 or less in order to become eligible for matching funds.
Once this initial threshold had been reached, contributions (again of $100 or less per
contributor) would be matched dollar for dollar up to a total of $50,000 in public
funds. Candidates who accepted the public subsidies would be bound by law not to
exceed the total spending cap of $150,000, and were further limited to spending no
more than $25,000 in personal funds on their campaigns. Again, primaries were not
covered in the bill.
In determining both eligibility for, and levels of public funding available for,
congressional candidates in the election cycles of 1972, 1974, and 1976, Jacobson
assumed that the provisions for partial public financing proposed in the respective
1977 House and Senate bills had been in force for the 1972, 1974 and 1976 elections.
In projecting the impact of such a public funding scheme onto the results of these
elections, Jacobson adjusted the expenditure figures for each candidate according to
what he/she would have spent under the public funding scheme; the expected vote
was then computed using the parameters estimated for the regression equations he
had established in his earlier analysis of spending effects. Noting that inflation had to
be taken into account, Jacobson adjusted the spending ceilings mandated in the two
bills in order to reflect comparable dollar amounts for the years examined.150

150 Jacobson notes, "The Consumer Price Index was used to deflate subsidies to
comparable dollar amounts for 1972 and 1974. The 1972 and 1974 equivalents of
$50,000are, in round figures, $37,000 and $44,000 respectively. Similarly, $150,000
is equal to $111,000 in 1972 dollars, $132,000 in 1974 dollars. Comparable
adjustments were also made in the Senate subsidy and limit figures." p.210.
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What Jacobson discovered is that had the public funding subsidies and spending
limits been in effect, the limits would have been too low to allow for much chance of
a challenger victory.

In fact, "...inspection of individual cases shows that the

spending limits are instrumental in decreasing the number of challengers predicted to
win more than 50 percent of the vote. With the limits removed, the number of
expected winning challengers increases sharply."151
Consequently, Jacobson finds little empirical support for any proposition that
public funds plus spending limits would permit fairer competition for congressional
seats leading him to conclude:
To recapitulate briefly: congressional elections are affected much
more by what challengers spend than by what incumbents spend. The
more spending by all candidates, the better challengers are likely to
do. Campaign finance reforms that get more money into the hands of
challengers will enhance competition for congressional seats; reforms
that make it more difficult to acquire and spend money will have the
opposite effect.152
The argument against public funding which holds that any such plan of campaign
finance would amount to little more than an incumbent protection program appears to
have credibility in light of Jacobson's analysis. Any plan of public financing must
consider ways to decrease the distinct advantages of incumbency if it is to be judged
consistent with its stated goal of enhancing competition.
Public financing opponents also argue, on constitutional grounds, that such a
system of public funding would lead to a diminution of political participation and
destroy the crucial link between constituents and their representatives in Congress.
Bernard Shanley, onetime Vice Chairman of the Republican National Committee,

151 Jacobson, p. 213.
152 Ibid., p.219.
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summed up this position early on in the debate. Testifying before a Senate
committee in 1973 which was holding hearings on campaign finance reform, Shanley
stated, "Federal financing of political campaigns is entirely contrary to America's
basic concepts of participatory democracy and individual involvement in the political
process of candidate selection and advocacy."153 Representative Bill Frenzel, an
early opponent of campaign finance reform efforts, testifying before that same
committee, stated that a candidate's ability to raise and spend money was:
...a barometer of: (1) a candidate's popular support, (2) public approval
of his [sic] record while in office, and (3) his seriousness about
serving in public office...private financing functions in a manner
similar to the free market. It has been one of the traditional ways of
determining the popularity and attractiveness of a candidate. Popular
candidates rarely have a shortage of funds, while unpopular candidates
are usually unable to raise large amounts of funds.154
A system of public funding which denied citizens the right to fund, or to refuse to
fund, the candidate(s) of their own choosing is seen as an infringement on political
liberty and free speech. Even a voluntary scheme of tax checkoffs, such as that
employed in the current presidential finance system, is one which "ultimately makes
everyone pay to make up for the lost revenue and so to fund indirectly the campaigns
of candidates they detest."155 Certainly, it is argued, the right of free political
expression involves the right to refuse to fund candidates one finds detestable. As
such, it is certain that a system of public finance would face legal challenges on that
basis. It is not clear how the Supreme Court would rule on such a challenge, but
Buckley gives us some indication that a system of public finance would be ruled

153 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Subcommittee on
Priveleges and Elections, Public Financing of Federal Elections. 93rd Congress, 1st
session, hearings September 18-21, 1973, p.317.
154 Ibid., p. 151.
155 Jacobson, p.203.
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constitutional since the presidential public funding provisions of FECA were upheld
in that decision. Nevertheless, imposition of any plan of public financing would
almost certainly force a Court review of the Buckley decision.
Professor Larry Sabato has written, regarding public financing reform proposals:
"But the weightiest opposition to this reform, and the fundamental reason why public
financing will not be passed until a tidal change occurs, is the electorate's refusal to
pay for it."156 Terry Dolan, founder of the independent National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC), bluntly expressed those sentiments:
...there is an army of fed-up taxpayers just waiting to see how you
[Congress] vote on this issue. They, like me, will be morally indignant
to get the names of those congressmen who will spend millions of
dollars getting themselves re-elected when they cannot balance the
federal budget.157
Evidence of public ambiguity with respect to a system of taxpayer financed
campaigns is not hard to gather. A 1982 Gallup poll found that a majority of 55
percent expressed support for the statement, "It has been suggested that the federal
government provide a fixed amount of money for the election campaigns of
candidates for Congress, and that all private contributions from other sources be
prohibited." Yet, when the Civic Service polling firm asked the following year
whether respondents would "approve or disapprove of the proposal to use public
funds, federal money, to pay the costs of congressional campaigns," 65 percent
disapproved, with only 25 percent in favor.158 Further evidence of public
disapproval of the use of taxpayer monies to finance political campaigns is seen in

156 Larry Sabato, PAC Power, p. 178.
157 Quoted in Sabato, p.178-179.
158 These polls are cited in Sabato, p. 179.
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the falling participation rate of tax checkoffs used to fund the presidential campaign the only existing mechanism of public financing.
Figure 3 below illustrates the decline in participation by taxpayers in the checkoff
scheme used to generate the public funds for presidential campaigns authorized under
FECA. The chart clearly shows a continuous decline in elective participation in the
checkoff plan. The plan never has received even a 30 percent participation rate and
has seen a steady decline both in terms of the percentage of tax returns with the
checkoff and total dollars allocated to the presidential public funding program via
that checkoff mechanism. Since many proposals which advocate public funding also
propose to pay for it via the tax checkoff program, it is evident that declining
participation in the limited presidential public funding plan makes its usefulness in
any extension of public funding to congressional campaigns highly problematic.
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Furthermore, the Federal Election Commission has been warning of a funding
shortfall for the presidential system since 1990. Projections are for the fund to
experience a serious shortfall of between $75 and $100 million in 1996.159 This fact
has led many proponents of public financing to propose an increase in the amount of
the checkoff - from the current $1 per taxpayer to $3, or even $5 - in order to generate
funds required to extend public funding to all congressional campaigns.
Additionally, a more aggressive program of taxpayer education about the nature and
use of the fund is envisioned by those who would seek to protect its solvency. The
problem of declining taxpayer checkoff participation is seen, in this view, to be one
of a lack of public understanding of the way in which the checkoff system operates
and the purposes of the fund. Taxpayer misunderstanding of the checkoff - that any
amount checked will not increase tax owed or decrease any refund amount - is
apparently widespread according to this view, and the way to health for the system is
to increase awareness of that fact via an aggressive public education program.
Whether such a program of public education would, in fact, increase participation in
the checkoff program is open to question. Absent a guarantee that participation
would increase and that the fund would be able to generate the kind of revenue
necessary to fund all federal election campaigns, opponents argue that a fund which
might well experience serious shortfalls, when coupled with constraints on total
candidate spending, would further hamper serious challengers and decrease
competitiveness.
Still, the problems of cost are not completely addressed by a discussion of the
relative solvency of the presidential checkoff fund. It is clear that any system of
public funding for all congressional campaigns is going to cost a substantial amount
159 Federal Election Commission Annual Report 199F Washington,
D.C.iGovemment Printing Office, 1992, p.39.
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of money. Even President Clinton's plan, with which this paper began, was estimated
to cost approximately $150 million per election cycle. Other plans have been
projected to cost as much as $500 million - quite a hefty sum. These figures are
unlikely to generate enthusiastic support either in the Congress, or in the general
public, for any public financing plan. It most certainly could not be sold as a deficit
reduction, cost-saving measure and it is questionable that any plan would be likely to
generate a substantial increase in the numbers of taxpayer checkoff participants. In
fact, given the politicized rhetoric surrounding the issue, it is much more likely to
generate a significant decrease in such participation and a subsequent shortfall in
available dollars if it were foisted upon a reluctant taxpaying public.
An explosion of unreported and unlimited "soft money" contributions and
unregulated independent expenditures is likely to follow in the wake of public
financing according to many of its opponents. Candidates relying on public funding
and abiding by the expenditure limits who faced a concerted and massive
independent expenditure campaign, might, in effect, be drastically outspent. Soft
money contributions for party-building, get-out-the-vote and voter registration
activities are largely unregulated under current law and would likely be widely
abused by parties eager to retain their level of access to members of Congress and to
the policy process. The practice of "bundling", in which many small individual
contributions are collected and presented en masse to candidates, could easily be
employed by PACs to insure a candidate's ability to reach the initial threshold of
eligibility for public matching funds. Continuing abuses and creative circumvention
of campaign finance law are very likely to occur even under a system of public
financing. The necessity of imposing further regulations on campaign finance
activity to deal with persistent abuse will inevitably lead to more government "red
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tape" and bureaucracy in the view of reform opponents. In their view more reform
only results in more undesirable, unintended consequences.
Larry Sabato, as long ago as 1984, in the first edition of his book PAC Power:
Inside the World of Political Action Committees, pointed (perhaps prophetically) to
the political difficulties standing as obstructions to passage of any plan of public
financing for congressional campaigns by stating:
But the obstacles blocking passage of this reform are substantial. As
long as Republicans are in control of either house of Congress or the
presidency, no such bill will be passed and signed into law since most
members of the GOP are philosophically and practically (they do not
need the money) opposed to the idea. With the anti-spending,
antiregulatory mood prevailing on Capitol Hill and perhaps in the
country at large in the deficit-filled 1980s, even a solidly Democratic
Congress and administration would have great difficulty securing a
public financing law.160
The fact of the Clinton administration's recent failure to secure passage of its
public financing campaign finance reform proposal (even though that proposal was
for a system of partial public financing) even while having a solid majority of
Democrats in both houses underscores Sabato's observation. The most recent round
of congressional elections which propelled Republicans into control of both houses of
Congress may seal the fate of any comprehensive campaign finance reform involving
public financing. Campaign finance reform is unlikely to be an issue on the
Republican congressional agenda. Public financing of congressional campaigns is an
issue of partisan polarization. So long as there is no public consensus on the issue, or
a groundswell of public support for publicly funded federal campaigns, the issue is
likely to remain partisan and divisive; hardly the kind of issue which might enjoy
likely congressional passage.

160 Sabato, p. 178.
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Arguments in Support
Despite these and other concerns about public financing as an alternative to the
present system of private campaign finance, many who study the issues involved in
campaign finance reform acknowledge current system inequities. It is those
inequities which precipitate the calls for comprehensive reform. Even Gary Jacobson
has recognized these current system inequities noting that "privately financed
campaigns give an inordinate advantage to wealthy individuals and interests,
violating the democratic principle of political equality."161162 He quotes from Joel
Fleishman's work "Private Money and Public Elections: Another American Dilemma"
162: "By providing the capital needed for effective campaigning, the wealthy [both
individuals and PACs] exercise political advantage. Through their influence over
public policy, the wealthy are able to secure their economic advantage."163 It is this
concern over the degree to which economic inequities affect public policy and
electoral processes which underlies many of the arguments advanced by proponents
of public financing.
Arguments in support of public funding for all congressional campaigns come
from many disparate sources. Charles McC. Mathias, the former Republican senator
from Maryland, and a staunch advocate of public financing, has argued that concerns
about the inequities of present-day campaign finance compel consideration of an
alternative system of publicly financed federal campaigns. He writes:
Partial public funding with realistic expenditure ceilings would enable
candidates to run competitive campaigns in which private funding

161 Jacobson, p.202.
162 Joel Fleishman, "Private Money and Public Elections: Another American
Dilemma", Changing Campaign Techniques, ed. Louis Maisel, Sage Electoral Studies
Yearbook 2, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976, pp. 19-54.
163 Joel Fleishman, quoted in Jacobson, p. 202.
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would continue to play an important but not a dominant role. A grant
of public funds would free candidates from the incessant demands of
fund-raising and offers the hope of shortening the seemingly endless
campaign season. A system of public finance that includes a limit on
the amount candidates may contribute to their own campaigns would
eliminate the unfair advantage enjoyed by those with great personal
wealth. And most important, public financing in congressional
campaigns would restore a missing equilibrium between the sources of
campaign funding and give officeholders a greater measure of freedom
to address issues in the broad national interest. Such results would go a
long way toward renewing public belief in the integrity of the electoral
process.164
Elizabeth Drew, the noted political commentator and journalist, in her book
Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption, after having cited a host of
anecdotal and circumstantial evidence of questionable (although, in many instances
perfectly legal under current campaign finance law) campaign finance activities
concludes:
The impact of the need for money on congressional behavior has been
dramatic. First, there is no question that we have a political system in
which politicians' access to money is vital and, in more cases than not,
decisive. ...Second, it is clear that the politicians' anxiety about having
access to enough money corrodes, and even corrupts the political
system. ...At the least politicians increasingly consider how their votes
will affect their own - and their opponents' - ability to raise money. At
worst, votes are actually traded for money. It is clear that we are at
some distance from the way the democratic process is supposed to
work.165
While there is only ambiguous empirical support for a charge of trading money for
votes, the fact that it is seen to occur at all is reason enough for concern. The

164 Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., "Should There Be Public Financing of Congressional
Campaigns?", The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
v.486, July 1986, p.71.
165 Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption. New York:
MacMillan Publishing, 1983, p. 146.
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principle argument raised by those who support public financing is that it would
restore a balance of interests in providing a more "democratic" means of campaign
finance. Wealth, and the inequities of its distribution, would no longer be allowed to
hold sway over either the accessibility of, the votes of, or the time and attention of,
elected representatives. In eliminating (or at least significantly reducing) the need for
politicians to engage a great deal of time and energy in the "money chase" in order to
finance their next re-election bids, the focus will instead turn to the real issues of
public business. The power of wealthy private campaign finance sources to affect
electoral or policy processes in their own best interests would be subjected to a more
democratic, egalitarian playing field. A guarantee of public campaign funds would
give members more time to spend actually legislating and keeping in touch with
constituents who may not happen to be wealthy contributors. Clawson, et al., quote
from one of only two PAC directors whom they interviewed166 who actually
supported the idea of publicly financed congressional campaigns:
I am looking to take off the back of the politician this terrible concern
he has of raising money. He [sic] spends too much time raising
money. He spends too much time thinking about raising money. And I
think if you turn around and gave him that time back - even if he didn't
use it for legislation - even if he used it to think- we'd all be better off.
When I first came to Washington as a kid, Congress wasn't in from
July through January. They closed up for the whole summer months.
These guys went home and got to see their people and thought a lot
more about what was going on, and they came back better people for
it. Now they have to spend all their time raising money. They have to

166 In conducting the research for their book Money Talks: Corporate PACs and
Political Influence, the authors interviewed key officials from every major kind of
corporate PAC. Officials of some 309 corporate PACs which made the largest
contributions in the period from 1957 to 1988 were included in the sample. For an
explanation of the sampling method employed see Clawson, et al., p. 14-17.
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spend all their time involved in enormous amounts of work that are
not productive.167
Members of Congress themselves recognize the veracity of that statement. As
former Senator Thomas Eagleton (D - MO) put it in testimony before the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration in 1983 hearings on campaign finance
proposals "What has changed. , is that money, always a necessary tool of waging a
campaign, has now become the be-all and end-all of the political campaign.
Fundraising has gone from a campaign ingredient to an all pervasive campaign
obsession. Senators start raising their war chest sometimes three or four years before
their reelection date." 168 Senator Robert Byrd (D- WV) states further: "To raise the
money, Senators start hosting fund-raisers years before they will next be in an
election. They all too often become fund-raisers first and legislators second."169 And
Senator David Boren points to the influence of money on the electoral process in
noting:
When we see the influence of money itself on the system, and we
realize that more and more people are being elected not on the basis of
their qualifications, not upon the strength of their character, not based
upon the ideas they have to confront America's needs, but based upon
which one can raise the most money, we know that something is
wrong...170
Even Senator Robert Dole (R -KS) recognized the inequities of wealth in securing
input to the policy process when he observed, "There aren't any Poor PACs or Food
Stamp PACs or Nutrition PACs or Medicare PACs."171

167 Clawson, et al., p.210-211.
168 Quoted in Mathias, p.67.
169 Senator Robert Byrd quoted in Wertheimer and Weiss Manes, p. 1133.
170 Quoted in Ibid., p.l 134.
171 Senator Dole quoted in Berry, p. 228.
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One of the most cogent and thorough presentations of major arguments in support
of public financing for all congressional elections is given by Jamin Raskin and John
Bonifaz in their contribution to the Columbia Law Review Symposium on Campaign
Finance Reform entitled "The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically Financed Elections."172 In their article, Raskin and Bonifaz present
compelling constitutional and practical arguments for adoption of a publicly funded
system of campaign finance. In the process of making those arguments, these authors
answer the criticisms raised by opponents of public financing and outline a plan of
public financing consistent with what they define as the essential criteria by which
either the current system of campaign finance, or any proposed publicly funded
system, ought to be judged.
Raskin and Bonifaz divide their six critical criteria into those (numbering three)
which are concerned with Constitutional issues of equality and democracy and those
of a more practical nature (again, numbering three) - concerned with overall costs and
the time and energy which public officials must devote to campaign fund-raising.
These authors enunciate the critical Constitutional questions, which must be
satisfactorily answered by any system of campaign finance, to be:
First, to what extent are all citizens meaningfully able to run for office
under each plan? ...Second, to what extent are all social groups fairly
represented in the ranks of candidates for public office, and to what
extent can all social groups exercise effective influence on the
political process as a whole? ...The third constitutional criterion asks:
to what extent is there meaningful democratic debate - substantive
dialogue among candidates and citizens about real problems
confronting society - during election campaigns, and to what extent
can each person meaningfully express herself [sic] in this process?173

172 Raskin and Bonifaz, supra note 71, p. 1160-1203.
173 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1167-68.
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Raskin and Bonifaz do not manufacture these criteria out of whole cloth but cite
legal precedents which buttress and support those choices. For instance, in choosing
the first constitutional criterion of meaningful candidacy being open to all citizens
regardless of wealth, the authors cite the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 decision in
Bullock v. Carter174 which held that a Texas filing fee system for potential
candidates which required payment of a high fee was unconstitutional in that
"potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent backers are in
every practical sense precluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no
matter how qualified they might be..."175 Raskin and Bonifaz state: "This case stands
for the principle that, in the modem American constitutional democracy, wealth - or
the lack of access to it - may not be used to prevent citizens from becoming
meaningful candidates for public office."176 These authors cite legal precedent from
which they construct the remaining two criteria as well. While one might quibble
with the interpretation which Raskin and Bonifaz give to the precedents they cite, one
can not be unimpressed with the organization and logic of their arguments.
The remaining three practical criteria are as follows:
The fourth criterion inquires into the extent to which each method
controls the overall social costs of political campaigns. By social costs,
we mean the amount of money that citizens pay - voluntarily or
involuntarily, directly or indirectly - to support the existence of a
particular system. ...The fifth criterion concerns the extent to which
"frivolous" candidacies are discouraged. ...Sixth and last, how much
time and energy do candidates, elected officials, and their staffs spend
raising money and reporting campaign contributions and
expenditures?177

174 405 U.S. 134(1972).
175 Id., at 143.
176 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1167.
177 Ibid., p. 1168-69.
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Here again, the criteria are both reasonable and relevant to the issues involved in
campaign finance regulation and reform. While others may want to add additional
considerations, it would seem that these six criteria certainly go a long way towards
providing the basis for analyzing and judging the relative merits of both the current
system of private campaign finance as well as a system of public funding. To the
degree that these six criteria are satisfied by either system, that system should be
judged desirable.
The following analysis of the current system of private campaign finance with
respect to the six criteria established by Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz parallels
their own analysis. It is presented here as a particularly cogent example of the kind
of qualitative policy analysis necessary to understand the complexities of the issues
inherent in comprehensive campaign finance reform proposals involving a
fundamental change in the way in which federal political campaigns ought to be
financed. It is an analysis to which the current author subscribes while making no
claim as to its origination in the current study.

An Analysis of Present System Desirability
Upon examination it becomes abundantly clear that the present system of private
finance is found wanting with respect to both constitutional and practical needs. It is
obvious to any observer that the exorbitant costs of modem day campaigns, and the
inequitable distribution of personal wealth, and access to wealthy contributory
sources, closes off the probability that all citizens are meaningfully able to run for
congressional office. The statistics are revealing:
A winning campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992
cost, on average, $543,000, and the average rose to $730,000 in what
can be deemed close races. Forty-three House candidates each spent
more than $1 million on his/her campaign in 1992. Meanwhile, a
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winning campaign for the U.S. Senate cost, on average, $3.9 million.
The top five Senate spenders in 1992 spent between $6 and $10
million. ... In 388 of 435 House races in 1992, the candidate who spent
the most money won. In the thirty-six Senate races, thirty-one of the
winners outspent their opponents, and twenty-four of them did so by a
margin of two-to-one or more.178
The amounts of money necessary to wage a meaningful campaign are huge,
making it virtually impossible to wage such a campaign with funds raised from small
contributors among the poor and working class segments of the population.
Consequently candidates must either enjoy great personal wealth or offer a platform
of issue positions which are consistent with the interests of those in control of the
available campaign wealth. Less than one percent of the nation’s population
contributed seventy-seven percent of the total of all campaign funds raised in the
1992 election cycle in individual contributions of $200 or more.179 Obviously, the
real sources of funding for political campaigns for Congress are an elite group of
moneyed individuals and PACs. There can be little doubt that those interests enjoy
an extraordinary disproportionate influence in the crucial electoral fundraising
process. It is this fundraising process which is determinative of meaningful
candidacy and to the extent that it is almost entirely controlled by an elite group of
wealthy interests, it is a process which inherently discriminates against the possibility
that all citizens are able to meaningfully compete.
In addition, the present system is designed to close off the possibility of being able
to compete meaningfully for elective office, not randomly, but to specific groups
among the less affluent of society. Since the present system is not open to the
likelihood of meaningful candidacy for the non-affluent, it is a logically consistent

178 Ibid., p. 1174-75. Statistics cited are from records of the Federal Election
Commission compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics.
179 Ibid., p.1177.
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conclusion that all social classes are not equally represented in the political
processes. The dominance of wealthy interests in the processes of American politics
is, perhaps, indicated by the growing disparities between rich and poor over the last
several decades. But, an even more telling bit of evidence is found in an examination
of the sources of campaign money. When one compares the financial
competitiveness of sources which seek to counterbalance the influence of wealthy
business and corporate interests, there is a stark contrast. "In 1990, business PAC
out-gave labor PACs by a ratio of almost three to one: $109 million to $37 million.
Environmental PACs gave $800,000, against the energy industry PACs' $12 million.
Defense industry PACs outspent peace PACs by $7.3 million to $340,000, a ratio of
22 to l."180
The exclusionary nature of the present system is also indicated by the levels of
voter apathy and pessimism among the poor and working class.181 The
responsiveness of the present system to the concerns and needs of the poor and
working classes is viewed by those groups quite pessimistically. The Institute for
Southern Studies has reported that there is "a strong correlation between voter
involvement and control of the influence of wealthy contributors. ... If political
leaders want to win back voter confidence, they must make access to the ballot easier
while reducing the access that lobbyists and wealthy contributors already have."182
Presumably that access extends to the policy process as well as ballot accessibility.

180 Ibid., p. 1180.
181 See, for instance, Jerry T. Jennings, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't. of
Commerce, Pub. No. P20-466, "Current Population Reports: Voting and Registration
in the Election of November 1992, (1993) p. 55-56. (reporting voting and registration
by family income).
182 Institute for Southern Studies, Press Release entitled "New Study Names 'Dismal
Dozen' for Poor Voter Tumout, Poor Laws," February 4, 1993, p. 1.
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It is apparent, as well, that inasmuch as wealth is a prerequisite for access to
legislators and to the crucial junctures of the policy process (at the subcommittee and
committee level) the less affluent are disadvantaged not only in their ability to
compete in the electoral arena but in their ability to influence the development of
public policy. This marginalization of all but the most wealthy in the electoral and
policy arenas has detrimental consequences for the breadth and quality of political
debate over substantive public issues. Clearly, a system which excludes effective
participation of the less affluent can not be inclusive of the broadest possible
spectrum of debate and political communication in either the electoral or the policy
process.
Evidence of the manner in which broad debate is subjugated in the current system
of campaign finance is revealed in the preemptory accumulation of massive
campaign fund war chests by incumbent officeholders which tends to discourage
competition and stifle debate. Clawson, et al., state: "Increasingly, incumbents use
money to win elections before voters get involved."183 Even when challenged, wellfinanced candidates can saturate the airwaves and other media with attack ads and
sound bites while opponents without substantial financial resources may be unable to
respond. The present system's lack of free television time and the inequalities of
resource distribution insure that those with the most money will dominate the debate.
Raskin and Bonifaz note: "The most substantive political discussion that takes place
today is probably that between candidates and the wealthy donors they must convince
to contribute to their campaigns; it is only in these encounters that the financial
discipline of the 'wealth primary' requires a thorough and frank exchange of
views."184
183 Clawson, et al., p.8.
184 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1183.
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Reviewing the way in which the present system of campaign finance works to
exclude rather than include as many groups as possible in the democratic processes,
reveals that the current system fails to adhere satisfactorily to the constitutional
criteria by which the desirability of any system of campaign finance should be
judged. It remains to ask how the present system fares when subjected to an analysis
of more practical criteria.
The fourth criterion by which a system of campaign finance ought to be judged,
according to Raskin and Bonifaz, is the social costs of the system. The current
system can be seen to be flawed in this regard in several respects. In addition to the
substantial direct costs associated with the current system - actual funds spent on
campaigns, costs of reporting and accounting for all receipts and expenditures, as
well as the costs of raising money - there are significant hidden costs which are the
result of legislative actions taken by members of Congress to benefit special interest
benefactors.
Part of the social cost of current campaign finance is the $693.5 million spent on
congressional campaigns in the 1994 election cycle. In addition, the budget of the
Federal Election Commission, put at $23.6 million in 1990, must be included in any
calculation of system costs. (Even this budget is woefully inadequate to the tasks the
Commission is charged to undertake. A Center for Responsive Politics study found
that, "...the FEC ended 1990 with the highest number of unresolved enforcement
cases in its history," 258 cases or 65 percent of its caseload.185)

185 Elizabeth Hedlund, Center for Responsive Politics, "Justice Delayed, Justice
Denied: The Federal Election Commission's Enforcement Record," Report #1, 1992.
Cited in Raskin and Bonifaz, footnote number 89, p. 1184.
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Numerous examples of special interest tax breaks can be cited to illustrate the
indirect costs which are absorbed by the taxpaying general public under the current
system. (Recall the examples of tax code loopholes discussed previously in this
study's analysis of PAC influence in the policy arena.) Perhaps one of the best, as
well as most recent, examples of special interest campaign contributions having a
significant effect on overall social costs is provided by the savings and loan crisis. In
what is unmistakably an instance of special interest money buying influence on
legislative decisions:
...the persistent behind-the-scenes intervention of five Senators on
behalf of Charles Keating, a campaign donor and the principal
stockholder of the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan, delayed the
shutdown and government takeover of that institution. That delay cost
the American taxpayer at least $1.3 billion. Despite the fact that
numerous savings and loan investors became rich in the 1980s with
constant legislative help, Congress has left the $500 billion tab for the
savings and loan bailout with the American people...186
An example of PAC influence in the policy arena and the "investment" nature of
PAC donations, with significant implications for social costs under the present
campaign finance system, is provided by Philip Stem who offers the following
calculation:
Because of the tax loopholes enacted by Congress over the years, a
single company (AT&T) was able to earn nearly $25 billion in profits
from 1982 through 1985 without paying one penny of taxes - in fact,
the government actually paid AT&T $635 million in tax rebates. The
company's tax savings totaled more than $12 billion. ...an officer or
director of AT&T might calculate that on the $12.1 billion tax savings
alone, the nearly $1.4 million given by the company's PAC netted a
return of 867,145 percent.187

186 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1185.
187 From Philip M. Stem, The Best Congress Money Can Buy. New York: Pantheon,
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One might also point out that there are additional opportunity costs associated
with public policy issues of general welfare importance - such as health care,
education, environmental concerns, etc - which are left unresolved due to the power
of the present system's private monied interests to forestall legislative progress.
Private wealth dominates the public agenda and its influence on the political
processes imposes indirect costs, as well as actual direct costs, onto the current
system of private campaign finance.
One of the arguments which is expressed by opponents of public financing is that
it would encourage (or at least not discourage) frivolous candidates for federal office.
In making public funds available for all federal candidates a system of public
financing would encourage candidates who had no chance of winning and who would
run just to receive the public funds for which they might be eligible. By implication,
the argument is that the current system does, in fact, discourage frivolous candidacies
and, as such, operates in the public interest in preventing such candidates from
fragmenting and "confusing"188 the electoral process.
The problem with this argument is that it makes a facile connection between
"seriousness" and the ability to raise money or between "seriousness" and private
wealth. The Supreme Court has determined that a candidate's wealth or ability to
raise funds was not to be considered in determining seriousness since its effect would
be to "exclude legitimate as well as frivolous candidates."189 The current system
continues, however to exclude not just frivolous poor candidates but serious poor
candidates as well. Raskin and Bonifaz see the current system as one in which:

1988, quoted in Clawson, et al., p.98.
188 The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Bullock v. Carter, held that frivolous
candidacies might "clog" the "election machinery" and cause "voter confusion". 405
U.S. 134 (1972) at 145.
189 Id. at 146.
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The equation of money with seriousness is pervasive: when poorer
candidates do try to run for office on a shoestring budget, they are
routinely ignored by the media on the grounds that they cannot be
"serious" candidates since they do not have enough money to compete
effectively. The flip side of this problem is that the current system is
ineffective at excluding frivolous candidates who happen to be
personally wealthy, or friendly with those who are.190
Clearly money is not a suitable measure for seriousness. Those who would argue
against public funding by touting the protection from a glut of frivolous candidacies
that the current system provides fail to define precisely who it is they are deeming
"frivolous." Furthermore, any serious plan for providing public funds to
congressional candidates requires those candidates to achieve a certain threshold
level of signatures before receiving ballot access and a threshold of "qualifying
contributions" before receiving federal funds. In this way "frivolous" candidacies are
weeded out in a much more equitable manner than under the current system.
The final practical criterion concerns the amount of time that officeholders and
candidates spend under either system raising funds and concentrating on their
election or reelection finances rather than devoting that time to an open and wideranging discussion of public issues or concentrating on actually legislating. Much has
already been discussed above about the amount of time currently spent by elected
officials in fund-raising activities and the effect it has on limiting their ability to
devote necessary time and energy to issues of public policy. One concern about
present system failure in this regard has not been addressed yet, that being the fact
that members of Congress chase all over the country because, as Clawson et al., put
it: "...reelection is more dependent on meetings with rich people two thousand miles

190 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1186.
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from home than it is on meetings with their own constituents."191 Time spent
chasing money for campaigns is time spent away from the home district and its
unique constituent concerns.
When then-Representative Thomas Daschle, D-S.D., was running for
the Senate in 1986, he journeyed to Los Angeles almost as regularly as
he visited Sioux Falls, the biggest city in his home state. In the two
years before the election...he flew to California more than 20 times to
meet with prospective contributors.192
The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates the deficiencies of the present system
of privately financed congressional campaigns. The current system fails to satisfy
constitutional criteria and practical needs by which the desirability of any system of
campaign finance ought to be judged. In the current system of private campaign
finance not all citizens are meaningfully able to run for public office or to access the
policy process to provide their input. The system is closed to groups without the
wealth to contribute to political campaigns, to become meaningful candidates
themselves, or to influence the political processes of government. In that whole
sectors of the population have become effectively marginalized in the current system,
the breadth and substance of debate and political communication has suffered. The
private campaign fund war chests of incumbent officials further discourages
competition and dialogue. The social costs of private financing, both direct and
indirect, are enormous as contributing interest groups seek and receive special tax
treatment, regulatory delays, and legal exemptions which end up costing taxpayers
vast sums over and above the more direct costs of campaign fund raising and
spending. The private campaign finance system discourages frivolous and legitimate

191 Clawson, et al., p. 9.
192 Quoted from "Money and Politics: A Special Report", National Journal, v. 22,
n.24, (June 16,1990), p. 1448, in Clawson et al., p.9.
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candidates alike; it discourages poor frivolous candidates but does not do likewise for
wealthy frivolous candidates. Finally, the current regime’s emphasis on fund-raising
absorbs vast amounts of legislators' time and attention which could be better spent on
the legitimate duties they were elected to perform. Because it is deeply flawed the
campaign finance system under which federal congressional campaigns are currently
conducted requires fundamental reform and replacement in order to rectify its
inequities and cure its ills.

The Desirability of Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns
In contrast to the current system of private campaign financing, a system of public
financing for all congressional campaigns is much more consistent with the criteria of
desirability established above. A plan of total public funding for all federal elections
(and, in time, quite possibly state and local elections as well) must be designed so
that all citizens would be able to run for public office if they so desired. It must
provide the opportunity for representatives of all social groups to serve in the ranks of
public officials and to provide their input in the political dialogue of the electoral and
policy processes. It must control the spiral of ever increasing direct campaign costs
and allow for greater control over the hidden social costs connected to inequities of
access to the policy process - opportunities for access must be equalized. A system of
public financing ought to be designed so as to deter frivolous candidacies and to
preserve the time and energy of elected public officials to do the work of legislating
rather than fund raising.
Various plans of public financing have been offered by proponents of the idea in
the debate over campaign finance reform. Many have attempted to incorporate
public financing within the existing system of private campaign financing as merely a
supplement to current financing mechanisms. However, it has been argued, herein
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and elsewhere, that piecemeal reform efforts within the confines of the present
regulatory system of private finance will not accomplish the goals of real reform.
Accordingly, a comprehensive system of public financing such as that put forward by
Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz193, or one advanced by Dan Clawson, Alan
Neustadtl, and Denise Scott194 is preferable.

A Blueprint for Public Financing
Public financing should be made available to candidates for the entire election
cycle - from primary to general election. Eligibility requirements would obligate
potential candidates to raise a significant number of small qualifying contributions
from within his/her election district before receiving public funds.195 Qualifying
contributions would serve as a legitimate measure of a candidate's "seriousness" in
that it can be seen as more indicative of the strength of his/her public support than
does a simple petition signature. Eligibility would be conditioned on a candidate's
pledge not to raise or spend any private money, or any personal funds, on the
campaign. Once eligibility has been established, a candidate ought to receive enough
public financing in order to compete effectively in the primary.

193 The proposal for full public financing which Raskin and Bonifaz espouse is
actually one originally proposed by the Working Group on Electoral Democracy, "an
association of grass roots activists and researchers who, for the past several years,
have been working to catalyze a new democracy movement in the United States". See
Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1189-1201.
194 Clawson, et al., p. 202-212.
195 Raskin and Bonifaz propose that candidates for the House of Representatives
would need to raise 1,000 five dollar contributions in order to become eligible for
public funding. Senate candidates from states with only one congressional district
would be required to raise 2,000 such small qualifying contributions with Senate
candidates from larger states would need to raise 2,000 of these contributions from
residents of the state at large plus additional qualifying funds from 250 contributors
in each of the state's congressional districts.
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Prior to the primary election period candidates would be permitted to raise a
limited amount of private "seed" money from private individuals or groups in
amounts of no more than $100 per donor.196 These funds could only be spent on the
start-up costs associated with raising the necessary qualifying contributions such as
hiring of workers or recruiting volunteers. These funds could not be spent for any
costs associated with the primary or general election campaigns.
Participation in the system of public financing would be strictly voluntary in order
to comply with the Supreme Court decision in Buckley. Any and all candidates
would be free to choose to opt for private financing - there would be no ban on PACs
or further restrictions on amounts they may contribute; present limits on private
contributions would continue - and thereby avoid the spending limits which would
accompany receipt of public funds (more about these spending limits later).
However, it is highly probable that most candidates would choose to participate in the
public financing plan because incentives for participation would be included in the
provisions of the system. Benefits of participation would include a substantial
decrease in time and cost associated with private fund-raising freeing candidates to
spend their time and energy actually campaigning among the voters, free media time,
and additional grants of public funds to candidates who faced excess expenditures by
privately financed candidates or massive independent expenditure campaigns.
These benefits are essential elements of any plan of public funding since they
provide the incentives for widespread candidate participation. As Clawson, et al.,
point out, in such a system of public financing:

196 An allowable aggregate amount of such seed money might be such that House
candidates could not exceed a $15,000 limit with Senate candidates allowed to raise
no more than $15,000 plus an additional $2,500 from each of the state's congressional
districts.
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Candidates would virtually all opt for public funding because
candidates using public financing are guaranteed that they will be able
to match their special-interest-financed opponents, thus undercutting
most of the reason for private fundraising. Although PACs and
individual donations would continue to be theoretically possible,
...candidates would not want that money because if they accepted it,
they would not be eligible for public financing, and private funding
would not enable them to outspend their opponents. Most candidates
find fundraising a miserable process, and all find that it takes time
away from campaigning. A candidate that relied on private financing
would face extra obstacles but gain no advantage.197
All candidates who fulfilled the eligibility requirements would receive equal
amounts of public financing for the primary campaign. This would include
candidates from both major parties as well as any independent candidates who had
met the eligibility threshold. Raskin and Bonifaz suggest that primary campaigns
receive $100,000 for House candidates with Senate candidates receiving $100,000
plus an additional $50,000 for each congressional district in the state.198 Clawson, et
al., on the other hand would vary the amounts of public funds available in primary
elections depending on whether or not the candidate was an incumbent. In their
proposal Clawson, et al., would provide $50,000 in public funds to incumbent House
members' primary campaigns while allowing non-incumbents to receive $75,000 in
such funds. The same kind of variation in incumbent/non-incumbent amounts would
pertain to Senate primary campaigns with the actual total amounts also varying from
state to state depending on population. Clawson, et al., reason that this is more
equitable since incumbents start with a significant name recognition advantage in
their own party's primary and therefore do not need to spend as much as non

197 Clawson, et al., p.207.
198 See Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1192.
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incumbents who do not enjoy the advantages of incumbency.199 Primary candidates
would be eligible to receive additional public funds to match any excess spending by
opposition candidates who opted to finance their campaigns privately, thus limiting
any possible financial advantage which might be gained by choosing private
financing over public financing.
In the new system of public financing, primaries would be both a mechanism for
selection of a party's candidate for the general election and a means by which third
party or independent candidates could qualify for general election public financing.
If an independent or third party candidate received twenty percent of the total primary
vote, he/she would become eligible for full public financing in the general election.
The winners of the Democratic and Republican primaries would automatically
become eligible for full general election funding. Candidates of parties which had
received between five and twenty percent would receive proportional general election
funding. Raskin and Bonifaz suggest that the amounts available to general election
candidates be $150,000 for House races and $150,000 plus $75,000 for each state
congressional district for Senate candidates.200
Candidates who opted to receive public funding in either the primary or general
election campaigns would be enjoined from spending more than the total of their
publicly allocated funds. Although it has been empirically demonstrated and argued
previously in this study that spending limits would hamper the competitiveness of
challengers in races for congressional office, the analysis of those spending limits
was done within the parameters and dynamics of private campaign finance. Professor
Jacobson's analysis of possible effects of public funding on the competitiveness of
1972, 1974, and 1976 congressional races which may have occurred had public
199 See Clawson, et al., p.212.
200 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1192.
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financing been in effect for those years, may or may not have been borne out in actual
fact. His study necessarily fails to consider (and quantity) what effects full public
financing would have on the entire dynamics of campaign spending (for incumbents
and challengers alike) from the beginnings of an election cycle to its completion. In
the present system the problem for challengers is that they can often not raise
sufficient funds early enough in the cycle from private sources to mount a credible
challenge to well financed incumbents.
Any reform of campaign finance must seek to increase the number of competitive
races. Studies such as that done by Gary Jacobson have indicated that the problem of
competitiveness is not overspending by incumbents but underspending by
challengers. Challengers must be able to spend enough money to get their campaign
exposed to voters. Indications are that challengers who are able to raise enough
money under the current system to do that usually run very competitive races. The
problem is, as has been illustrated earlier in this study, that private wealthy
contributors tend to pattern their giving toward incumbents (recall the earlier analysis
of PAC donation patterns). Incumbents have little difficulty securing private
financing under the current system while challengers have a distinct comparative
disadvantage in this regard under current campaign finance processes. Incumbents,
and other candidates, who are able to build up early financial "war chests" under
current campaign finance practices, effectively stymie meaningful competition. The
evidence shows that challengers who find themselves at a drastic disadvantage with
respect to fundraising and spending rarely offer real competition to well financed
incumbents. Clawson, et al., cite relevant statistics in support of this argument:
In 1988, in better than four out of five races (81.4 percent), one
candidate spent more than twice as much as the other. Only 3.2
percent of these races were competitive (that is, decided by margins of
ten points or less, for example 55 percent to 45 percent). In the
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remaining one out of five races the underfinanced candidate had at
least half as much money as the funding leader. A much higher
proportion of these races was competitive - about four out of ten (31.9
percent), if challengers have enough money to make their case, they
have a chance to make the race competitive. Therefore, a reform
proposal needs to ensure adequate funding for challengers.201
In a system of full public funding, instead of the incumbent enjoying a three to one
advantage over the challenger202, the two candidates would have equal amounts to
spend. Incumbents would therefore spend less and challengers more than at present.
By providing a readily accessible source of early funds for challengers to mount
meaningful campaigns, and by restricting the ability of incumbents to amass
preventive war chests of privately donated funds, competitiveness would surely be
enhanced under a new system of publicly financed congressional campaigns.
Provisions in a new system of publicly financed campaigns which allow for
candidates to receive additional public funds to match privately financed candidates'
excess expenditures, or to match opposition independent expenditures, are crucial to
the success of any scheme of voluntary public financing. Raskin and Bonifaz, and
Clawson, et al., recognize the vital nature of such provisions; the former authors
would permit publicly financed candidates to receive funds to match the excess
expenditures of privately financed candidates up to 300 percent of their original
amount of public funds. The same would be true for those candidates who found
themselves to be the targets of independent expenditures.203 Raskin and Bonifaz
point out the value of this guarantee of matching public funds in achieving the goal of
limiting the influence of private wealth in the processes of democracy by noting:

201 Clawson, et al., p.203.
202 Clawson, et al., report that in 1988 the incumbents spending advantage was 3.2 to
1, while in the Senate it was 2.1 to 1. Clawson, et al., p.247, endnote #19, referred to
on p.205.
203 Raskin and Bonifaz, p. 1198-99.
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Since this system would be voluntary, candidates could still choose to
participate in the wealth primary [the author's euphemism for the
present system] raising large amounts of money from private donors.
Yet, privately financed candidates would know that while they spent
time competing in the wealth primary, their publicly financed
opponents would be meeting the voters and would be guaranteed an
increase of up to 300 percent of their original funding, if necessary, to
match the private fundraising process. Through this provision, the
attractions of the wealth primary would fade, both for the privately
financed candidate and for the large donors.204
This provision guarantees that candidates who accept public financing can not be
outspent by their opponents (unless those opponents spent 300 percent more). No
candidate could gain an advantage, as happens in the current system, by outfundraising his or her opponent.
The proposal for full public funding issued by Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz
would include provisions for what they refer to as "campaign scholarships" - an
additional grant of money to means-qualified poorer candidates that would "enable
them to support themselves and their families while they ran for public office."205
The rationale behind such a provision is to further open up the process to poor and
working class people who otherwise would forego the chance to become a candidate,
and venture out into the hustings, because of the economic hardship it would entail
for themselves and their families.
Additionally, these same authors would propose mandatory participation by all
publicly financed candidates in broadcast debates in order to further the goal of
substantive political dialogue. The air time for these debates would be required to be

204 Ibid., p.1199.
205 Ibid., p. 1194. The authors would set the amount of such scholarships not to
exceed $2,000 per month with an additional $500 per month for each dependent.

207

donated by television and radio broadcast stations as a condition of their licenses.206
Citing a relevant Supreme Court ruling as precedent (Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 1977), the authors state that it is likely that the Court would accept the debate
requirement as an acceptable condition of receipt of public campaign funds. Their
proposal would also require that broadcast stations make free media time available to
candidates above and beyond that already donated for broadcasting public debates.207
As such, the substantial sums currently spent on campaign media would be
significantly reduced and candidates would be able to concentrate their spending in
other critical areas.
That media advertising costs consume a significant portion of current campaign
finances is indisputable. Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris, in analyzing campaign
expenditures in 1990 congressional races, found that media advertising costs
amounted to 22.5 percent of all expenditures in House races, while those expenses for
Senate races amounted to 33.3 percent of all campaign expenditures.208 The extent
to which those costs are reduced by an extension of free media time to candidates
who qualify for public funds, will provide even further incentive for candidates to
join the plan, since those who might opt for private financing would have to pay for
those hefty media costs from their own resources.
Regarding administration and enforcement of a system of total public financing,
Raskin and Bonifaz would rest such authority in the hands of a strengthened Federal
Election Commission. The FEC would have a much easier time with its enforcement
duties insofar as most candidates would opt for public financing (for reasons outlined

206 Ibid., p.1195.
207 See Ibid., p. 1196-97 for the details of such provisions.
208 Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris, Handbook of Campaign Spending: Money in the
1990 Congressional Races. Washington D C.: Working Group on Electoral
Democracy, 1992, p.8-9.
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above), thereby alleviating much of the load of private campaign finance regulation
which the Commission currently oversees, and the system of public financing itself
would be so much more easily administered.
Qualified candidates would receive not money but credit [italics in
original] from a federal account established by the FEC. Such a credit
line would help prevent misuse of the public funds allocated to each
candidate. The treasurer for each campaign would be issued a special
FEC credit card with which to make campaign purchases and pay bills.
The law would prohibit payments by cash or check for any campaign
expenses.209
While provision has been made for dealing with independent expenditures within
the proposal for full public funding of all congressional campaigns, implementation
of such a system would require that certain minor changes be made in other facets of
allowable optional private financing. Foremost among those is a ban on soft money
contributions by private individuals and PACs. If these loopholes were allowed to
remain open, they might surely be used to undercut the limitations on public
financing expenditures. PACs and wealthy individuals who found themselves on the
outside of any new plan for public financing would likely seek to retain their access
to, and influence within, the political system by channeling enormous contributions to
existing soft money loopholes which allow unlimited contributions for "party
building" activities and the like. These loopholes often serve as convenient vehicles
for circumventing current contribution limitations and, absent their closure in a
system of public funding, would likely become even more abused than at present.
"Bundling", should also be outlawed as it would allow for corruption of the
qualifying process of eligibility for public funds by large organizations which could
make a concerted effort to collect from their members the required number of small

209 Ibid., p.1200.
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qualifying contributions and to offer them to a candidate en masse. Bundling
activities by PACs, if allowed to continue, would thus serve the access interests of
wealthy contributors and would lend a degree of legitimacy to a practice clearly
designed to circumvent private finance contribution limitations.
Before dealing with an assessment of the public cost of such a system of public
financing of all congressional campaigns, a word or two about the current tax
checkoff procedure of raising public financing funds is in order. Any proposal for
extension of public financing to all congressional campaigns ought not to envision
that adequate funds can be obtained through this peculiar mechanism. As
demonstrated above (Figure 3), experience with this system has indicated a lack of
public enthusiasm for voluntary checkoff schemes. Opponents of public financing
like to point to this fact as evidence of the public's disdain for the idea of public
financing altogether. Yet, the question might fairly be asked if any expenditure of
government funds (public taxpayer money) would engender widespread voluntary
support if it were subjected to a checkoff procedure for authorization. Clawson, et
al., state the point quite clearly:
The voluntary checkoff system is extraordinary and, in our opinion,
intended to subvert public financing. The wording on the tax form
makes it appear that the taxpayers must pay an extra dollar, when, in
fact, checking the box does not raise your taxes. Nothing [italics in
original] else the government funds depends on voluntary checkoffs. If
the B-2 relied exclusively on taxpayers voluntarily designating money,
how many bombers would we build? We propose that public financing
of elections be paid for the same way everything else is - out of
general revenues. Let voluntary tax checkoffs be used for the savings
and loan bailout.210

210 Clawson, et al., p.207.
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Raskin and Bonifaz estimate the cost of their comprehensive public funding plan
to be approximately $500 million per year. This would amount to an average of five
dollars per taxpayer per year.211 The levels of public financing would be indexed
with inflation so the total dollar figure would fluctuate in any given year. This figure,
which many might consider an extraordinarily high price to pay, must be put into
proper perspective. First, it is considerably less than the $693.5 million spent by
congressional candidates in the 1994 election cycle. It is also quite a bit less than the
price tag for one B-2 bomber - $865 million.212 It is not unfair to consider the cost of
public financing in light of the $500 billion price tag of cleaning up the savings and
loan debacle - much of which can be traced to congressional accessibility (through
campaign contributions) by powerful and wealthy savings and loan PACs.
It can also be argued that a system of public financing actually saves money by
making it possible to eliminate many special-interest privileges obtained through
private financing accessibility to the crucial stages of policy development. We have
already seen many examples of the way in which the present system ends up costing
much more than the direct costs of actual campaign expenditures. Elizabeth Drew
has written: "The costs are everywhere - throughout the tax code and the federal
budget. They turn up in everything from the Pentagon budget to medical bills. In
effect, as we go about our daily lives, buying food, gasoline, and medicine, and as we
pay our taxes, we are paying for the current system of financing campaigns."213

211 For a detailed explanation of the manner in which the cost estimate was
calculated see the extensive footnote #142, p.1200-1201 in Raskin and Bonifaz.
212 Figure is from Clawson, et al., p.206.
213 Drew, p.156.
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Clawson, et al., provide one final example of present system special interest
privilege which can serve to put estimates of the cost of full public funding for
congressional campaigns into perspective:
...in 1955 corporations paid 27.3 percent of all federal taxes, but in
1989 they paid only 11.0 percent. The reduced contributions by
corporations meant that individuals had to pay more. Total federal tax
revenue in 1898 was $975 billion. If corporations had paid the same
share of taxes in 1989 as in 1955, they would have paid an additional
$159 billion, enough in that one year to provide public financing for
both House and Senate general elections for more than 300 years.214
The costs of the current system, both direct and indirect, are enormous; the cost of
extending full public funding to all congressional campaigns is small by comparison
and would represent a huge savings in the not too distant future.

Analysis of the Desirability of a System of Full Public Financing
If the proposed system of public financing is submitted to the same kind of
analysis, based on the same set of criteria that was used above in analyzing the
desirability of the current system of private campaign funding, it is found to be
markedly superior. Recalling the six criteria forjudging the desirability of any
system of campaign finance, the following conclusions regarding a system of full
public financing are reached:
•

First, a public financing system would open up the possibility that all citizens,
regardless of wealth would have an opportunity to run for elective office. Rather
than having to gather hundreds of thousands of dollars from special interests and
wealthy individual contributors, potential candidates would need only to gather
the required qualifying contributions from within their election districts.

214 Clawson, et al., p.206.
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•

Second, the "campaign scholarships" would make it doubly possible for
candidates with limited personal wealth to run for public office. Because such
scholarships would be based entirely on need, they would be issued only to the
poorest candidates. The combination of scholarships, which alleviate the
economic hardships of taking time out of work to run for public office, and
elimination of the necessity of constant fundraising makes it much more likely
that all social groups would be fairly represented in the ranks of candidates for
public office. The current system's exclusion of political candidates without great
personal wealth, the time to spend in endless fundraising activities, or access to
wealthy private funding sources - along with that system's structural bias in
governmental policy development would be eliminated.

•

Third, a proliferation of new voices in the nation's political discussions, both in
the electoral and policy processes, would inevitably result from an extension of
financial campaign resources to qualifying candidates regardless of personal
wealth or class status. The requirement that all publicly financed candidates
participate in broadcast debates would greatly enhance the quality of substantive
political dialogue. Free media time would allow for a more thoughtful
presentation of candidate positions on substantive issues rather than the current
system's over-reliance on the economically efficient (but nearly meaningless)
"sound bites", slogans and platitudes.

•

Fourth, many of the current system's direct costs would fall dramatically under
public financing. Fundraising expenses would be virtually eliminated (except for
the initial expenses incurred as start-up costs for gathering the required qualifying
contributions). Media costs would decline in the wake of free time provisions.
The hidden costs of privately subsidized elections - special interest giveaways, tax
breaks, subsidies, corporate bailouts, and regulatory exemptions - can only be
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addressed by eliminating the current system of campaign finance and replacing it
with a system of full public funding. The $500 million per election cycle price
tag seems a small price to pay when compared to the billions of dollars lost as a
result of current system inequities. Serious public policy issues which are
currently left unresolved because of the pervasive (and inequitable) access to the
policy process enjoyed by monied interests, impose additional, not as easily
quantifiable, social costs on the American public. The degree to which that
policy process is opened up by eliminating the stranglehold on the means to
election (money) which wealthy individual and corporate interests have, the more
likely it is that those social costs can be ameliorated.
•

Fifth, in terms of deterring frivolous candidacies, the qualifying contributions by
which candidates become eligible for full public financing, is a much more
equitable mechanism of deterrence than that which exists under the current
system. The present reliance on a candidate's fundraising ability or personal
wealth as an indication of seriousness is invalid and unfair. The present system
only declares poor candidates to be frivolous; not so wealthy ones, regardless of
"seriousness." Insofar as citizens from within a given candidate's home district
would be making a determination as to that candidate's "frivolousness" through
the mechanism of the numerous required small qualifying contributions, it is
vastly superior to large wealthy donors (often from out of state) being allowed to
make such a determination.

•

Finally, a plan of full public funding would free up the time and energy of elected
officials, and their staffs, away from the incessant (and in the current context
indispensable) drive of fundraising and direct it toward more thoughtful
consideration of the merits of particular pieces of legislation. Legislation would
likely be judged, and voted on, on the basis of its merits as desirable public policy
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and not any calculation (however minor) of its impact on sources of campaign
funding. Candidates (incumbents and challengers alike) could spend more of
their campaign hours communicating with home district voters and not talking to
out of state wealthy contributors. Additionally, all of the countless hours which
the present regulatory system requires be spent on recording and reporting all
campaign contributions and expenditures would be saved. All campaign
expenditures would be public and all would be paid for via the FEC credit card
which would vastly simplify the administrative and enforcement tasks of the FEC.
In short, a system of full public financing of congressional campaigns is found to
be highly desirable when judged by the standards of the constitutional and practical
criteria set forth above. It is clear that the present regulatory system of private
campaign finance can not be deemed preferable by any of those same criteria.
Indeed, nothing short of a complete replacement of the current regulatory model of
campaign finance with full public financing will satisfy these constitutional and
practical demands.
The Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments were intended to reform
a campaign finance system which was seen as having been so corrupted that the
integrity of America's political processes was being increasingly called into question.
Watergate revelations, and other revealed instances of campaign finance scandal
involving undisclosed large donations by wealthy "fat cats" were perceived as
threatening the workings of democracy. What the current system of private campaign
finance established by the FECA has lacked has been a commitment to a
constitutional and practical design to keep the processes of democracy open and
flexible rather than rigid and exclusionary.

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
This study began with a history of campaign finance reform efforts throughout the
last two decades. That history was revealing in its illumination of the complexities of
the issues involved in campaign finance reform. Yet, out of that complex of issues
certain key areas of discussion and dispute became evident. The present study sought
to analyze three major issues of the ongoing campaign finance reform debate which
have consistently been the focus of substantive reform proposals: (1) Spending limits
for federal campaigns - whether as a freestanding proposal or in conjunction with
public financing plans, (2) Limitations, or an outright ban on all political action
committees, and (3) Public financing of congressional campaigns, either partially or
fully. Additionally, this study sought to empirically determine the impacts of the
present system of private campaign finance and to examine the desirability of further
comprehensive reform.
Although this study determined that spending limits, in and of themselves, might
well have an adverse impact on electoral competition by undermining the needs of
challengers to raise and spend large sums to effectively compete against advantaged
incumbents (as critics of such a proposal contend), that finding is tempered by the
realization that it has been arrived at within the context of present system private
campaign finance. A replacement of the current system with a system of full public
financing for all congressional campaigns would most certainly alter the fundamental
dynamics of campaign spending. Incumbents would be prevented from amassing
early campaign "war chests" which, under the current system, can effectively stymie
meaningful challenger campaigns. In a system of full public financing, with
215
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concomitant free media time and virtually no fundraising costs, challengers would
receive and spend more than at present, while incumbents would spend less. In the
context of full public financing spending limits might well enhance electoral
competition rather than restrict it. In any case, no definitive answer can be had to the
question of spending ceiling effects in a system of full public financing until it can be
empirically assessed following implementation of such a plan.
In examining the rationale behind proposals either to further restrict, or ban
altogether, political action committees, no empirical support whatsoever was found
regarding a cause and effect relationship (or even a simple correlation) between PAC
donations themselves and election results. While the correlation between total
spending and election results may have been significant, PAC contributions as merely
a part (albeit a substantial part) of total spending were found to be statistically
insignificant with respect to their effect upon election results.
Yet, an ambiguity of findings with respect to any legislative quid pro quo
exchange of money for votes is discovered when one examines various empirical
studies done by political scientists and others. The current study analyzed two Senate
floor votes in which the nature of the issues involved - highly visible, politically
partisan, and ideologically divisive - seemed to preclude any finding of correlation or
causal relationship between PAC monies and floor votes. However, the fact that, in
some instances, under certain circumstances (low issue visibility, absence of partisan
conflict, little saliency for constituents, etc.), a statistically significant causal
relationship between PAC donations and floor votes on specific pieces of legislation
has been indicated, (e.g. Frendreis and Waterman, Davis, Neustadtl) is cause for
some concern. But, what may present cause for even greater concern was the degree
to which PAC money, and other private wealth, opens up the doors of access to both
the electoral and policy processes at critical junctures. Clearly candidates who can
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amass sufficient campaign resources from wealthy private sources (their own funds
or those of others) early on in the process are distinctly advantaged in accessing the
electoral processes. Wealthy interest groups and their PACs enjoy the same
advantages in being able to access critical junctures in the process of policy
development. Those individuals or groups which by virtue of their wealth alone are
afforded access to the electoral and policy processes enjoy distinct advantages of
"undue access" and the possibility of exerting, if not "undue" certainly inequitable
influence on the political processes. The present system's overreliance on requiring
that candidates and interest groups amass enough private funding to access
effectively these democratic processes is inherently anti-democratic.
This study analyzed both the current system of private campaign finance and a
blueprint for full public financing of all congressional campaigns in the context of six
constitutional and practical criteria, developed by Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, by
which the desirability of any system of campaign finance ought to be judged. In each
specific instance, by the standards of each criterion, the present system of private
finance was found wanting and the desirability of full public financing was made
evident. The costs of a system providing full public funding for all congressional
campaigns were examined in the light of current system costs, both direct and
indirect, those easily gathered and those well hidden, and the conclusion was reached
that full public financing is preferable, even from a cost standpoint, to the present
system. Full public financing of all congressional campaigns is what this study
recommends as the logical and most equitable next step in comprehensive campaign
finance reform.
Still, the current political rhetoric which pervades the issue of the cost of
providing public subsidies for political campaigns, as well as the underlying
consequences of replacing a system which provides significant advantages to
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powerful wealthy interests with one which would level the playing field, threaten to
undermine any real probability that full public financing could ever be enacted. Such
a system would eliminate or drastically reduce the impact of special interest money,
and would improve the competitiveness of federal elections. As such, it is very likely
that present members of Congress, political parties, corporate interests, moneyed
interest groups and wealthy individual donors would vigorously oppose its adoption.
Dick Cheney, former Republican congressman from Wyoming, and President Bush's
Secretary of Defense has offered a memorable remark on this point: "If you think this
Congress, or any other, is going to set up a system where someone can run against
them on equal terms at government expense, you're smoking something you can't buy
at the comer drugstore."215
The partisan political machinations which have pervaded campaign finance
reform proposals from the outset continue to the present day. That President
Clinton's reform package went down to defeat in the final session of the 103rd
Congress was not at all surprising given the political calculations and partisan
posturing which has consistently occurred throughout all campaign finance reform
efforts.
That the 1970s saw the last successful piece of legislation dealing substantively
with how American political campaigns would be financed is testament to the
uniqueness of that era. The extent to which Watergate propelled much of the most
significant reform action cannot, perhaps be overestimated. While the initial FECA
was passed before Watergate became an issue, the most substantive changes in
campaign finance reform law were enacted in the amendments which followed in
1974, 1976 and 1979. Watergate seemed to so crystallize and simplify what was
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Quoted in Clawson, et al., p.213.
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wrong with American campaign finance that it became relatively easy to forge a
consensus that something indeed had to be done about it. With that consensus
transcending partisan political boundaries, FECA was enacted and amended in that
"decade of campaign finance reform."
But, since that decade, numerous attempts to reform further the way in which
American campaigns are financed have been frustrated by politics. Democrats have
called for spending limits and partial public financing, in part because they may have
implicitly recognized the arguments of many that such limits might amount to a form
of incumbent protection from strong competitive challengers. Partial public funding
would provide the financially strapped Democratic party with a way to supplement
meager (in comparison to Republicans) party candidate treasuries. With their
congressional majorities devastated in the 1994 elections, one might well ask if those
same Democrats will be so quick to offer support for spending limits now that they
have been put in the position of challengers rather than incumbents. Will public
financing continue to hold Democratic support in the event that the opportunity arises
in the near future to vote on its implementation? That opportunity may not soon be
forthcoming as campaign finance reform seems to have evaporated from the national
agenda in the wake of GOP congressional majorities.
Republicans have always been philosophically opposed to most reform efforts
seeing them as just another attempt to impose government regulation on the workings
of the political marketplace. They further argue that contributions to political
campaigns by individuals and interest groups is a fundamental form of political
participation and, as such, ought not to be either regulated or enjoined. From that
perspective Republicans have traditionally viewed spending limits as amounting to
incumbent protection and had, therefore, been opposed to such limits when faced
with what appeared to be entrenched Democratic congressional majorities. Whether
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the GOP will remain so unalterably opposed given their new majority status remains
to be seen. The GOP has also been opposed to any form of public financing of
congressional campaigns, in part because they didn't need the money and wished to
hold on to their financial advantage under current campaign finance practice (The
GOP retains a distinct fundraising advantage over the Democratic party under current
private campaign finance.), and, in part because they view such public subsidies as
being both fiscally irresponsible in an era of budget deficits and as simply amounting
to a form of "welfare for politicians" which would engender government control of
what should remain free political exercise. It is very likely, given this philosophical
bent, that Republican opposition to public financing will continue.
The only proposal which Republicans in the past have supported was that which
sought to ban all corporate, labor, and trade association political action committees.
Perhaps the motivation to support such a PAC ban came out of a review of PAC
donation patterns which heavily favored incumbent Democrats. Now that the
advantages of incumbency with respect to PAC donations favors the GOP, will that
opposition to PAC activity continue to hold Republican allegiance?
On June 11,1995, President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, and the Republican Speaker
of the House, Newt Gingrich, appearing jointly at a "town hall" question and answer
meeting in Claremont, New Hampshire, agreed to form a blue-ribbon commission to
study the issues of campaign finance reform and, presumably, to issue
recommendations on what ought to be done by way of further reform. The purpose
of the proposed commission forum is to attempt to study the issues devoid of partisan
politics. But like Wilson's "politics and administration dichotomy" any attempt to
separate politics and campaign finance reform may be naive and doomed to fail. For
as Frank Sorauf, in his most recent of a number of writings on the subject of
campaign finance reform has noted:
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...the politics of campaign finance has a number of special
characteristics. It is...a politics centered in a broader politics of
representation and, therefore, a politics of politics. Naturally, it is a
politics to which the members of Congress are enormously sensitive,
for it is the politics of their reelection and political careers. It is also a
politics that is almost pure populism, driven by mass fears, mass
opinion, and mass voting, a politics easily inflamed whether by
somber editorialists or by the demagogues of the radio talk shows. It is
a politics that looks not at a member of Congress's legislative record
but at personal qualities and political styles. And it is a politics
complicated and heightened by the fact that the members of Congress
legislate about themselves, by the fact that self-interest is central to the
policies they choose.216
And so it is likely to continue, blue ribbon commission or not. Politics is what
campaign finance reform is all about.

216 Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1992, p.244-45.

APPENDIX 1
MULTIPLE REGRESSION - EXPENDITURES AND CHALLENGER VOTE
PERCENTAGES

THE ESTIMATED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
b 0 = 36.92181859
b 1 =0.03884016
b 2 = -0.00289945
b3 = 0.00583831
b 4 = 0.00039279
b 5 = -0.11355940
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE = 6.55844
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 0) = 2.13039
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 1) = 0.00821
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 2) = 0.00713
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 3) = 1.32973
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 4) = 0.00019
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 5) = 0.04118

COMPUTED T 0 = 17.33099
COMPUTED T 1 = 4.73325
COMPUTED T 2 = -0.40673
COMPUTED T 3 = 0.00439
COMPUTED T 4 = 2.11640
COMPUTED T 5 = -2.75731

COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION (R SQUARED) = 0.30967
COEFFICIENT OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION (R) = 0.55648
COEFF. OF DETERMINATION CORRECTED FOR D. F. = 0.27372
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.07498

ANOVA TABLE
SOURCE OF VARIATION_____________O E _______ M ^ .
SSR
1852.317792
5
370.463558
SSE
4129.260640
96
43.013132
SST
F RATIO

5981.578432

101

8.6128
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Fig,4 Residuals u, Chall. predicted of uote
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Fig. 4 Residuals v. Chall. predicted % of vote

29,89

37,37

44,84

52,32

APPENDIX 2
MULTIPLE REGRESSION - EXPENDITURES AND INCUMBENT VOTE
PERCENTAGES

THE ESTIMATED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
b 0 = 62.89479049
b 1 =-0.03937381
b 2 = -0.00097533
b 3 = 0.04434274
b 4 = -0.00054415
b 5 = 0.08551600
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE = 7.12529
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 0) = 2.31453 COMPUTED T 0 = 27.17395
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 1) = 0.00892 COMPUTED T 1 =-4.41655
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 2) = 0.00774 COMPUTED T 2 = -0.12593
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 3) = 1.44466 COMPUTED T 3 = 0.03069
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 4) = 0.00020 COMPUTED T 4 = -2.69873
STANDARD ERROR OF (b 5) = 0.04474 COMPUTED T 5 = 1.91121
COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION (R SQUARED) = 0.28643
COEFFICIENT OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION (R) =
0.53520
COEFF. OF DETERMINATION CORRECTED FOR D.F. = 0.24927
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.17809

ANQVA TABLE
SOURCE OF VARIATION
S.S.
SSR
1956.450188
SSE
4873.902754

D.F._____MJL
5
391.290038
96
50.769820

SST

101

F RATIO

6830.352942
7.7071
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APPENDIX 3
CORRF.I.ATION AND RF.GRESSION - PAC DOLLARS AND VOTE
PERCENTAGES

Correlations:

PERCENT

PAC$

PERCENT
PAC$

1.0000
.3906**

.3906**
1.0000
1-tailed significance: * - .01

N of cases : 356

** - .001

REGRESSION
Dependent Variable.. . PERCENT
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error

PERCENT OF VOTE RECEIVED

.39058
.15255
.15016
15.39954

Analysis of Variance
Regression
Residual
F = 63.72561

Sum of Squares
15112.27009
83949.67092

DF
1
354

Mean Square
15112.27009
237.14596

Significance F = .0000

95% C.I. B

Variable_______ B__ ________ SE.B

__________ Beta

PAC$
3.442686E-05 4.31261E-06 2.594529E-05 4.290842E-05 .390581
(Constant) 43.162139
1.088161
41.022067
45.302212
.................in................
Variable__________ I __________ Si.g. T
PAC$
7.983
.0000
(Constant)
39.665
.0000

226

APPENDIX 4

CRQSSTABS - PAC DOLLARS AND CLOTURE VOTES
I. Campaign Finance Reform Cloture Vote (FINCLOT) by PAC Contributions
collapsed into categories (PAC$)
CHI- SQUARE____________VALUE
5.11057
Pearson
6.27542
Likelihood Ratio
.05373
Mantel-Haenzel test for
linear association

DF________SIGNIFICANCE
9
.82457
.71207
9
.81669
1

Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.416
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 13 of 20 (65%)
VALUE
STATISTIC
.23963
Phi
.23963
Cramer's V
Contin. Coeff
.23303
Lambda
(FINCLOT dependent) .11905
.00878
Kendall's Tau-b
.01161
Kendall's Tau-c
.01323
Gamma
Somer's D
(FINCLOT dependent) .00662
-.02471
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation .01016

ASE1

T-VALUE___ APPROX. SIGNIF,
.82457
.82457
.82457

.15643
.09166
.12118
.13798

.71634
.09585
.09585
.09585

.06911
.10415
.10602

.09585
-.23055
.09479

.81820
.92470

II. Lobby Reform Cloture Vote (LOBRE) by PAC Contributions collapsed into
categories (PAC$)
CHI-SQUARE_________VALUE____DF___SIGNIFICANCE
9
.25932
Pearson
11.24446
.18078
12.61578
9
Likelihood Ratio
1
.75101
Mantel-Haenszel test for .10068
linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.416
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 12 of 20 (60%)
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STATISTIC
Phi
Cramer's V
Contin. Coeff.
Lambda
(LOBRE dependent)
Kendall's Tau-b
Kendall's Tau-c
Gamma
Somer's D
(LOBRE dependent)
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation

VALUE
.35545
.35545
.33492

ASE1

.26190
.06175
.08181
.09184

.12102
.09149
.12110
.13581

1.89654
.67555
.67555
.67555

.04646
.03383
.07153

.06891
.10496
.10590

.67555
.31568
.66886

T-VALUE

APPROX SIGNIF
.25932
.25932
.25932

.75300
.50536

III. Campaign Finance Reform Cloture Vote (FINCLOT) by Party Identification
(PARTY)
CHI-SQUARE__________VALUE_______DF____SIGNIFICANCE
Pearson
63.32923
1
.00000
Likelihood Ratio
74.81355
1
.00000
Mantel-Haenszel test for 62.61767
1
.00000
linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency -18.404
STATISTIC__________VALUE
Phi
.84354
.84354
Cramer's V
Contin. Coeff.
.64478
Lambda
(FINCLOT dependent) .83333
.84354
Kendall's Tau-b
.83575
Kendall's Tau-c
.98806
Gamma
Somer's D
(FINCLOT dependent) .84872
.84354
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation .84354

ASE1____ T-VALUE___ APPROX. SIGNIF
.00000
.00000
.00000
.06070
.05615
.05867
.01027

6.96720
14.24516
14.24516
14.24516

.05520
.05615
.05615

14.24516
14.65016
14.65016

.00000
.00000
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IV. Lobby Reform Cloture Vote (LOBRE) by Party Identification (PARTY)
CHI-SQUARE_______ VALUE_______ DF
Pearson
36.34606
1
Likelihood Ratio
39.26305
1
Mantel-Haenszel test for 35.93768
1
linear association

SIGNIFICANCE
.00000
.00000
.00000

Minimum Expected Frequency - 18.876
STATISTIC
Phi
Cramer's V
Contin. Coeff.
Lambda
(LOBRE dependent)
Kendall's Tau-b
Kendall's Tau-c
Gamma
Somer's D
(LOBRE dependent)
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation

VALUE
.63905
.63905
.53848

ASE1

T- VALUE

.61905
.63905
.63477
.90889

.09294
.08161
.08198
.04836

4.56742
7.74297
7.74297
7.74297

.08167
.08161
.08161

7.74297
7.74949
7.74949

.64133
.63905
.63905

APPROX. SIGNIF.
.00000
.00000
.00000

.00000
.00000

V. Cloture votes of Senators up for reelection and and their PAC contributions
Statistics___________ FINCLOT values
LOBRE values
Pearson
5.0744 8DF Sig.-.74959
7.8661 8DF Sig.-.44666
Phi
.48027
Sig.- .74959
.59795
Sig.-.44666
Cramer's V
.48027
Sig.-.74959
.59795
Sig.-.44666
Kendall's Tau-b
-.05241
T-value (-.2964)
-.12821 T-value (-.7039)
Kendall's Tau-c
-.06612
T-value (-.2964) -.23481 T-value (-.7039)
Gamma
-.08163
T-value (-.2964) -.19231 T-value (-.7039)
Pearson's R
-.17117 T =-. 7769 Sig.-.4463
-.17069 T = -.7747 Sig.-.4476
Spearman Corr. -.06019 T = -.2697 Sig.-.7902
-.14723 'r = -.6657 Sig.-.5132
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